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INTRODUCTION
Among the greatest threats to global security is the slaughter of civil-
ians. This is due to the inconsistent reaction of the international commu-
nity to genocide and other atrocity crimes. Whether it was the slaughter of
hundreds of thousands of Armenians in Turkey in 19152 or Rwandan Tut-
sis in 1994,3 mass murderers act with impunity when there is not a forceful
response. Contrast these situations to Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia
in 1978 that put an end to the Khmer Rouge’s nightmarish killing fields,4
or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in Ko-
sovo in 1999 that protected ethnic Albanians from Serb brutality.5 Even
though atrocities like these have been the hallmark of oppressive regimes
throughout recorded history, they continue today in places like Syria
partly as a result of the uncertain legality of the use of force to respond to
these crimes. Strict interpretation of state sovereignty and the United Na-
tion’s monopoly on authorizing force significantly limit effective response
measures, allowing grotesque human rights violations to continue. In or-
der to break the atrocity cycle, states must have the authority to use force
to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes when the United Nations fails to
act.
2. See discussion infra note 36. R
3. See discussion infra note 50. R
4. See discussion infra note 45. R






      10/10/2013   11:12:26
34040-mil_34-4 Sheet No. 41 Side A      10/10/2013   11:12:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\34-4\MIL402.txt unknown Seq: 3 10-OCT-13 10:01
Summer 2013] Humanity and National Security 747
A new strategy, led by the United States, is emerging in response to
atrocity crimes.6 The doctrine of Mass Atrocity Response Operations
(MARO)7 is developing as a result of several high-level reports and strate-
gic publications highlighting the urgent need for more effective measures.8
Further support came on August 4, 2011, when President Barack Obama
issued a presidential directive to create an interagency “Atrocities Preven-
tion Board.”9 This interagency body is tasked with coordinating a govern-
ment wide approach to preventing mass atrocities.10 Of the many possible
actions that can be taken to prevent atrocity crimes, military action—
noncombat or outright intervention—must be included as a key element
to deter and suppress violence. Still, due to the uncertain legality of inter-
vention to halt atrocities, the new U.S. strategy could have a short life span
largely due to inflexible interpretations of the U.N. Charter’s prohibition
on the use of force and traditional notions of state sovereignty.
Until now, scholarship has failed to address the application of MARO
when there is no U.N. authorization. This article proposes that the United
States take the lead in developing a new norm allowing states to intervene
to protect civilians from atrocity crimes when multilateral institutions fail
to act. This can be accomplished in two complimentary ways. First, the
United States should engage the world community—the United Nations,
states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the public, and the me-
dia—in a discursive process challenging the failure of the status quo to
effectively stop the next Rwanda. Highlighting the institutional and practi-
cal ineffectiveness of the current legal regime will demonstrate that atroc-
ity prevention is a global and state priority in need of a new normative
standard.
Second, during the interpretive phase of a positive norm, like-minded
states should work together to respond to mass atrocities with force if nec-
essary and use the developing norm as the basis for intervention. Instead
of waiting for global consensus on the positive law, which may never oc-
cur, this approach contributes to the gradual development of a customary
6. See SARAH SEWALL ET AL., MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS: A MILI-
TARY PLANNING HANDBOOK 97 (2010) [hereinafter MARO HANDBOOK].
7. Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) are the future of U.S. military ini-
tiatives to halt mass murders. The military intervention of MARO is a subset of atrocity
response measures falling under the full spectrum of Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response
Operations (MAPRO), which include diplomacy, intelligence gathering, economic, and other
measures to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes. See id.
8. See MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT & WILLIAM S. COHEN, PREVENTING GENOCIDE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS (2008) [hereinafter GENOCIDE REPORT]; MARO
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 23. R
9. Directive on Creation of an Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board and Corre-
sponding Interagency Review, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter
Presidential Directive]. The Atrocities Prevention Board was formally activated in April
2012. See President Obama Announces Creation of Atrocities Prevention Board, HUM. RTS.
FIRST (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/04/23/president-obama-announ
ces-creation-of-atrocities-prevention-board/.
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norm—even when violating the U.N. Charter’s provisions.11 Genocidal re-
gimes do not wait for an effective international legal framework, and
neither should those who seek to prevent another Holocaust.
Preexisting barriers to developing a norm of this nature are breaking
down. The traditional pillar of world order—state sovereignty—has been
eroded since the drafting of the U.N. Charter. A robust human rights
framework makes individuals, not just states, proper subjects of interna-
tional law.12 Additionally, the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
now places the focus on states and their ability to prevent civilians from
being subjected to large-scale atrocities.13 This concept, adopted by every
state at the 2005 World Summit,14 suggests that sovereignty is now contin-
gent on a state’s ability to protect its civilians from these crimes.
Nonetheless, many remain concerned that powerful states will use hu-
manitarian justifications as pretext for political aims. Some states are fear-
ful that a right to intervene in response to atrocity crimes will usher in a
new era of imperialism, with stronger states annexing vulnerable neigh-
bors.15 Similarly, scholars suggest that permitting the use of force beyond
the U.N. framework will cause a breakdown in world order.16
Responding to these claims, this Article emphasizes that the unilateral
use of force in response to mass atrocities remains a last resort. Leaders do
not face an all-or-nothing choice when deciding which actions are best
suited to respond to genocide and other atrocity crimes.17 But when the
diplomatic, economic, and multilateral options prove insufficient, there
must be a framework in place that applies MARO doctrine in a principled,
accountable manner in adherence with the rule of law. Therefore, this Ar-
ticle proposes six threshold conditions for the application of MARO: (1)
an objective threat assessment of atrocity crimes is conducted prior to in-
tervention, (2) the intervention is necessary to prevent or halt the atroci-
ties, (3) the scale and nature of the intervention is proportional to the
threat to civilians, (4) intervening states have coordinated with regional
actors and coalition partners, (5) the intervening states regularly update
the United Nations about the situation, and (6) the intervening states con-
duct advanced planning for post-atrocity or jus post bellum contingency
efforts prior to the intervention. Applying these six conditions will contrib-
ute to the responsible development of atrocity response without U.N. au-
thorization and persuade uncertain states that intervention should not
only be justified, but lawful as well.
This article is the first scholarly work to analyze the legal framework
governing the emerging MARO doctrine and should serve as a guide for
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.
13. See discussion infra Part II.D.
14. See discussion infra Part III.A.
15. See discussion infra Part III.D.
16. See discussion infra p. 263.
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policy makers and military personnel when planning atrocity prevention
and response measures. Part I of this article discusses the history of atroc-
ity crimes, the legal framework in place to prevent massive human rights
violations, and the viability of modern enforcement measures such as hu-
manitarian intervention, R2P, and MARO. The uncertain state of the law
governing atrocity response is examined in detail in Part II, revealing an
overly restrictive interpretation of the U.N. Charter’s general prohibition
on the use of force, antiquated political notions of sovereignty, and nonle-
gal considerations such as moral justifications that must be taken into ac-
count. Part III urges policy makers to enter into a discursive process,
domestically and abroad, that supports a developing norm allowing state
action when multilateral efforts fail. This Part also demonstrates the na-
tional and global interests at stake when atrocities arise, and dispels con-
cerns that this norm will be used as pretext for states’ political agendas.
Finally, Part IV proposes and analyzes six threshold conditions that clearly
define the parameters of unilateral MARO and appropriately limit the
scope of intervention based on legal, moral, and political considerations.
Throughout the Article, the situation in Syria is analyzed to demonstrate
both the failure of historical approaches to atrocity crimes and the viability
of the six-part threshold analysis proposed in Part IV.
I. HISTORY OF MASS ATROCITIES: PREVENTATIVE
AND RESPONSE MEASURES
Humanity remains unwilling and unable to take effective measures to
prevent the slaughter of innocent civilians. Although the plague of mass
murder has existed since the beginning of recorded history, even today
world leaders have no cure. In a 2009 U.N. Report, Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon stated that
the brutal legacy of the twentieth century speaks bitterly and
graphically of the profound failures of individual States to live up
to their most basic and compelling responsibilities, as well as the
collective inadequacies of international institutions.18
Today, the world community is at odds over prevention and response
strategies, which consist of bilateral diplomacy, multilateral efforts at the
United Nations, humanitarian intervention, or the application of the con-
cept of R2P. This Part details a brief history of atrocity crimes, early
(failed) steps to prevent them, and the current plans for operations to pre-
vent and respond to the next atrocity, including the development of U.S.
MARO doctrine.
A. History of Violence: Atrocity Crimes Through the Centuries
Many centuries before there was a name for these crimes, slaughtering
civilians was considered business as usual for regime elites and conquering
18. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the
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armies.19 As used in this Article, “atrocity crimes” and “mass atrocities”
refer to any large-scale brutality against civilians, by a state or a non-state
group, including the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, large-
scale war crimes, and the concept of ethnic cleansing.20 In order to com-
prehend these gruesome acts, it is helpful to first understand the scope of
atrocities committed by brutal regimes. Initially, one must recognize that
aggressive war is not, as some suggest, the crime of all crimes.21 In fact, the
number of victims of government murder greatly exceeds the numbers of
international war related deaths.22 Professor R.J. Rummel estimates that
in all of the international wars between 30 B.C.E. and 1900 C.E., as many
as 40,457,000 were killed.23 This is less than one-third of the estimated
133,147,000 civilians killed at the hands of governments.24 But numbers
alone are not sufficient to properly understand the nature of these acts.
19. See MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 95-96. Professor David Scheffer cites five R
characteristics of atrocity crimes, which are: (1) must be of significant magnitude (“substanti-
ality test”), (2) may or may not be international and occur in time of war or peace, (3) must
be identifiable as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing, (4) must
have been led by a ruling or otherwise powerful elite in society, and (5) individuals may be
held responsible for the crime. David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to
Protect, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 111, 118 (2008).Atrocity crimes do not cover combat
fatalities or even civilian casualties directly related to combat operations, i.e., collateral dam-
age. Other terms previously used to define offenses committed by governments against civil-
ians include politicide (“[T]he murder of any person or people by a government because of
their politics or for political purposes,”), mass murder (“[T]he indiscriminate killing of any
person or people by a government,”), and democide (“[T]he murder of any person or people
by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.”). R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH
BY GOVERNMENT 31 (1994).
20. See MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 95. For the purposes of this article, I R
make reference interchangeably to mass murder, civilian slaughter, and massacre, all of
which are references to the more formal “atrocity crimes” and “mass atrocities.”
21. See INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, One Hundredth and Eighty-Ninth Day, Monday,
29 July 1946, in 19 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 530, 562 (1948), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/
NT_Vol-XIX.pdf (closing remarks of French prosecutor, Champetier de Ribes, recognizing
genocide as the “greatest crime of all.”).
22. RUMMEL, supra note 19, tbl.1.6, at 15. Rummel includes in his definition of war R
deaths the killing of soldiers by lawful means, the collateral death of civilians during an oth-
erwise lawful use of force, as well as battle-related disease and famine. Id. At 40-41. Al-
though governments are not the only groups capable of atrocity crimes, they are the most
common culprits. Non-state actors, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army or al Qaeda, also
commit atrocity crimes in numerous territories.
23. Id. tbl.3.1, at 70 (noting that this number is likely inflated due to concurrent civil-
ian slaughter not related to combat).
24. Id. at 69, 71 (noting that it is impossible to accurately reflect the total number of
civilians murdered by government or government agents, but that this modest estimate is
only a small fraction of those deaths resulting from atrocity crimes prior to the twentieth
century). Approximating civilian deaths at the hands of tyrants is not an exact science and
various studies result in different casualty rates. See Robert I. Rotberg, Deterring Mass
Atrocity Crimes: The Cause of Our Era, in MASS ATROCITY CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTURE
OUTRAGES, 1, 22 n.2 (Robert I. Rotberg, ed., 2010)(providing a significantly lower estimate
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Whether it was the Hebrews of the Old Testament,25 ancient Assyrians,26
or the Roman Empire,27 mass murder was common practice throughout
history and was often part of the strategy of conquerors.28 In the Common
Era, Christian crusaders29 and the Mongol Khans30 contributed to the suf-
fering of millions. But atrocities were not limited to combat and con-
quest.31 European settlers of the Americas,32 as well as five centuries of
the African slave trade,33 caused the death of millions.
The carnage of the twentieth century serves as a reminder that atrocity
crimes are not a relic of the ancient past. The wholesale slaughter of civil-
ians by governments, not including war deaths, approached 170 million.34
This is four times the number of war-related casualties in the same period
and greater than the estimated total of mass murders from all previous
centuries.35
25. It is recorded in the Old Testament that Hebrews slaughtered men, women, and
children of the Amalekites and Midianites. See 1 Samuel 15:2-3; Numbers 31:7-18; see also
ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 4-5 (2006).
26. Among the most infamously bloody of the ancient regimes were the Assyrians,
whose soldiers were rewarded for every severed head brought in from the field, “whether
enemy fighters or not.” RUMMEL, supra note 19, at 45-46; see also JONES, supra note 25, at 5. R
27. After Rome sacked Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War in 46 B.C.E., some
150,000 civilians perished when the city was razed. JONES, supra note 25, at 5. R
28. Even in classical literature, atrocity crimes were recognized as part of business as
usual. In Homer’s ILIAD, Agamemnon states:
So soft, dear brother, why? Why such concern for enemies? I suppose you got such
tender loving care at home from the Trojans. Ah would to god not one of them
could escape his sudden plunging death beneath our hands! No baby boy still in his
mother’s belly, not even he escape—all Ilium blotted out, no tears for their lives,
no markers for their graves!
HOMER, THE ILIAD bk. 6, at 197, ll. 63-70 (Robert Fagles trans., 1990).
29. Some estimate that when Christian crusaders sacked Jerusalem in 1099, some
40,000 to 70,000 inhabitants were butchered. RUMMEL, supra note 19, at 47. R
30. During the reign of terror of the Mongul Khans and their successors, their forces
“slaughtered around 30 million Persian, Arab, Hindu, Russian, Chinese, European, and other
men, women and children.” Id. at 51.
31. Id. at 46.
32. During the course of European colonization of the Americas, it is estimated that
anywhere between two million and fifteen million Native Americans (in both North and
South America) were eradicated, not including deaths related to disease or war. Id. at 59.
33. The African slave trade by Europeans, Arabs, Asians, and African traders resulted
in the death of at least 17 million Africans. Id. at 48.
34. Id. at 4 tbl.1.2.
35. Rummel estimates that 169,198,000 civilians were murdered by governments in the
twentieth century through 1987, compared with an estimated figure of deaths caused by war
during the same period of 34,021,000 people. Id. at 15 tbl.1.6. This, of course, does not ac-
count for those murdered after 1987, including Serbia’s attempted ethnic cleansing of two
hundred thousand in Bosnia and Kosovo, Charles Taylor’s atrocities in Sierra Leone and
Liberia resulting in 1.3 million murdered, over eight hundred thousand Rwandan Tutsi elimi-
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The Armenian genocide by the Young Turk Government prior to the
First World War is widely recognized as one of the first genocides of the
twentieth century,36 and is noteworthy for several reasons. Not only does
modern day Turkey deny that this atrocity occurred,37 but this particular
massacre would later be cited as an example of impunity for other atrocity
crimes.38 To make matters worse, the world community knew of the Ar-
menian genocide while it was occurring and failed to act.39 This sort of
willful blindness is just one part of the cycle of atrocity crimes—a dismay-
ing pattern of inaction that persists today.40 Moreover, this inaction was
encouraged by common views of sovereignty at the time. Then U.S. Secre-
tary of State Robert Lansing said of the Turkish atrocities, “The essence of
sovereignty [is] the absence of responsibility.”41 As discussed in more de-
tail below, remnants of this logic remain an impediment to atrocity pre-
vention efforts today.42
The atrocities that followed are a tale of unmitigated human suffering.
The worst of the mass murdering states were the Soviet Union (62 million
victims from 1917-1987), communist China (35 million victims from 1949-
perhaps five million killed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and approxi-
mately three hundred thousand murdered in Darfur. ROTBERG, supra note 24, at 1. R
36. The Young Turk Government attempted to exterminate every Armenian in the
country and nearly succeeded by massacring approximately 1.9 out of 2 million Turkish
Armenians. RUMMEL, supra note 19, at 209. R
37. French Genocide Bill Angers Turkey, BBC NEWS (December 20, 2011), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16261816.
38. In a meeting with his military chiefs, Adolph Hitler demonstrated what he learned
from the Young Turks’ atrocities. He asked, “Who today still speaks of the massacre of the
Armenians?” SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 23 (2002) (citing an August 22, 1939 meeting with military chiefs in Ober-
salzburg). Josef Stalin would also learn that atrocities are not remembered in history. He
asked, “Who’s going to remember all this riff-raff in ten or twenty years’ time? No one. Who
remembers now the names of the boyars Ivan the Terrible got rid of? No one.” Id. at 23 n.16.
39. In January 1915, Turkish interior minister Mehmet Talaat was quoted in the New
York Times as saying, “there was no room for Christians in Turkey.” POWER, supra note 38, R
at 2, 5. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, Sr. sent a cable to Washington on
July 10, 1915, describing how Turkish authorities engaged in “rape, pillage, and murder, turn-
ing into massacre, to bring destruction [to the Armenians].” Id. at 6.
40. Samantha Power decries U.S. inaction in the following passage:
Time and again the U.S. government would be reluctant to cast aside its neutrality and for-
mally denounce a fellow state for its atrocities. Time and again though U.S. officials would
learn that huge numbers of civilians were being slaughtered, the impact of this knowledge
would be blunted by their uncertainty about the facts and their rationalization that a firmer
U.S. stand would make little difference. Time and again American assumptions and policies
would be contested by Americans in the field closest to the slaughter, who would try to stir
the imaginations of their political superiors. And time and again these advocates would fail to
sway Washington.
Id. at 13-14. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of government inaction and willful
blindness, see infra Part IV.B-C.
41. POWER, supra note 38, at 14; see also GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF R
VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 125-29 (2001).
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1987), Nazi Germany (21 million victims from 1933-1945), and Chiang
Kai-Shek’s nationalist China (10 million victims from 1928-1949).43 Fol-
lowing these mass murders were several cases in the 1970s: 1.5 million
Bengali civilians slaughtered by Pakistani forces in 1971,44 2 million
Cambodians massacred by the Khmer Rouge from 1975-78,45 and
Idi Amin’s murder of 300,000 Ugandans in 1979.46 When the Cold War
ended, it was hoped in the 1990s that power politics would give way
to greater international cooperation and usher in an era of peace
and prosperity. Multilateral institutions indeed flourished, but were
still incapable of preventing atrocities in Iraq,47 Liberia and Sierra
43. RUMMEL, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.1.2. These rounded figures include civilians mur- R
dered by all forms of atrocity crimes, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder. These
numbers do not include the war dead. Rummel notes, “These are most probable mid-esti-
mates in low to high ranges.” Id.
44. In 1971, India intervened in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), putting a halt to the
slaughter of 1.5 million Bengali civilians by the Pakistan government. Don Hubert, The Re-
sponsibility to Protect: Preventing and Halting Crimes Against Humanity, in MASS ATROCITY
CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES, supra note 24, at 89, 90; RUMMEL, supra note 19, R
at 315-16; see also Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of
Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 276 (1973) (concluding
that India’s intervention to halt Pakistan’s human rights violations did not establish a unilat-
eral right of humanitarian intervention). Although India’s intervention halted Pakistan’s
crimes, India justified its intervention on self-defense, not humanitarian, grounds. See U.N.
SCOR, 1606th mtg. at 32-33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1606 (Dec. 4, 1971); U.N. SCOR, 1608th mtg. at
27-28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1608 (Dec. 6, 1971); U.N. SCOR, 1611th mtg. at 7-14, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.1611 (Dec. 12, 1971).
45. The communist Khmer Rouge—among the most gruesomely effective of the 20th
Century’s mass-murdering regimes—killed more than 2 million of its 7 million inhabitants
from 1975-1978, before Vietnam intervened and put an end to the worst of the atrocities.
Rotberg, supra note 24, at 1; RUMMEL, supra note 19, at 159-61. Vietnam was reacting to R
Cambodian incursions into its territory, and so its intervention was based on self-defense, not
humanitarian purposes. Still, the humanitarian effects are readily apparent by the end of the
Khmer Rouge’s murderous rampage. Hubert, supra note 44, at 90. R
46. Following Idi Amin’s murderous rampage of 300,000 of his fellow Ugandans, RUM-
MEL, supra note 19, at 93-94, Tanzania intervened in 1979 to remove him from power, Hu- R
bert, supra note 44, at 90. R
47. Shortly after the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s brutal treatment of Iraqi Kurds
and the oppressive crackdown of a Shia uprising, led to the enforcement of no fly zones in
Northern and Southern Iraq respectively by U.S.-led coalitions. See SEAN D. MURPHY, HU-
MANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 165-98
(1996); MICHAEL P. SCHARF & GREGORY S. MCNEAL, SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING
AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 59 (2006) (describing how the 1991 crimes by
Hussein’s regime are only one in a long line of atrocity crimes committed against Iraqi civil-
ians. Hussein was accused of “ordering the slaughter of some 5,000 Kurds with chemical gas
in Halabja in 1988 [and] killing or deporting more than 200,000 Northern Iraqi Kurds during
the Anfal campaign in the 1980s . . . .”). Saddam was also responsible for slaughtering 8,000
Kurds of the Barzani clan in 1983. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Events Leading to the Creation of the
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Leone,48 Bosnia and Kosovo,49 and Rwanda.50
Today, in spite of reports indicating that armed conflict is on the de-
cline,51 atrocities continue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) (some 5 million killed),52 Darfur (some 300,000 killed),53 and Syria
(approximately 100,000 civilians killed as of summer 2013),54 just to name
a few. That these situations are occurring in the twenty-first century
clearly indicates that the global community has yet to implement an effec-
tive strategy to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes.
B. Global Failure to Prevent Mass Atrocities
Following the Second World War, the global community has taken
great strides in developing a legal regime that prohibits and responds to
atrocity crimes. These include the peaceful ordering of states through the
United Nations, the continued development of humanitarian law, the
emergence of human rights law, and more recently, the revival of interna-
tional criminal law. In spite of these efforts, and as the previous Section’s
account of modern atrocities makes clear, an effective solution remains
elusive.
According to the Genocide Task Force Report, “There is no consensus
as to the causes of genocide and mass atrocities, nor is there one com-
monly agreed upon theory that sufficiently explains the key catalysts,
motivations, or mechanisms that lead to them.”55 Nonetheless, atrocity
48. The infamous warlord Charles Taylor, now on trial in The Hague, was responsible
for the massacre of 1.3 million civilians in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Rotberg, supra note 24, R
at 1, 10-11.
49. Serbian atrocities claimed the lives of 200,000 Bosnians and Kosovo Albanians. Id.
at 1.
50. 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi were slaughtered in the genocide by the ethnic majority
Hutu. Id.
51. See HUMAN SEC. REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2009/2010: THE
CAUSES OF PEACE AND THE SHRINKING COSTS OF WAR 1-10 (2010), available at http://www
.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx. See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE
BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE (2011) (suggesting that we may be living in the most
peaceful era in world history).
52. Rotberg, supra note 24, at 1. R
53. Id.
54. Opposition presses for weapons as Syria Death Toll tops 100,000, CNN (July 26,
2013 5:59 AM) http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/25/world/meast/syria-violence; Syria Deaths Near
100,000 says UN – and 6,000 are children, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 13, 2013 4:17 PM) http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/13/death-toll-syrian-conflict-93000. According to an inde-
pendent U.N. commission, Syrian forces have committed “widespread, systematic, and gross
human rights violations.” Rep. of the Independent Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic, para. 2, delivered to the General Assembly Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HCR/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Report on the Syrian Arab Republic], available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-
19-69_en.pdf.
55. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at xxii. But see Power Point: Gregory Stanton, R
The Eight Stages of Genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH (2007), available at www.genocidewatch
.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html (describing the common stages of genocide and
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crimes in a temporal context can be viewed in three overlapping periods.
Prior to the twentieth century, mass slaughter of civilian populations was
business as usual for brutal regimes. Then, following the Peace of West-
phalia in 1648, and today enshrined in the U.N. Charter, the concept of
state sovereignty served as a shield for barbaric acts within a state.56 Dur-
ing this time, even though most theological and political traditions prohib-
ited war-time atrocities,57 civilians were murdered at alarming rates during
times of war and peace.58 It was not until 1944, when Raphael Lemkin
defined the term genocide, that humanity entered a third phase—the de-
velopment of the modern legal framework to punish and prevent atrocity
crimes.59 Lemkin, outraged that sovereignty could mean “the right to kill
millions of innocent people,”60 worked tirelessly until the Genocide Con-
vention became law in 1948.61 The sovereignty shield was losing its luster,
and states now had a responsibility to prevent or punish genocide.62
In 1945, the United Nations was established in order to “save suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of war.”63 In furtherance of conflict
prevention, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) is authorized under Chap-
ter VII of the Charter to maintain peace and security. Initially understood
as regulating only international armed conflict, this authorization is now
widely understood to extend to internal human rights violations and atroc-
ity crimes.64 Despite this authority, states failed early on to take advantage
56. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 42. R
57. Rotberg, supra note 24, at 2. For a detailed discussion of ancient traditions, see R
MURPHY, supra note 47, at 35-42. R
58. See discussion supra Part II.A.
59. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (1944). For a detailed dis-
cussion of the tireless efforts of Raphael Lemkin to put a name to the worst crimes known to
man, see POWER, supra note 38, at 17-60; Henry T. King, Jr., et al., Origins of the Genocide R
Convention, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L 13, 14-34 (2008).
60. POWER, supra note 38, at 19. R
61. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
62. Id. art. I.
63. U.N. Charter pmbl.
64. See SUSAN BREAU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS &
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 238 (2005). The U.N. authorization for intervention in Rhode-
sia in 1966 marked the first time the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) treated an internal
human rights situation as a “threat to the peace” and paved the way for future Chapter VII
actions—ranging from sanctions to the use of force—in matters that would otherwise have
been treated as internal to the state and protected from U.N. involvement under article 2(7)
of the Charter. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 117-18. The first time the UNSC authorized armed R
intervention in an internal conflict after the Cold War was in Somalia in 1992. S.C. Res. 794,
¶10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992); see also W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Vic-
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of the United Nation’s atrocity response capabilities, which set a prece-
dent for practice today.65
For example, the UNSC has rarely authorized a Chapter VII action
against a state targeting its own citizens.66 In fact, some suggest that the
United Nations has never relied upon Article 42 the way the drafters in-
tended,67 depriving the Security Council of a tool that would allow it
greater flexibility to utilize armed forces to maintain peace and security.68
In order to give effect to this provision, Article 43 of the Charter envi-
sioned a standing U.N. security force that could be deployed to crisis situa-
tions.69 But this provision is contingent on member states providing
standing forces to be utilized by the UNSC. Because the necessary state
agreements were never reached under Article 43, the United Nations has
never exercised its Article 42 authority as intended.70 As a result, one of
the United Nations’ most promising atrocity prevention tools remains
dormant.71
Additionally, the entire U.N. system is premised on consensus-based
decision making by the UNSC for the collective good, not for the political
self-interests of states. When good faith consensus building broke down in
the early days of the Charter system as a result of Cold War power politics,
the entire organization failed to function properly.72
Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted in 1962 that
“the Security Council [cannot be said to be] impotent in the face of an
emergency situation when agreements under Article 43 have not been
concluded,”73 other U.N. enforcement measures, ranging from sanctions
65. Russia and China are partly responsible for this result, since, as some have pointed
out, they tend to block UNSC actions that could set a precedent, which might someday re-
quire them to account for their own human rights violations. See Rotberg, supra note 24, at 7. R
66. The intervention in Libya in 2011 was the first time the UNSC authorized enforce-
ment action (non-peacekeeping) to protect civilians. S.C. Res 1973, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
67. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 304-07 (4th ed. 2005).
68. U.N. Charter art. 42.
69. Id. art. 43. See also, Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Great Power Security, 10
CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2009).
70. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 304-07 (4th ed. 2005).
71. But see NEWT GINGRICH & GEORGE MITCHELL, AMERICAN INTERESTS AND UN
REFORM: REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS 28 (2005)
(stating that “the United Nations must create a rapid reaction capability among UN member-
states that can identify and act on threats before they fully develop.”).
72. W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Coercion and Self-Determination: Con-
struing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 642, 643 (1984). Reisman argues elsewhere,
“Only in the most exceptional cases will the United Nations be capable of functioning as an
international enforcer; in the vast majority of cases, the conflicting interests of diverse public
order systems will block any action.” W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 850 (1971).
73. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Para. 2, of the Charter), Advi-
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to peacekeeping forces,74 are not demonstrably more effective at protect-
ing civilians.75 Failed peacekeeping missions in places like Somalia, Bos-
nia, and Rwanda are often used to illustrate the shortcomings of the
United Nations to effectively respond to complex crisis situations.76 These
missions, however, are inherently limited because they are premised on
host state consent and are not permitted to take military action against a
state.77 This necessarily means that peacekeeping missions are not ori-
ented to halting atrocity crimes, but rather to facilitate a political resolu-
tion to ongoing conflicts—a separate and distinct goal.78 Gaining the
consent of the host government means the United Nations is required to
negotiate the mandate of peacekeepers with leaders that may be complicit
in, or primarily responsible for, ongoing atrocity crimes.79
74. The UNSC adopted numerous resolutions in the post-Cold War era that cite a
threat to the peace, impose sanctions, or authorize coercive enforcement measures. DIN-
STEIN, supra note 70, at 300-04. Many of these relate to situations of atrocity crimes, but R
cannot be said to have consistently reduced the threat of further atrocities. See infra note 78. R
75. Although peacekeeping missions attempted to protect civilians during the mid-
1990s, the U.N. Security Council recognized the authority to take action to protect civilians in
1999. S.C. Res. 1265, ¶10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (Sept. 17, 1999). The United Nations au-
thorized a peacekeeping mission for the express purpose of protection of civilians in Sierra
Leone in 1999. S.C. Res. 1270, ¶14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999). According to one
study, the United Nations and experts “continue to struggle with what it means for a
peacekeeping operation to protect civilians, in theory and practice.” VICTORIA HOLT ET AL.,
PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN THE CONTEXT OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: SUCCESSES,
SETBACKS, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 18 (2009).
76. See John Norton Moore, Introduction to the Reprint Edition, in LAW AND CIVIL
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD vii, x (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) (discussing the failure of
Belgium, the United States, France and others to support an effective U.N. effort to stop the
Rwandan genocide); see also HOLT ET AL., supra note 75, at 2-3 (analyzing deficiencies in the R
ability of U.N. peacekeeping missions to protect civilians). Efforts were made at the United
Nations to determine where the failures lie in the process. Two reports, one on the failure at
Srebrenica and the other on the lack of will in Rwanda, demonstrated that there was a need
to re-evaluate the ability to intervene in the event of humanitarian crises. The Srebrenica
report urged that atrocity crimes “must be met decisively with all necessary means,” and
criticized the “pervasive ambivalence within the [United Nations] regarding the use of force
in the pursuit of peace” and “an ideology of impartiality even when confronted with at-
tempted genocide.” U.N. Secretary-General, The Fall of Srebrenica, ¶¶502, 505, U.N. DOC.
A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999). The independent inquiry into Rwanda concluded that “there can
be no neutrality in the face of genocide, no impartiality in the face of a campaign to extermi-
nate part of a population.” Rep. of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the U.N.
During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, ¶19, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999).
77. See Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 73, R
at 170, 177.
78. See GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76. Additionally, U.N. forces lack certain R
mission essential characteristics to effectively halt atrocity crimes, including: the ability to
deploy rapidly and effectively, adequate resources and training for hostile combat environ-
ments, intelligence capabilities, certain command and control structures, and a host of com-
munications and logistics capabilities. Id. at 85. Moreover, forces contributed by member
states often come with crippling national caveats on their combat role and prohibitive rules
of engagement. Id.
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The Charter paradigm was never intended to regulate state conduct
vis-à-vis civilians, but rather interstate disputes and interactions. The re-
sponsibility of states to individuals is governed by three overlapping but
distinct disciplines: international humanitarian law (IHL, also referred to
as the laws of armed conflict), international human rights law (IHRL), and
international criminal law (ICL). Each discipline has suffered its own en-
forcement deficit. As one commentator notes,
Collectively . . . [these laws] compose an overarching norm that
should be sufficient to prevent renewed attacks on civilians . . . .
But converting that norm into a series of effective preventive
measures is still a work very much in progress, and tentative in its
advances.80
International humanitarian law (IHL) has long prohibited the mis-
treatment of combatants and civilians during war. States have had an in-
terest in regulating the way hostilities are conducted since at least the
nineteenth century.81 Following the Second World War, the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 were implemented to guarantee humane treatment of
combatants who are shipwrecked, sick, wounded, or hors de combat, in
addition to prisoners of war and civilians.82 While this body of law has had
a tremendous impact on state behavior during armed conflict,83 there is no
80. Rotberg, supra note 24, at 3. R
81. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land with An-
nex of Regulations, pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention
(II)]; U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, GEN. ORDER NO. 100, ART. 33-37, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (1863), available at http://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp (commonly referred to as the Lieber Code); see also,
e.g., Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021,
118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention (III)]; Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, [hereinafter 1899
Hague Convention (IV)].
82. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III];
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. Additionally, certain stan-
dards of humane treatment apply to the conduct of states and non-state actors alike in non-
international conflicts under article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., Ge-
neva Convention III supra, art. 3. Following Vietnam and other post-colonization civil wars,
Additional Protocol I & II to the Geneva Conventions were drafted to further clarify the
standards governing international and non-international armed conflicts respectively. Con-
vention Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Protocol I]; Convention Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Geneva Convention Protocol II].
83. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical
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indication this framework has had a limiting effect on the behavior of non-
state actors or the conduct of states vis-à-vis their citizens. For example,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the monitoring body of
IHL, has no enforcement mechanisms other than dialogue with parties to
armed conflict, and, on rare occasions, public statements condemning
violations.
International human rights law, which restricts state behavior toward
individuals during peacetime and war, found robust support following the
Second World War.84 In fact, human rights are embedded in the U.N.
Charter, which had as its three primary purposes to maintain peace and
security, protect state sovereignty, and respect human rights.85 Shortly
thereafter, Lemkin’s notion of genocide became law in 1948 with the Ge-
nocide Convention, followed days later by the passage of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.86 Later still, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Cul-
tural and Social Rights, and other treaties would be added to this bur-
geoning body of law.87 Similar to IHL, IHRL norms are difficult to
enforce. Monitored in part by the UN, and in part by states themselves,
the lack of accountability at the international level means that violations
often go unpunished.88
International criminal law (ICL) emerged after the Second World War
when the Axis leaders most responsible for policies of aggression, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes were prosecuted at the Nuremburg and
Tokyo Tribunals.89 Tyrants would no longer be able to engage in aggres-
sive war or subject civilians to wholesale slaughter with impunity, or so it
was thought. While ICL lay dormant for the remainder of the Cold War,
the atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s shocked the world into
action and led to the creation of two ad hoc tribunals: the International
respect for the law of armed conflict is institutionalized and reflected by the legal advice
given by U.S. judge advocates).
84. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 49
(Richard B. Lillich, et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS] (describing the
revolutionary developments in human rights law following the Second World War).
85. U.N. Charter pmbl.
86. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
87. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [herein-
after ICESCR].
88. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 84, at 439, 613 (discussing state and re- R
gional measures to enforce human rights violations respectively, including the European
Court of Human Rights). Human rights nongovernmental organizations, however, have been
instrumental in bringing awareness to violations and in norm development. See POWER, supra
note 38, at 72; GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at ix. R
89. PETER JUDSON RICHARDS, EXTRAORDINARY JUSTICE: MILITARY TRIBUNALS IN
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)90 and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).91 The failure to prevent the
massacres in Bosnia and Rwanda caused the United Nations to recognize
that its obligations to protect civilians “superseded existing principles of
peacekeeping and noninterference.”92 The successful efforts to establish
the ad hoc tribunals motivated world leaders to restart negotiations for a
permanent war crimes tribunal. The International Criminal Court was re-
alized in 1998 with the drafting of the Rome Statute, which entered into
force in 200293 and established the Court’s jurisdiction to prosecute four
crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the recently
defined crime of aggression.94
Today, ICL is the preferred method for responding to atrocity crimes,
even though “[t]he debate rages over the deterrent value of punish-
ment.”95 Courts cannot prevent atrocities, since they punish crimes after
the fact.96 The existence of international tribunals had little impact on
atrocities in Kosovo, Darfur, DRC, Uganda, Libya, and now Syria.97 In
fact, some suggest that the issuance of indictments and arrest warrants—
mostly unenforceable—gives perpetrators of atrocity crimes little incen-
tive to exercise restraint in their slaughter.98
Others are more positive about the deterrent effect of ICL, arguing
that “anecdotal evidence suggests that some perpetrators are more fearful
that they will be prosecuted by the ICC . . . . to the extent that the interna-
tional community demonstrates its willingness to detain indicted fugitives
and bring them before the court.”99 Former international prosecutors sug-
90. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 23, 1993).
91. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
92. Rotberg, supra note 24, at 8. R
93. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 100-02 (describing the role of International R
Criminal Law (ICL) at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International
Criminal Court (ICC)).
94. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5-8, opened for signature
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. For a discussion of
the history of the crime of aggression, see Keith A. Petty, Sixty Years in the Making: The
Definition of Aggression for the International Criminal Court, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 531 (2008); Keith A. Petty, Criminalizing Force: Resolving the Threshold Question for
the Crime of Aggression in the Context of Modern Conflict, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 105
(2009). Although the Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until
after January 1, 2017, the new definition was adopted by consensus on June 11, 2010. See
Resolution RC/Res.6 of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute Annex I, June 11, 2010,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf.
95. Reisman, supra note 64, at 58. R
96. Reisman pointedly asks, “[I]f life is the most precious of things, then I ask you,
should not acting to prevent before the fact, as opposed to acting to punish after the fact, be
the primary technique of international law for dealing with mass murder?” Id. at 59.
97. Id. at 62-68 (commenting on the failure of ICL to prevent atrocity crimes).
98. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 103. R
99. Id. at 103; see also KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN
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gest that it is too early to tell whether the ICC and ad hoc tribunals have
had a clear impact on preventing atrocity crimes.100 Richard Goldstone,
former ICTY Chief Prosecutor, senses that the loss of impunity through
the ICC and the vigilance of special courts have created “moderation” of
at least the language of tyrants.101 The presence of war crimes tribunals,
he suggests, is in the minds of political and military leaders engaged in
armed conflict.102
As valuable as the humanitarian legal regime is to the world commu-
nity, IHL, IHRL, ICL, and domestic laws are too often recognized in the
breach. While the delegates met in San Francisco debating the final word-
ing of the U.N. Charter, the Soviet gulags were fully operational. Before
the ink had dried on Lemkin’s Genocide Convention, communist China
was engaging in mass murder in the name of re-education. Even with an
active ICC, indictments and arrest warrants have failed to deter violence
in Darfur and the DRC.103
C. Modern Developments in Atrocity Prevention and Response
Where the legal regime has proven insufficient, states have been re-
quired to take action even without U.N. support. When Serbia threatened
to wipe out the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo in 1999, NATO in-
tervened without U.N. authorization and effectively ended the slaughter.
This prompted fierce debate about the legality of humanitarian interven-
tion. As a result of the legal backlash to NATO’s action, policy makers and
legal experts sought to answer when, if ever, states may intervene to pre-
vent atrocities. The result was a study describing the new concept of
R2P.104 This Section discusses the origins and application of both humani-
tarian intervention and R2P and how they have contributed to atrocity
prevention and response.
had a deterrent effect); Richard J. Goldstone, The Role of the International Criminal Court,
in MASS ATROCITY CRIMES, PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES, supra note 24, at 55 (citing R
other benefits to ICL such as bringing an end to impunity for war criminals, providing justice
to victims, ending fabricated denials, advancing international humanitarian law, and increas-
ing the capacity of states).
100. Rotberg, supra note 24, at 9 (citing comments by Richard Goldstone, former Chief R
Prosecutor at the ICTY, and David Crane, former Chief Prosecutor at the Special Court for
Sierra Leone).
101. Goldstone, supra note 99, at 61-62. R
102. Id. States also have a role in prosecuting atrocity crimes. Under the doctrine of
complementarity, domestic resolution of atrocity crimes is preferred, but international tribu-
nals, such as the ICC, will assert jurisdiction when states are unwilling or unable to effectively
investigate and prosecute offenders. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
352 (2003); see also SIKKINK, supra note 99, at 5 (describing the trend in holding leaders R
accountable in international and domestic courts). In the United States, domestic laws al-
lowing jurisdiction over atrocity crimes include the Genocide Convention Implementation
Act, the War Crimes Act, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and, on the civil side, the
Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims’ Protection Act.
103. Reisman, supra note 64, at 62. R
104. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
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1. Humanitarian Intervention
The history of humanitarian intervention is given a thorough treat-
ment in Don Hubert’s, The Responsibility to Protect: Preventing and Halt-
ing Crimes Against Humanity, and Sean Murphy’s, Humanitarian
Intervention.105 Humanitarian intervention, defined as “the use of armed
force by a state or states, without authorization by the U.N. Security
Council, for the purpose of protecting nationals of the target state from
large-scale human rights abuses,”106 is legally controversial.107 For the
purposes of this Article, this definition excludes intervention when the tar-
get government consents, and also interventions used to protect the na-
tionals of the intervening state, which is consistent with prevailing
interpretations of international law.108
Hubert, among others, recognizes that the promulgation of the U.N.
Charter in 1945, and its limits on the use of force, may have deprived
states of the ability to unilaterally intervene to protect another states’ citi-
zens.109 Under Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter, the use of force may
105. Hubert, supra note 44; MURPHY, supra note 47. This section relies heavily on Hu- R
bert’s and Murphy’s works, as well as several sources originally cited by those authors.
106. Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian Inter-
vention, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2010). Mohamed’s definition is limited to non-U.N.
sanctioned interventions, which is the focus of this article. Her definition is consistent with
other widely recognized definitions, such as Professor Sean Murphy’s, which states that hu-
manitarian intervention is “the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or interna-
tional organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state
from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights.” MURPHY, supra
note 47, at 11-12. R
107. Henry Wheaton has been credited as the first scholar who attempted to draft a
legal framework for humanitarian intervention. See ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 461, 538 (1921) (citing HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 91 (1836)).
108. See Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1281. R
109. The right of states to intervene to protect another states’ civilians has a long his-
tory. For example, in several cases in the late nineteenth century, European states intervened
in the Ottoman Empire on behalf of Christian minorities on humanitarian grounds. See Hu-
bert, supra note 44, at 90; see also GARY JONATHAN BASS, FREEDOM’S BATTLE: THE ORI- R
GINS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 18-19 (2008); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338 (1963); MANOUCHEHR GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 22-24, 33-37 (1962) (detailing the demands of Austria, France,
Italy, Prussia, and Russia on the Ottoman Empire (1866-68) for action to improve treatment
of the Christian population of Crete, and the intervention of Austria, Russia, Great Britain,
Italy, and France in Turkey as a result of insurrections and misrule in Macedonia (1903-08));
MURPHY, supra note 47, at 52-56 (describing five instances of humanitarian intervention R
prior to the formation of the League of Nations: Great Britain, France and Russia in Greece
in 1827-30; France in Syria in 1860-61; Russia in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria in 1877-
78; the United States in Cuba in 1898; and Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia in Macedonia in
1913).
The interwar/League of Nations period presented examples of how an exerted right to inter-
vene can be abused, including Japan’s incursion into Manchuria in 1931 (“Rape of Nank-
ing”), Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, and Germany’s annexation of Czechoslovakia in
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only be authorized by the UNSC or in situations requiring self-defense.110
Because the UNSC “was incapable of obtaining a consensus [during the
Cold War] on the use of force to address threats to international peace,
states and regional organizations were left on their own to develop coer-
cive techniques for conflict management.”111 Even though several inter-
ventions legitimately halted widespread human rights violations, a mistrust
of great power politics112 as well as a distaste among post-colonial states of
any kind of foreign intervention prohibited a norm of humanitarian inter-
vention from solidifying into law.
Several interventions in the 1970s brought the legal debate to the fore-
front once again.113 First, in 1971 India intervened to put an end to East
Pakistan’s (now Bangladesh) slaughter of hundreds of thousands of its
own citizens.114 In 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia to oust the genocidal
Khmer Rouge.115 Tanzania’s intervention into Uganda to remove Idi
Amin in 1979 underscored the prominence of this practice.116 And even
though the legal justification in each of these cases was self-defense, the
humanitarian results are self-evident. Contrast these interventions with
And even though the Second World War was not fought in defense of human rights, the
Allied victory over the Axis powers did have the ancillary effect of ending Germany’s atroc-
ity crimes. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 65 (rejecting the argument that WWII was a humanita- R
rian war when history clearly reflects that it was a war of self-defense). But see FERNANDO R.
TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 156 (2d ed.
1996) (stating that the Second World War was a humanitarian war).
110. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51.
111. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 143. R
112. Several interventions in the 1950s and 1960s are cited as examples of powerful
nations using humanitarian justifications as pretext to intervene out of some national interest.
MURPHY, supra note 47, at 87-97 (describing the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and R
Czechoslovakia in 1968; Belgian and U.S. intervention in the DRC in 1964; U.S. intervention
in the Dominican Republic in 1965).
113. Following the crisis in Pakistan, some attempted to establish a new international
legal standard. See International Law Association 56th Conference, New Delhi, India, Dec.
29, 1974–Jan. 4, 1975, Report of the Fifty-Sixth Conference: Human Rights, INT’L L. ASS’N
REP. CONF., 1976, at 178; Hubert, supra note 44, at 90. But see MURPHY, supra note 47, at R
143-44 (describing how the international community was widely critical of unilateral inter-
ventions during this period).
114. Hubert, supra note 44, at 90; MURPHY, supra note 47, at 97-100 (arguing that India R
likely believed partitioning Pakistan would serve its national interests, even though they ar-
gued before the United Nations that the reason for intervention was related to self-defense).
Murphy goes on to argue that the weighing of two concerns—maintaining international
peace and security versus human rights benefits—will not always come out in favor of human
rights, based on the international response largely condemning India’s intervention. Id.
115. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 103-04 (arguing that Vietnam intervened out of self- R
defense based on Cambodian aggression, and perhaps had humanitarian reasons as a secon-
dary concern, if at all); see also Hubert, supra note 44, at 90. R
116. Hubert, supra note 44, at 90; MURPHY, supra note 47, at 107 (stating that for R
Tanzania “once the justification of self-defense existed for intervening in Uganda the desire
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France’s bloodless coup in the Central African Republic in 1979 that was
based on humanitarian grounds.117
The modern practice of humanitarian intervention arose after the end
of the Cold War. The first situation occurred in Liberia in 1990, when the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) authorized a
humanitarian force to intervene.118 This regional action was only later
“endorsed” by the UNSC in 1992.119 ECOWAS also intervened to halt
atrocities in Sierra Leone in 1997 and only received UNSC approval
months later.120 Similarly, the U.S. led coalition that enforced the Iraq no-
fly zones was not preauthorized by the UNSC.121 And, as previously men-
tioned, in March 1999 the debate over humanitarian intervention took on
an urgent tone when NATO launched a seventy-eight day bombing cam-
paign against Serb forces targeting Kosovo Albanian civilians.122 Numer-
ous scholars labeled the intervention unlawful,123 in addition to some
leaders outright condemning the military action.124 An independent com-
mission into the NATO intervention famously concluded that the mission
was unlawful but “legitimate.”125
117. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 107-08 (explaining that from 1966 to 1979 Jean-Bedel R
Bokassa brutally ruled the Central African Republic after which a Franco-African Commis-
sion of Inquiry determined that Bokassa had committed atrocities). In 1979, France sent mili-
tary forces in a bloodless coup that ousted Bokassa. Id.
118. See MARC WELLER, REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCE-
MENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 69-71 (1994). See also Hubert, supra note 44, at 91. R
119. See S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992) (determining that the
situation in Liberia constituted a threat to international peace and security and provided
authorization for the Economic Community of West African States Monitory Group
(ECOMOG) force under Chapter VII); WELLER, supra note 118, at 71-72; Anthony R
Chukwuka Ofodile, The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, 32 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 381, 413-418 (1994); Hubert, supra note 44, at 91. See also, Hubert, supra note 44, at R
91.
120. S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132, (Oct. 8,1997) (providing explicit authoriza-
tion for ECOMOG under Chapter VII). See Hubert, supra note 44, at 91; Akintunde Kabir R
Otubu, Collective Intervention in International Law: ECOMOG/Sierra Leone in Retrospect
(July 6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.1140203).
121. See discussion supra note 47. R
122. Hubert, supra note 44, at 92. R
123. Antonio Cassese stated that the “resort to armed force was justified . . . . [but]
contrary to current international law.” Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving
Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World
Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 25 (1999); Jonathan Charney, Anticipatory Humanita-
rian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 834, 836-837 (1999); John J. Merriam, Kosovo
and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 111, 151 (2001);
Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 22
(1999); see also Hubert, supra note 44, at 92. R
124. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation
of Use of Force Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release SC/6659 (Mar.
26, 1999). See also Hubert, supra note 44, at 92. R
125. INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOS., KOSOVO REPORT (2000) [hereinafter KOSOVO RE-
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Efforts to articulate a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention were
met with skepticism and ultimately failed due to concerns for state sover-
eignty.126 As a result, then Secretary General Kofi Annan famously asked,
“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sover-
eignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross
and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our
common humanity?”127 Unable to reach consensus on a right of humani-
tarian intervention, the next effort to combat atrocity crimes focused not
on the intervening state, but on the right of people everywhere to be free
of assault by genocidal regimes.
2. Responsibility to Protect
The new concept of R2P is a direct response to twentieth century
“failure of individual States to live up to their most basic and compelling
responsibilities, as well as the collective inadequacies of international insti-
tutions” to combat the world’s worst crimes.128 The shift in the debate
began in 2001 when the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) published a report outlining the concept of
R2P.129 According to the ICISS Report, R2P is a two-tiered concept. First,
states are responsible for the protection of their civilian populations, spe-
cifically for the prevention of atrocity crimes against them.130 Second, if a
state fails to protect its population, then its sovereignty gives way to the
international community’s responsibility to prevent civilian slaughter.131
Intending to set a standard with greater weight than the controversial
“right” of humanitarian intervention,132 the ICISS report established a
high threshold for intervention, set parameters for the decision to use
126. See U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 8th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.8 (Sept. 22, 1999);
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 9th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.9 (Sept. 22, 1999) (chronicling
the divisive debate at the General Assembly over humanitarian intervention); see also Ed-
ward C. Luck, Building a Norm: The Responsibility to Protect Experience, in MASS ATROCITY
CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES, supra note 24, at 108, 111. R
127. U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, ‘WE THE PEOPLES’ THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY at 48, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000, U.N. Sales No. E.00.I.16 (2007).
128. U.N. R2P Report, supra note 18, ¶5. For a detailed discussion of the development R
of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), see GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PRO-
TECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 38-54 (2008); Luck, supra note
126. R
129. ICISS REPORT, supra note 104. R
130. The 2005 World Summit Outcome proved:
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the preven-
tion of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We
accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.
2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶138, GA Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005)
[hereinafter Summit Report].
131. Id.; see also Hubert, supra note 44, at 93. See generally FRANCIS DENG ET. AL., R
SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (1996).
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force,133 and urged the UNSC to act first before states take action on their
own.134
In spite of mixed initial reactions to the ICISS Report,135 R2P became
a priority in light of atrocities in the DRC and genocide in Darfur.136 It
was in this context at the 2005 World Summit of leaders—at the time the
largest gathering of world leaders in history—that consensus was reached
on R2P. The World Summit Outcome Report (Summit Report) embraced
the notion of R2P, but with caveats.137 Notably, it did not contemplate
intervention without UNSC approval. Article 139 of the Summit Report
provides:
[The international community is] prepared to take collective ac-
tion, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Coun-
cil, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional orga-
nizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.138
Under this U.N. model, R2P relies on three pillars. First, states are
responsible for protecting their civilians. Second, states should work to-
gether on a preventive strategy involving development, human rights, gov-
ernance, peacebuilding, rule of law, security sector reform efforts, and two
types of consent-based military action.139 It is the third pillar,140 “timely
and decisive response to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war
crimes and crimes against humanity”—including the use of force under
133. The six criteria established in the ICISS Report are: right authority, just cause,
right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success. ICISS
REPORT, supra note 104, at 32. These threshold criteria for the use of force to halt atrocities R
were instructive to the conditions established in this article. See infra Part V.
134. Hubert, supra note 44, at 93. The African Union was actually first to articulate a R
collective right to intervene in cases of atrocity crimes a few years before the emergence of
R2P. The AU Constitutive Act takes a position of “non-indifference” to unfolding atrocities,
compared to the failed African League’s policy of “nonintervention.” See GENOCIDE RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 98. R
135. The initial reaction to the ICISS report ranged from apathy to strong opposition.
Hubert, supra note 44, at 93. Because the report was released just after the attacks of Sep- R
tember 11, 2001, the world was more focused on the “war on terror” and less on humanita-
rian missions. The reaction to the concept grew more hostile in the wake of the U.S. invasion
of Iraq, which was not authorized by the UNSC. Id. For a more detailed discussion regarding
the concern of pretext with regard to intervention to halt atrocity crimes, see infra Part III.D.
136. Hubert, supra note 44, at 94 n.31. R
137. Summit Report, supra note 130. R
138. Id. at ¶139.
139. These two types are: (1) preventive peacekeeping, as in Macedonia (FYROM) and
Burundi, and (2) military assistance, including Chapter VII action, to help states controlled in
part by armed groups, such as Sierra Leone. Luck, supra note 126, at 116-17. R
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Chapter VII when states fail to act—that has drawn the most attention
and concern, particularly from smaller states fearful that broadening the
ability to use force will be easily abused.141 While states do in fact have the
responsibility to protect their civilians, the international community only
has the option to intervene to protect civilians (with U.N. authorization),
but no affirmative obligation.
In its current form, R2P does little to change preexisting norms or the
ability of states to intervene absent U.N. authorization.142 Best under-
stood as an “important tool for moral suasion,”143 R2P can have an impact
on government policy toward atrocity crimes and should motivate states to
enforce widely accepted humanitarian standards.144 Perhaps the two most
significant breakthroughs of R2P are the shift in focus from intervening
states to perpetrator states,145 and a dedication to early warning and ca-
pacity building to protect populations from slaughter.146
In this early, developmental stage of R2P, it is difficult to tell whether
it will prove to be effective in practice.147 So far, the early test-cases have
demonstrated mixed results. Beginning in 2003, the widespread attacks
against civilians in Darfur by Sudan backed forces appeared to meet the
threshold of R2P.148 Still, the African Union (AU) force that deployed in
2004, followed by a UN-AU hybrid operation in 2007, failed to prevent the
deaths of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of millions.149 Simi-
141. RtoP and Rebuilding: the Role of the Peacebuilding Commission, INT’L COAL. FOR
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-
rtop/related-themes/2417-pbc-and-rtop (last visited 12 Apr. 2013); U.N. R2P Report, supra
note 18, at ¶139. R
142. See Summit Report, supra note 130. R
143. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 98. R
144. Luck, supra note 126, at 109. R
145. For further discussion on the shift in focus to perpetrator states, see infra Part
III.B.
146. MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERVENTION TO
STOP GENOCIDE AND MASS ATROCITIES 5 (2009).
147. Institutionally, the United Nations is working to make R2P part of its bureaucratic
process in order to provide early warning and be able to develop interdepartmental and
interagency responses to emergency situations. Luck, supra note 126, at 124; see also GENO- R
CIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 99. Additionally, the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy R
includes language that mirrors the concept of R2P, suggesting greater acceptance. See NA-
TIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 48 (May 2010) [hereinafter 2010 NA-
TIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_view
er/national_security_strategy.pdf.
148. See generally, Paul D. Williams & Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect
and the Crisis in Darfur, 36 SEC. DIALOGUE 27 (2005).
149. Hubert, supra note 44, at 96-97. But these shortcomings have less to do with the R
validity of R2P, and more to do with geopolitical realities. For example, China threatened to
veto UNSC efforts to place an oil embargo on Sudan, which many believe would have ended
the genocide. Katy Glassborow, China, Russia Quash ICC Efforts to Press Sudan Over Dar-
fur Crimes, SUDAN TRIB. (Jan. 12, 2008), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25
544. Sudan just so happens to be a key oil supplier to China. Hubert, supra note 44, at 97. R
Sudan’s open defiance to indictments and arrest warrants issued by the ICC has also frus-
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larly, international and regional efforts to end atrocities in the DRC have
been a failure.150 Contrast these situations with the UN-authorized inter-
vention in Libya in 2011 in response to President Qadhafi’s brutality
against Libyan civilians.151
In spite of the push to see universal application of R2P, efforts have
stalled. Observers are naturally concerned as “[n]ations have stood by as
atrocities unfolded in the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, deferring action to weak regional bodies or patchy and under-
resourced multilateral forces.”152 This failure is compounded by propo-
nents of R2P that want to keep the discussion on the “safe” terrain of
nonmilitary prevention methods. While mass atrocities require a full spec-
trum of responses, including diplomacy, economic sanctions, and multilat-
eral efforts, military measures must be on the table if peaceful measures
fail to stop the next genocide.153 The difficult issue of military interven-
tion, whether as an extension of R2P or humanitarian intervention, must
be addressed if there is any hope of adopting an effective strategy to pre-
vent and respond to atrocity crimes.
D. The United States and Mass Atrocity Prevention
& Response Operations
In conjunction with, and as a logical extension to, the concept of R2P,
the United States is actively developing a mass atrocity prevention and
response doctrine (MAPRO).154 The 2010 National Security Strategy
promises, “In the event that prevention fails, the United States will work
both multilaterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian,
financial, and—in certain instances—military means to prevent and re-
again, China was responsible for blocking the UNSC from even issuing a Presidential State-
ment condemning Sudan’s noncooperation. Rotberg, supra note 24, at 7 (stating that Russia R
and China will often block UNSC actions, worrying that U.N. intervention (reprimands,
sanctions, or even outright intervention) could set a precedent, which they will have to some-
day answer to for their own breaches of international law).
150. Claire Applegarth & Andrew Block, Acting Against Atrocities: A Strategy for Sup-
porters of R2P, in MASS ATROCITY CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES, supra note 24, R
at 128, 128.
151. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. SCOR, S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res. 1973, U.N.
SCOR, S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 2040, U.N. SCOR, S/RES/2040 (Mar. 12,
2012). Each of these UNSC resolutions refer to states’ responsibility to protect their popula-
tions, and specifically reference the crisis in Libya.
152. Applegarth & Block, supra note 150, at 128. R
153. Professor Sarah Sewall notes that state paralysis will continue so long as R2P pro-
ponents make “prevention appear to be low-cost and uncontroversial.” Sarah Sewall, From
Prevention to Response: Using Military Force to Oppose Mass Atrocities, in MASS ATROCITY
CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES, supra note 24, at 159, 172. R
154. See Presidential Directive, supra note 9. The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stabil- R
ity Operations Institute also issued a white paper titled, MASS ATROCITY PREVENTION AND
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spond to genocide and mass atrocities.”155 This passage is significant be-
cause it moves away from a strict non-kinetic, preventive strategy that
many leaders, R2P advocates, and scholars endorse.156 Rather it recog-
nizes that when peaceful preventive efforts fail, the United States may use
whatever means necessary to respond to the threat of atrocity crimes—
and not necessarily with U.N. support. This Section discusses recent devel-
opments in this strategy and recognizes the need for the development of
military doctrine specifically tailored to confront mass atrocity prevention
and response operations.
As recently as 2010, expert commentary criticized nations for failing to
prepare for the next atrocity crisis.157 Although the United States has not
yet included atrocity response operations in military doctrine,158 recent
efforts indicate there is reason to be optimistic. In addition to independent
studies such as the 2008 Genocide Prevention Task Force Report159 and
the 2010 Mass Atrocity Response Operations Handbook (MARO Hand-
book),160 President Obama has convened the full spectrum of U.S. na-
tional security actors, including the Department of Defense (DoD), the
Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, among many others, to develop a gov-
ernment-wide approach to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.161 Pro-
posals by the Genocide Prevention Task Force, the MARO Handbook, as
well as leading scholars highlight issue areas that should be included in
future policy and practice.
155. 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 147, at 48; see also U.S. DEP’T. R
OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW, at 15 (2010) [hereinafter QUADRENNIAL DE-
FENSE REVIEW] (providing that, “The Defense Department must be prepared to provide the
President with options across a wide range of contingencies, which include[s]. . . preventing
human suffering due to mass atrocities. . . .”); S. Con. Res. 71, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted)
(calling for the United States to engage in a “whole of government” and “strategic effort to
prevent mass atrocities and genocide.”).
156. See Ian Hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoher-
ent World, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1, 10 (2011) (stating that “much of the formal support for
[R2P] . . . is for the relatively easy case of intervention approved by the Security Council.”).
157. Rotberg, supra note 24, at 16. R
158. Sewall states, “Political leaders are reluctant to direct the [U.S.] military to prepare
for a MARO, while military leaders, already fully occupied, say they will prepare for a
MARO when civilian leaders direct them to do so. As a result, the United States may not be
better prepared for the next Rwanda than it was in 1994.” Sewall, supra note 153, at 172. R
Most agree that institutional capacity to prevent atrocity crimes at the earliest stages must be
strengthened at both the state and international levels. Hubert, supra note 44, at 100. R
159. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8. R
160. MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 6. R
161. Presidential Directive, supra note 9. The United States is not alone in taking mea- R
sures to prevent atrocity crimes. France recently included R2P in its 2008 Defense and Na-
tional Security White Paper. See PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, THE FRENCH
WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 115 (2008). Additionally, the Euro-
pean Union defense strategy incorporates R2P. European Union, Report on the Implementa-
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1. Full Spectrum Approach
The nature of mass atrocities and the range of options States have to
respond to them, mean that these crimes are “absolutely preventable.”162
States have numerous tools at their disposal to react to pending or ongoing
atrocities, only one of which is the use of military force.163 In fact, it is
necessary to point out that in spite of this Article’s emphasis on coercive
intervention measures, military action should be a last resort following
diplomatic, economic, and multilateral efforts.164
The Genocide Prevention Task Force recognized that genocide and
atrocity crimes are avoidable tragedies when there is leadership and politi-
cal will to confront brutal regimes.165 Besides leadership, the Task Force
identified five initiatives that should be implemented for an effective pre-
vention strategy: (1) an atrocity risk assessment prepared by the Director
of National Intelligence for Congress, (2) early prevention measures, (3)
preventive diplomacy, (4) military atrocity response doctrine, and (5) in-
ternational cooperative networks to remove the shield of sovereignty from
perpetrator states.166
2. Military Preparedness
Many of the options and considerations discussed by the Task Force
focus on policy shaping, capacity building, institutional development, and
non-kinetic engagement of world leaders and organizations before atrocity
crimes occur. These are all consistent with the accepted meaning of R2P
discussed above, and fall within the comfort zones of scholars and leaders
alike. But even the Task Force recognized that the “credible threat of co-
ercive measures, including ultimately the use of force, is widely seen as a
necessary complement to successful preventive diplomacy.”167 The diffi-
cult question remains—if peaceful prevention measures fail, is the United
States prepared to take military action to halt atrocity crimes?
In the 2006 National Security Strategy, the United States offered the
first glimpse of its willingness to use force to respond to genocide. It pro-
162. See Reisman, supra note 64, at 59, argues, “Unless a mass murder is accomplished R
with a single devastating weapon of mass destruction,. . .the business of killing a large group
of people takes time, communication, and organization.” Reisman goes on to state, “This
means that, unlike individual murders. . .many of the individual murders that comprise a
mass murder can be prevented.” Id.
163. Currently, the only office in the U.S. Government that is the closest to being fo-
cused on atrocities prevention is the State Department Office of War Crimes Issues (S/WCI),
which was created in 1997 to advise on serious humanitarian violations throughout the world
with an emphasis on prosecution at an international tribunal. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note
8, at 4. R
164. MAPRO HANDBOOK, supra note 154, at 81. For a detailed discussion of the pro- R
posed threshold for using force to prevent or respond to mass atrocities when the United
Nations fails to act, see infra Part IV.
165. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-2. R
166. Id. at xvii-xviii.
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vides, “Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful
intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces
of several nations working together under appropriate regional or interna-
tional auspices.”168 This strategy highlights the desire to utilize peaceful
measures first, and force if necessary. Crucial to this passage is the desire,
but not the requirement, to have the military action authorized by an “ap-
propriate” international or regional organization. The 2010 National Se-
curity Strategy adopts a similar approach.169
Experts recognize that in order to increase military readiness, states
must develop “rules of engagement, a military doctrine, and pre-deploy-
ment training that all differ from traditional peacekeeping or war-fight-
ing.”170 In fact, the Genocide Task Force specifically recommended that
the “secretary of defense and U.S. military leaders should develop military
guidance on genocide prevention and response and incorporate it into De-
partment of Defense (and interagency) policies, plans, doctrine, training,
and lessons learned.”171
Mass Atrocity Response Operations are a subset of atrocity response
measures falling under the full spectrum MAPRO paradigm, and are the
future of U.S. military initiatives to halt mass murders. MARO policy
deals only with military operations, distinct from MAPRO policy which
includes diplomatic, economic, and military measures, among others, to
respond to atrocities. The MARO Handbook, noted above, provides pol-
icy-makers with a blueprint for turning MARO planning into official mili-
tary doctrine. It discusses challenges unique to atrocity prevention and
response operations, planning strategies, and specific tactics to facilitate
mission success.172
Although the nature of MARO operations will resemble international
armed conflicts or contingency operations, MARO have many distinguish-
ing characteristics.173 For example, MARO success is measured in terms
of protecting civilians, not necessarily by vanquishing an enemy force. Sa-
rah Sewall clarifies that, regime change, enforcing agreements, and sup-
porting peacetime humanitarian operations might be follow-on aspects of
168. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (March
2006) [hereinafter 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY] (emphasis added), available at
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2006.pdf.
169. 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 147, at 22. The Genocide Report R
similarly endorses military measures to respond to ongoing atrocities once opportunities for
prevention have been lost. Moreover, the Report suggests that “U.S. military assets can also
play an important role in supporting and providing credibility to options short of the use of
force.” GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at xxiii. R
170. Hubert, supra note 44, at 100. See generally VICTORIA HOLT, THE IMPOSSIBLE R
MANDATE: MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND MODERN
PEACE OPERATIONS (2006); Thomas Weiss & Don Hubert, Conduct and Capacity, in THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RESEARCH BIBLIOGRAPHY AND BACKGROUND 177-206
(Thomas Weiss & Don Hubert eds., 2001).
171. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 87. R
172. MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 8. R
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these missions, but are not the military objective in a MARO.174 As a
result, the complexity of mass atrocities should not be underestimated by
planners. As the MARO Handbook explains, “every situation of mass kill-
ing is unique and requires a tailored response.”175 Initially, there can be
no illusion that intervening to protect a civilian population will be seen as
hostility toward the perpetrator.176 There can be no impartiality in mass
atrocity situations, even if the underlying goal is to protect something as
seemingly neutral as human rights.
Military planners must also take into account the complex multiparty
dynamics of MARO. Mass atrocities involve a number of players—perpe-
trators of violence (usually regime elites), victims, and interveners—some
of whom may switch roles and cause the situation to escalate quickly.177
Additionally, the response of the victims can often confuse the matter.
Whether the victims flee, fight, or ask for outside intervention will deter-
mine how the perpetrator acts and the political viability of the intervener’s
options. Take, for example, the Serbian slaughter of Bosnian Muslims and
Croats. The United States failed to take initial action in part out of a con-
cern that intervention would result in a Vietnam-like quagmire because
atrocity crimes were being committed by all parties to the conflict.178 As a
result of the uncertainty of the various actors’ roles in a mass atrocity situ-
ation, the intelligence community will need to tailor its intelligence gather-
ing to the actors and cultures involved.179
Finally, there is a potential for escalation of violence. As stated in the
MARO Handbook, “mass killing of civilians can potentially intensify and
expand very quickly once it begins.”180 Also, the initial victims of govern-
ment violence may also use the intervention as a shield for exacting ven-
geance, while outside parties, such as neighboring states, may seize on the
chaos of conflict to intervene on either side or manipulate the conflict to-
ward their own ends. As a result of these unique concerns and distinguish-
ing characteristics, decision makers must be prepared to respond to
situations of mass violence quickly, which requires established doctrine,
policy, and training.181 Unlike a traditional conflict, enemy gains (such as
174. Sewall, supra note 153, at 166. R
175. MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 9. R
176. See GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 74. R
177. Sewall, supra note 153, at 167. R
178. POWER, supra note 38, at 284. R
179. Sewall, supra note 153, at 168. R
180. MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 28. See, for example, the rapid pace of R
slaughter in the Rwandan genocide, which lasted only 100 days and resulted in approximately
800,000 murdered. POWER, supra note 38, at 329-89. In contrast, other situations are more R
sporadic, as in the varying degrees of intensity of the Darfur genocide at different times,
which may have resulted from Bashir’s belief that culpability can be avoided as long as the
bloodshed stays under a certain threshold. Sewall, supra note 153, at 170. R
181. The MARO Handbook lists several operational and political considerations that
must be taken into account during the planning phase. These are (1) utilizing different infor-
mation from different sources (traditional intelligence and NGOs) to best inform the unpre-
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seizing territory) cannot be undone in a mass atrocity situation. In mass
atrocity situations, “the perpetrator has achieved success if the civilians it
wishes to have killed are killed; no subsequent victory against the perpe-
trators will undo the civilian deaths. Since the primary purpose of a
MARO is to stop that killing, speed of response can determine overall
success.”182
Prior to a full intervention, and when there is a threat of atrocity
crimes, states may consider military flexible deterrent options (FDOs) to
aide ongoing diplomatic, economic and intelligence gathering efforts. For
example, U.S. forces stationed around the globe can provide intelligence
that could be useful to atrocity prevention at the early warning phase.183 If
atrocities have begun, methods such as disrupting supply lines, launching
cyber network attacks against communications and military infrastructure,
and protecting internally displaced persons will prove useful.184 These tac-
tics vary in scope and level of intrusion, but will in any event be used to
“expose perpetrators to international scrutiny, establish the credibility of a
potential intervention, build capacity, isolate perpetrators, protect poten-
tial victims, dissuade or punish perpetrators, or build and demonstrate in-
ternational resolve.”185
Depending on the success of FDOs, the MARO Handbook lists sev-
eral tactics that can be employed individually or jointly in a comprehen-
sive intervention to protect the civilian population from mass killings.
MARO forces can (1) saturate a large area with sufficient force deployed
in sectors; (2) secure limited areas with the intent of growing them like “oil
spots”; (3) establish a buffer zone between perpetrators and victims; (4)
secure safe areas for victims and internally displaced persons; (5) provide
support—advisory, military equipment, or technical and air support—to
coalition partners, host nations, or victim groups; (6) contain perpetrators
with blockades or no-fly zones; and (7) attack and defeat the perpetrators’
leaders and/or capabilities.186
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must take relevant doctrine
and training and specifically tailor these aspects of mission readiness to an
so that leaders can shape a preexisting crisis plan to fit the dynamics on the ground; (3)
prioritizing speed over mass in terms of military deployment as well as political and military
decision making; (4) developing a historical record (Power of Witness) of events with various
tools, which can be used to make the political case for the need to intervene, and later the
legal case in a criminal tribunal; (5) determining whether the MARO will encompass immedi-
ate civilian rescue or attempt to handle root causes such as restoration of government; (6)
satisfying immediate nonmilitary requirements such as short term humanitarian assistance,
public order, and justice; (7) overcoming moral dilemmas including distinguishing between
perpetrator and victim and avoiding complicity in revenge killings; and (8) engaging political
leaders for guidance on key issues such as identifying perpetrators and determining the scope
of operations. MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 18-19. R
182. Id. at 33.
183. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23. R
184. Id. at 84.
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atrocity prevention and response scenario. Until MARO doctrine is in
place, military leaders will be unprepared to present a full range of options
to political leaders, who must ultimately decide whether utilizing U.S.
armed forces to intervene is in the best interests of the United States.187
Additionally, advance planning for MARO will permit the United States
to offer sufficient support in atrocity situations to international and re-
gional organizations—such as the United Nations, NATO, the European
Union (EU), AU, or ECOWAS—who currently “rely on doctrine, train-
ing, guidance, and scenarios developed by western [sic] nations such as the
United States.”188
Developing MARO doctrine will not cause an undue burden on DoD
resources. While mission accomplishment is measured differently in
MARO than in typical military interventions, U.S. armed forces are
uniquely situated to handle these diverse tasks. The preexisting ability of
U.S. forces to respond rapidly to any crisis is a built-in strength crucial to
MARO success. Additionally, there are many aspects of MARO that will
utilize the same tasks required in other missions, including convoy escorts,
direct fires, noncombatant evacuations, counterinsurgency measures, de-
tainee operations, no-fly zones, protected enclaves, and separation of
forces.189 Peace and stability operations are already a core mission of U.S.
armed forces and will have significant overlap with the underlying MARO
mission.190 Even without specific mention of atrocity response, these and
187. The MARO doctrine is implicated in the Department of Defense (DOD)’s 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review:
[T]he Defense Department must be prepared to provide the President with options across a
wide range of contingencies, which include supporting a response to an attack or natural
disaster at home, defeating aggression by adversary states, supporting and stabilizing fragile
states facing serious internal threats, and preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or
large-scale natural disasters abroad.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW, supra note 155, at vi (emphasis added); GENOCIDE RE- R
PORT, supra note 8, at 75. R
188. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 78. As of 2008, these are currently the only R
international organizations that have authority and “some capacity”—although inconsistently
applied—to use military force to prevent and stop genocide. Id. at 84. It is U.S. policy to
work with allies, international, and regional organizations to prevent atrocity crimes. See
2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 147, at 12, 48. In fact, in previous interven- R
tions in East Timor in 1999, Liberia in 2003, and Darfur in 2004-2007, the United States
provided assistance to missions led by Australia, ECOWAS, and the AU, respectively, al-
though with an aim at stability rather than MARO. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 84. R
189. Sewall, supra note 153, at 167 (citing JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CJCSM 3500.04E, R
UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (2008), available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/cjcsm3500_
04e.pdf); see also GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 79. R
190. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 79-80; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD R
MANUAL 3-07, STABILITY OPERATIONS (6 Oct. 2008) (emphasizing that as of 2008, stability
operations were at least on par with traditional combat operations in terms of importance to
military success); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 3000.05, MILITARY SUPPORT FOR STABILITY, SE-
CURITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS (28 Nov. 2005) (explaining the
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other MARO-relevant training and tactics are already on the books.191
Because the MARO Handbook is drafted in a military friendly planning
style,192 it will be easy to apply this doctrine to atrocity situations that
arise quickly, like what occurred in the Syrian situation described below.
E. Atrocities in Syria
While the international community debates effective response mea-
sures to atrocity crimes, Syria’s government, led by Bashar al-Assad, con-
tinues to perpetrate crimes against its people. Following popular uprisings
in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrians began protesting against the Assad regime in
early 2011 demanding “political freedom, an end to corruption, and action
[against] poverty.”193 Syrian government forces and government spon-
sored militia quickly embarked on a brutal crackdown of dissidents, mili-
tary defectors, and the general population, resulting in over 100,000
civilians killed as of summer 2013.194
Today, the Syrian opposition is organized, has garnered international
support, and is currently engaged in a full-fledged non-international armed
conflict against government forces.195 Even if the opposition coalition is
successful in toppling Assad’s regime, the international community has al-
ready failed to take effective action to prevent widespread atrocity crimes,
191. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB 3-0, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS (11
Aug. 2011) (outlining military strategy on joint operations); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL 3-0, OPERATIONS (27 Feb. 2008) (revising military doctrine to include a variety of
offensive, defensive, and civil support strategies to advance military goals). See generally
DEP’T OF DEF., UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (2012), available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/train
ing/ujtl_tasks.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, THE ARMY UNIVERSAL TASK LIST (2012). Even
without referencing genocide prevention, these publications include many tasks that would
be utilized in prevention and response operations. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 70-80. R
192. The MARO Handbook utilizes a typical mission analysis outline. MARO HAND-
BOOK, supra note 6, at 33. Additionally, the Handbook lists lines of effort (LOEs) such as R
situation understanding, strategic communication and diplomacy, unity of effort, military op-
erations, force generation and sustainment, safe and secure environment, governance and
rule of law, and social and economic well-being. Id. at 20-21. The MARO Handbook also
conforms to the “doctrinal-phasing construct” as follows: “Phase 0 (Shape): Prevent Crisis or
prepare a contingency; Phase I (Deter): Manage Crisis, deter escalation, prepare for inter-
vention; Phase II (Seize Initiative): Conduct initial deployments and actions by intervening
forces; Phase III (Dominate): Stop atrocities; control necessary areas; Phase IV (Stabilize):
Establish secure environment; Phase V (Enable Civil Authority): Transition to responsible
indigenous control.” Id. at 21.
193. Arab Uprising: Country by Country – Syria, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2012), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482309.
194. Opposition presses for weapons as Syria Death Toll tops 100,000, CNN (July 26,
2013 5:59 AM) http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/25/world/meast/syria-violence; Syria Deaths Near
100,000 says UN – and 6,000 are children, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 13, 2013 4:17 PM) http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/13/death-toll-syrian-conflict-93000.
195. European Union Backs Syrian Opposition Coalition, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/middleeast/islamists-reject-new-syrian-opposition-
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adding to the long list of historically preventable civilian slaughter dis-
cussed above.
The failure to prevent Syria’s crimes reflects the failure of the U.N.
Security Council to effectively respond to mass atrocities. Russia and
China, both allies of Syria, have prevented UNSC resolutions that would
have taken steps toward stalling, if not halting, war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed by Assad’s forces.196 As articulated by Tur-
key’s foreign minister, the UNSC’s failure “encourages the Syrian nation
to kill even more people.”197
Unable to agree on even economic sanctions, the UNSC is certainly
not poised to consider more intrusive, but likely effective, measures such
as a U.N. peace enforcement mission, or U.N.-authorized intervention.198
The U.N. Human Rights Council, however, did vote overwhelmingly to
extend the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which has
already reported the “widespread, systematic, and gross human rights vio-
lations” of Syrian forces.199 While the Commission will have no impact on
stopping atrocities, it could be useful to document atrocity crimes and for
building a case for future prosecution of war criminals before international
or domestic courts. Because Syria is not a party to the ICC, crimes com-
mitted by its leaders would have to be referred to the Court by the UNSC
(unlikely due to Russia and China’s veto) or permitted by Syria itself.200 If
the Syrian opposition is successful, it is feasible that the new government
would permit the investigation and prosecution of Assad and other offi-
cials most responsible for atrocities.
As discussed above, international criminal justice serves more of a re-
tributive function and has a limited deterrent effect. Currently, the Syrian
crisis is well past the point of atrocity prevention. There is no bringing
back the thousands already murdered. Still, dozens of countries are calling
for regime change in Damascus in an effort to halt the slaughter. That
Turkey, the United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom,
among dozens of other Western and Arab states, have the will to respond
to these atrocity crimes underscores the need to equip these states with
effective response measures.201
196. Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution
on Syria Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/
middleeast/russia-and-china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html.
197. Diplomat to UN: Security Council Has Failed in Syria, CNN (Sept. 28, 1992) [here-
inafter Security Council Has Failed], http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/28/world/meast/syria-civil-
war/index.html.
198. One of Russia’s primary concerns to any U.N. resolution regarding Syria is that it
would result in international military action to oust the Assad regime, as occurred in Libya in
2011. See Gladstone, supra note 196, at 2-3. R
199. Report on the Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 54, at para. 2; see also Security R
Council Has Failed, supra note 197. R
200. See Rome Statute, supra note 94, art. 13. R
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As a result of situations like Syria, the United States is developing a
government wide approach to mass atrocity prevention and response op-
erations. This alone is a significant step and because of the comprehensive
nature of these efforts, there is reason to believe the recommendations of
the Genocide Task Force will be fully implemented.202 Once the domestic,
interagency lines of effort are sorted out, one challenge remains to full
implementation of MARO doctrine. As discussed in the next Part, it is
uncertain at best whether the law permits the use of military force to pro-
tect civilians from slaughter without the authorization of the United Na-
tions. Overcoming this challenge of legal interpretation—and traditional
notions of sovereignty—is vital to responding to atrocity campaigns like
that of Bashar al-Assad.
II. THE LEGALITY OF ATROCITY RESPONSE WHEN THE
UNITED NATIONS FAILS TO ACT
At the 2005 World Summit, every world leader agreed that states have
an affirmative responsibility to protect civilians from slaughter.203 Still,
history demonstrates that the international response to genocide and
crimes against humanity has been a failure, including the cautious re-
sponse to the atrocities occurring in Syria today.204 As such, U.S. efforts to
establish a comprehensive strategy involving diplomatic, economic, intelli-
gence, and military measures to deal with this scourge should be welcomed
by all.205 When the discussion turns to military intervention, however,
there is little consensus on the lawfulness of using force to prevent atrocity
crimes absent U.N. authorization. Recent reports and scholarship recog-
nize that military force may be necessary to prevent or respond to mass
killings in some situations, but most do not address the more difficult
question of the legality of this practice when the UNSC fails to act. This
Part critically analyzes the history of humanitarian intervention as it devel-
oped parallel to jus ad bellum and concludes that a traditional interpreta-
tion of the U.N. Charter prohibits the unilateral use of force even to halt
mass atrocities. Over sixty-five years after the Charter’s inception, how-
ever, the law has evolved. The erosion of state sovereignty, the focus on
202. With regard to military options, the Genocide Report recommends: (1) the Secre-
tary of Defense and military leaders should develop policies, plans, doctrine, training, and
lessons learned for genocide prevention; (2) the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense should leverage military and intelligence capacity for early warning of
atrocity crimes; (3) the Departments of Defense and State should work to enhance the capac-
ity of international, regional, and subregional bodies to develop military capacity to respond
to mass atrocities; (4) increase state preparedness to reinforce or replace U.N., AU, or other
peace operation to prevent atrocities; and (5) the Departments of State and Defense should
enhance U.S. and U.N. capacity to support long term post-conflict stability operations after
genocidal violence. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 87-92. R
203. Summit Report, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 138-139. R
204. See Nic Robertson, Syria Toll Rises to 25; Monitors Cheered in Besieged Town,
CNN (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/15/world/meast/syria-unrest/index
.html?hptHP_t3.
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state responsibility under R2P, and the emergence of the human rights
legal regime must inform a state’s legal analysis when deciding whether to
use force in response to atrocity crimes when the United Nations has
failed to act.
A. Jus ad Bellum & Atrocity Response
The legality of the use of force to prevent atrocity crimes falls within
the body of law governing when states may resort to force: jus ad bellum.
This law developed from natural law principles and state practice to the
modern day U.N. Charter framework. A brief history of the jus ad bellum
demonstrates that the legal authorization to use force to protect civilians
has evolved over centuries. This survey details the current status of the law
and whether a new norm is developing that would authorize unilateral
armed force to respond to atrocity crimes.
Jus ad bellum emerged within natural law teachings, relying on “just
causes” from religious and moral principles to guide decisions to go to
war.206 While these principles sought to limit leaders’ resort to force, there
was no general prohibition on aggressive war. Later, in the nineteenth cen-
tury, state practice and international agreements—positive law—deter-
mined whether the use of force was lawful.207 In the twentieth century,
customary law208 and treaty law209 became the exclusive sources of law
governing armed conflict.210 A general prohibition on the use of force
emerged.211
206. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 33. The Just-War tradition of Saint Thomas Aquinas is R
often cited as evidence of the natural legal justifications for using force. See IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 5 (1993); ANTHONY CLARK &
ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHAR-
TER PARADIGM 11-16 (1993); C.A. POMPE, AGGRESSIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME
125, 127 (1953). Murphy explains that ancient legal traditions typically had requirements
prior to a just use of force that included: “exhaustion of means of reconciliation, the need for
a valid ground for commencing war, the requirement in some circumstances for a declaration
of war prior to its commencement, rules on the conduct of the fighting, and rules on truces
and cessation of the conflict.” MURPHY, supra note 47, at 35-36. R
207. See, e.g., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, I, at 103, 115
(Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CHARTER COMMENTARY] (citing the 1899
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Hague Convention, and the Hague Peace Conferences of
1899 and 1907).
208. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 165 (June 27) (noting that Article 2(4) of the Charter reflects customary law).
209. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug.
27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
210. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 33-34. R
211. For example, following the First World War, the preamble to the League of Na-
tions Covenant announced the acceptance of members “of obligations not to resort to war.”
League of Nations Covenant pmbl., arts. 12, 13, 15. The Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the
Pacific Settlement of Disputes filled in some gaps to the Covenant’s prohibition on the use of
force. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 207, at 115-16; see also Kellogg-Briand Pact, R
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Support for the use of force to prevent tyrants from slaughtering their
people has a long history.212 Aristotle theorized that war could be used to
help others to share in the good life, and disdained rulers who “ask for just
government [among other rulers]; but in the treatment of others they do
not worry at all about what measures are just.”213 In the school of natural
law, then, failure of foreign peoples to abide by “universal principles”
could be a just cause for using force against them.214
The concept of state sovereignty arose following the Peace of West-
phalia in 1648 and set in motion a reinterpretation of when rulers could
wage war against one another.215 Sovereignty at this time meant that rul-
ers could govern their internal affairs in any way they deemed appropriate
without outside interference.216 But even during this time, tensions
emerged between those who viewed using force to prevent widespread
suffering as a “right vested in humanity”217 and those who advocated non-
intervention in order to protect state sovereignty and maintain the balance
of powers among nations.218 This tension remains today.
Even if there existed a universal right to intervene to prevent the
slaughter of civilians, this natural law concept did not survive beyond the
Second World War. Professor Sean Murphy warns, “The fact that older
doctrines [and state practice] regarding the use of force may have included
notions properly associated with humanitarian intervention . . . does not
mean that a right of humanitarian intervention survived into this cen-
tury . . . .”219 The creation of the United Nations, and lessons learned from
212. The concept of humanitarian intervention, however, only arose in the scholarship
of the twentieth century. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 34. R
213. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 396-97 (Trevor J. Saunders ed., T.A.
Sinclair trans., rev. ed. 1992); see also MURPHY, supra note 47, at 38. R
214. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 40. R
215. Id. at 42-43. For a detailed discussion of the role of sovereignty in atrocity preven-
tion and response, see infra Part III.B.
216. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 42. R
217. Influential international scholars in the 17th and 18th centuries, such as Hugo Gro-
tius and Emmerich de Vattel, paid explicit attention to the use of force to prevent the suffer-
ing of those ruled by an unjust sovereign. Id. at 43-46 (citing H. GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF
WAR AND PEACE, bk. 2, ch. 25, para. 8 (F. Kelsey, trans., 1925); E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS, bk. 1, ch. 2, sec. 17 (C. Fenwick trans., 1916)
(finding that the sovereign right to rule at all costs was limited and could result in lawful
outside intervention by foreign powers)).
218. Nonintervention would become the norm, as described in the writings of Imman-
uel Kant and John Stuart Mill. See IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (1939); John Stuart
Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859), reprinted in ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND CUL-
TURE 368 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1962); see also MURPHY, supra note 47, at 46. R
219. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 35; see also Ian Brownlie, International Law and the R
Use of Force by States’ Revisited, 1 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1, 12-19 (2002), stating:
By the end of the nineteenth century the majority of publicists admitted that a right of hu-
manitarian intervention (l’intervention d’humanité) existed. A state which had abused its sov-
ereignty by brutal and excessively cruel treatment of those within its power, whether
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the failed League of Nations, forever altered the legal framework gov-
erning the use of force.
1. Law and the Use of Force: Article 2(4) in Context
The U.N. Charter is the primary legal instrument governing jus ad bel-
lum and explicitly prohibits the use of force as an extension of state policy.
It was drafted in 1945 following two devastating World Wars in order to
prevent aggressive war, protect state sovereignty, and promote human
rights.220 Article 2(4) prohibits states from using force against other
states,221 and is widely regarded as jus cogens—a peremptory norm that is
binding on all states.222 When read in conjunction with article 2(7)223—
prohibiting the United Nations from interfering in states’ domestic mat-
ters—the prohibition against the use of force to protect foreign civilians is
quite broad.
The Charter provides two explicit exceptions to the general prohibi-
tion on the use of force. First, the U.N. Security Council may authorize
collective security measures under its Chapter VII authority after it has
determined that there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression.224 The second type of authorized force is individual or col-
lective self-defense pursuant to Article 51.225
prepared to intervene. [By 1963] few experts believed that humanitarian intervention had
survived the legal regime created by the United Nations Charter.
220. See generally STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF
THE UNITED NATIONS (2003) (describing the political and legal circumstances surrounding
the drafting of the U.N. Charter at the San Francisco Conference in 1945).
221. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (providing, “[a]ll members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”).
222. DINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 99-102 (discussing authorities that consider the prohi- R
bition on the use of force a peremptory norm); see also Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1283. R
223. U.N. Charter art. 2(7).
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Id.
224. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42. “The Security Council has shown that human rights
violations may, under certain circumstances, be regarded as threats to the peace and rampant
and egregious violations of essential human rights may constitute “breaches” of the peace.”
Dan Kuwali, Old Crimes, New Paradigms: Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes, in MASS ATROC-
ITY CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES, supra note 24, at 26 (citing the U.N. interven- R
tions in Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), and Haiti (1994) as evidence
that the UNSC will authorize Chapter VII action to end mass atrocities). Although the inter-
vention in Haiti may not have been in response to atrocity crimes, there was a disruption of a
democratic regime leading to a threat to the peace.
225. U.N. Charter art. 51 (providing, “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
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Beyond these explicit exceptions, there is no consensus on whether
the Charter provides an implicit exception for military intervention to pre-
vent or respond to mass atrocities.226 The following Subsections examine
the legality of humanitarian intervention by interpreting Article 2(4) in
terms of (a) the plain meaning of the Charter’s text, (b) subsequent inter-
pretation and practice by U.N. member states, and (c) whether preexisting
or emerging custom has changed the normative character of the Char-
ter.227 After undergoing this analysis, if the Charter’s terms remain ambig-
uous or lead to a “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” result, then
supplementary interpretive materials—such as the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion—may be utilized.228
a. Plain Language of the Charter
The terms of the Charter appear unambiguous at first blush. A use of
force, of nearly any kind, will be a violation of the territorial integrity or
political independence of the target state, and is therefore prohibited. To
traditionalists, it is irrelevant whether the use of force is to prevent the
slaughter of civilians; it still must be authorized by the UNSC or be taken
under a theory of self-defense.229 Under this view, unilateral intervention
in response to atrocity crimes is a prima facie violation of Article 2(4).230
In support of this position, traditionalists point to the drafting history of
the Charter to demonstrate that the language “territorial integrity or polit-
226. Although the issue was given consideration in 1958 by Julius Stone, the scholarly
debate regarding the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention in the Charter era can rightly
be said to have begun with Richard B. Lillich’s proclamation that humanitarian intervention
is lawful. See JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 95, 98-99 (1958); Richard B.
Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 326
(1967); see also Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to
Protect the Ibos in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167 (Richard
B. Lillich ed., 1973); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United
Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (1968). But see Ian
Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217,
219 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) (arguing that intervention is unlawful absent U.N.
authorization).
227. This subsection follows the analytical model of treaty interpretation found in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinaf-
ter VCLT].
228. Id. art. 32.
229. For scholars taking the traditional approach, the use of military force, even if for
humanitarian purposes, is unlawful absent UNSC authorization or self-defense purposes. See,
e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND USE OF FORCE BY STATES 342 (1963);
MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT
102-103 (2005); DINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 91; MURPHY, supra note 47, at 72 (stating that R
even if the intervention is only for a short term and is for a good purpose, it runs afoul of
Article 2(4)); Brownlie, supra note 226, at 219; Franck & Rodley, supra note 44, at 267; Mary R
Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57,
70 (2002) (stating that there is no customary right or treaty that authorizes humanitarian
intervention without UNSC approval); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed
Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1629 (1984).
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ical independence” was added to strengthen the prohibition against non-
UNSC authorized force, not to limit its application.231
To modernists, the intent of the intervening state is relevant to the
lawfulness of the use of force. Under this interpretation, the purpose of
using force to prevent mass atrocities is not to annex or occupy territory,
nor is it to overthrow a sitting government.232 Although these actions may
in fact occur in the course of military operations, they are ancillary to, and
not the goal of, missions to prevent and arrest genocide.233 However, a
similar argument failed in the Corfu Channel case, where the ICJ invali-
dated U.K. claims that its unilateral minesweeping in Albanian waters was
not for the purpose of intervention as prohibited in Art. 2(4).234
Similarly, some suggest that the phrase “or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the purposes of the United Nations” permits humanitarian in-
tervention.235 These scholars maintain that because one of the purposes of
the Charter was to promote respect for human rights,236 intervening to
231. See Comm’n I: Gen. Provisions, Summary Report of Seventh Meeting of Commit-
tee 1/1, [1945] 6 Doc. U.N. Conf. on Int’l Org. 331, 334-35, Doc. 784; Comm’n I: Gen. Provi-
sions, Summary Report of Seventh Meeting of Committee 1/1, [1945] 6 Doc. U.N. Conf. on
Int’l Org. 342, 342, Doc. 810 (adopting provision unanimously); RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HIS-
TORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 456-57 (1958)
(explaining that the drafters’ interest was in codifying an obligation stronger than a mere
promise not to use force); CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 207, 117-18, 124; Brownlie, R
supra note 109, at 268 (stating that “the phrase under discussion was not intended to be R
restrictive but, on the contrary, to give more specific guarantees to small states and that it
cannot be interpreted as having a qualifying effect.”); Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1286; R
Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 645, 648-49
(1984) (arguing that it is not logically consistent to argue for right to use force to protect
human rights).
232. Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea
for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 236-37 (John
Norton Moore ed., 1974).
233. For scholars taking the modernist view, intervention for humanitarian purposes
does not violate the plain language of Article 2(4) and, in any event, may be justified under
certain circumstances. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 226, at 95; TESÓN, supra note 109, at 217; R
Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTER-
VENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); John Norton
Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT’L L. 205, 264
(1969).
234. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
235. U.N. Charter art. 2(4); STONE, supra note 226, at 43, 95-96. R
236. See U.N. Charter pmbl. (“to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.”), art.
1(3) (stating its goal to “achieve international co-operation in . . .promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights.”), art. 13(1) (providing that the GA “shall initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of . . . assisting in the realization of human rights.”), art. 55
(requiring the United Nations to “promote. . .universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights.”), art. 56 (requiring states to take “joint and separate action in co-operation
with the [UN]” to achieve universal respect for human rights.), arts. 62, 68 (establishing the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which is called upon to establish a commission
promoting human rights.), art. 76 (establishing the basic objectives of the U.N. trusteeship
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prevent widespread atrocities is consistent with the Charter.237 However, a
textual interpretation of the Charter illustrates that the “or” in Article
2(4) supplements the general prohibition on the use of force. This means
that states may not use force against other states as a general matter, but
they are also prohibited from the threat or use of force in a manner that
runs afoul of the Charter’s other purposes.238
Looking beyond article 2(4), some find support for unilateral atrocity
response operations in the human rights provisions of the Charter. As
noted above, the protection of human rights is a primary purpose of the
U.N. Charter239 but is often given second billing to regulating the use of
force and ensuring state sovereignty.240 In fact, advocates of a unilateral
MARO policy should be cautious of reading too much into the Charter’s
human rights provisions. First, these provisions arise in a nonbinding con-
text. Language such as the United Nations shall “promote” human rights,
or its members are “determined” to “reaffirm” does not create obligations
or appear to modify the prohibition on the use of force.241 Second, the
last-minute inclusion of the human rights language into the draft Charter
at San Francisco indicates that the delegates were primarily concerned
with peace and security.242
b. Subsequent Interpretation & Practice
The legality of unilateral MARO must reside beyond a formalist
Charter interpretation, if at all, and can be gleaned from “any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
or the application of its provisions.”243 While traditionalists tend to view
the Charter as a static document, modernists consider Charter interpreta-
tion to evolve to meet modern challenges.244 One such subsequent agree-
ment was the General Assembly’s adoption of the Uniting for Peace
resolution in 1950, which permits the General Assembly to recommend
the use of force when the UNSC fails to act, but only if two-thirds of Mem-
237. See generally Lillich, supra note 232; Reisman, supra note 64, at 76. R
238. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 73. R
239. U.N. Charter supra note 63, art. 1(3). R
240. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 69-70. R
241. Hurd, supra note 156, at 10. R
242. Clark Eichelberger is widely acknowledged as being responsible for getting human
rights into the Charter, including the Human Rights Commission. SCHLESINGER, supra note
220, at 124. See also MURPHY, supra note 47, at 66. But see Michael Reisman, Criteria for the R
Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 279, 279-81 (1985); Reisman,
Coercion and Self-Determination, supra note 72, at 642 (arguing that intervention would be R
unnecessary if the United Nations functioned according to terms of the Charter).
243. VCLT, supra note 227, art. 31(3)(a). R
244. See, e.g., HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 149 (2005); see also CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 207, at 13, 26 (argu- R
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bers vote in favor.245 This resolution does little to change the nonbinding
nature of General Assembly resolutions, nor does it take away from the
primacy of the UNSC in matters of peace and security.246 Nonetheless,
this was a significant blow to the UNSC’s authority—a recognition that
political paralysis, at the time a result of Cold War power politics, requires
other actors to make decisions. As a result, the UNSC’s ability to author-
ize the use of force is no longer absolute, and the General Assembly could
recommend that states intervene in situations of mass human rights
violations.
Another subsequent interpretation of the Charter is General Assem-
bly Resolution 3314, which serves as a nonbinding guide for the UNSC
when determining whether state acts constitute a “threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”247 Making no distinction based
on the purpose of the intervention, the prohibited acts in Resolution 3314
are comprehensive, making virtually any use of force an act of aggres-
sion.248 This is just one of many subsequent interpretations of the Char-
ter’s prohibition on the use of force and the requirement to resolve
disputes peacefully.249
Instances of U.N.-authorized force are instructive as to the appropri-
ate circumstances for intervention, particularly because the Security Coun-
cil maintains control over decisions to use force for nondefensive
purposes.250 The Security Council’s interpretation of its authority to main-
tain peace and security has developed from resolving international armed
conflicts to reacting to intrastate human rights violations and atrocity
crimes.251 During the Cold War, for example, there were only two in-
245. See G.A. Res 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 3, 1950) (“Uniting for Peace Reso-
lution”), which provides that in cases of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression,
the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropri-
ate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach
of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.
246. The Uniting for Peace Resolution has rarely been invoked. Two notable examples
were in the 1950s during the Korean crisis and to establish the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEFI) to oversee the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel in 1950. Reis-
man, supra note 64, at 73 n.48. R
247. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).
248. G.A. Res. 3314, Article 3 provides that aggressive acts include: invading territory
or military occupation, however temporary; the use of any weapons against the territory of
another state; blockades; a use of force against the armed forces of another state; using force
within the territory of another state beyond any prescribed agreement permitting the pres-
ence of the “visiting” state; allowing another state to launch aggressive attacks from a state’s
territory; sending armed groups to carry out attacks against another state. Id.
249. For a summary of declarations and resolutions, see CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra
note 207, at 104. R
250. Reisman, supra note 64, at 78 (stating, “the explicit language of the U.N. Charter, R
as repeatedly and authoritatively construed, does not allow actions to prevent or arrest mass
killings without Security Council authorization.”).
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stances when the UNSC authorized member states to use force: (1) in 1950
after North Korea invaded the South, and even then the UNSC only “rec-
ommended” that Members assist South Korea;252 and (2) in 1966 to pre-
vent, “by use of force if necessary,” the arrival in Mozambique of tankers
believed to be carrying oil for Southern Rhodesia.253
Since the end of the Cold War, the UNSC has authorized force more
frequently. Specifically, it authorized force in the following six situa-
tions:254 (1) to repel Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,255 (2) to facilitate
humanitarian assistance in Bosnia in 1992,256 (3) to establish a secure envi-
ronment for humanitarian assistance in Somalia in 1992,257 (4) to restore
the Aristide government in 1994 in Haiti,258 (5) to combat piracy in
Somalia’s territorial waters and land in 2008,259 and (6) in 2011 to protect
civilians in Libya.260
The legality of the above interventions, at least half of which were
based on humanitarian assistance or the protection of civilians from re-
gime violence, is not questioned because UNSC resolutions are legally
binding on all member states. Nonetheless, the practice of the United Na-
tions since the 1990s demonstrates a seismic shift in the perception of mas-
sive human rights violations. No longer the exclusive business of
perpetrator states, “internal violations of human rights” are now recog-
nized as threats to international peace and security that may require force-
ful intervention.261 The nexus between the human rights violation and
international peace and security is essential. The UNSC is not authorized
to take Chapter VII action for any severe violation of human rights with-
out this crucial link.262 It is when the UNSC fails to act to prevent atrocity
crimes that unilateral or multilateral intervention is called into
question.263
252. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (June 27, 1950).
253. S.C. Res. 221, ¶5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (Apr. 9, 1966). See generally BYERS, supra
note 229. R
254. MICHAEL J. MATHESON, COUNCIL UNBOUND: THE GROWTH OF UN DECISION
MAKING ON CONFLICT AND POSTCONFLICT ISSUES AFTER THE COLD WAR 145-58 (2006).
255. S.C. Res. 678, ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 23, 1990).
256. S.C. Res. 770, ¶6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (Aug. 13, 1990).
257. S.C. Res. 794, ¶3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
258. S.C. Res. 940, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 940 (July 31, 1994).
259. S.C. Res. 1851, ¶6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); see also S.C. Res. 1838,
¶¶3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, ¶7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June
2, 2008).
260. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
261. Reisman, supra note 64, at 71-72. R
262. See CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 207, at 725. R
263. See Paul R. Williams & Meghan E. Stewart, Humanitarian Intervention: The New
Missing Link in the Fight to Prevent Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide?, 40 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 97, 97 (2008) (arguing that the lack of a legal framework permitting humani-
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Member States’ interpretations of the Charter’s terms are reflected in
actions taken by regional organizations to halt ongoing conflict and atroci-
ties—often without prior U.N. authorization.264 The U.N. Charter specifi-
cally contemplates action for maintenance of peace and security by
regional organizations.265 The African Union, for example, allows AU
Members to intervene in the event of genocide.266 NATO famously inter-
vened in 1999 to prevent Serb atrocities in Kosovo without U.N.- backing.
Still, the lawfulness of forcible measures taken by regional actors is based
on UNSC authorization.267 Even if the AU Charter or other regional
agreements authorized collective action without U.N. authorization, such
provisions are considered ultra vires, since article 103 of the U.N. Charter
requires any conflict between another treaty and the U.N. Charter to be
settled in favor of the U.N. Charter’s terms.268
The ICJ is also empowered to determine when the use of force is law-
ful,269 although rulings on the legality of conflicts are rare—particularly as
it relates to humanitarian intervention. Generally taking a cautious ap-
proach, the ICJ has until very recently rejected forceful measures to pre-
vent massive human rights violations without UNSC authorization.
Specifically, the Court has reaffirmed that self-defense under Article 51
and UNSC Chapter VII authority are the only two exceptions to the pro-
hibition on the use of force;270 there are no implicit exceptions to the
Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force;271 collective armed re-
sponse is not permitted unless it is in response to an armed attack;272 the
use of force is not permitted to ensure respect for human rights;273 and
264. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text (describing examples of regional R
interventions).
265. See U.N. Charter arts. 52(1), 53(1).
266. See A.U. Charter art. 4(h) (granting the A.U.’s right to collective action, rather
than a right for individual states to intervene).
267. See U.N. Charter art. 53(1).
268. See id. art. 103. If this provision relates to future treaties, then arguably subsequent
human rights treaties, including the genocide convention, cannot be used to weaken the pro-
hibition on the use of force. See also Hurd, supra note 156, at 6-7. R
269. See Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, art. 36(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI.
270. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 244(38) (July 8).
271. See, e.g., Corfu Channel supra 234 (rejecting the UK’s argument that emergency R
circumstances implicitly allowed it the right to sweep Albanian territorial waters for mines,
which had previously done damage to UK ships, using its naval forces).
272. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 208, R
¶¶246-49.
273. Id. ¶268; MURPHY, supra note 47, at 129; N.S. Rodley, Human Rights and Humani- R
tarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 321, 332
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UNSC resolutions may not be read to imply the authorization to use
force.274
Two cases involving the former Yugoslavia are critical to the Court’s
interpretation of armed force in response to atrocity crimes. In 1999, the
Court was highly critical of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, stating that
the Court was “profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia”
and that “under the present circumstances, such use raises very serious
issues of international law.”275
Almost a decade later, the Court issued a seminal opinion, which
could serve as the legal basis for unilateral MARO, at least with regard to
the crime of genocide.276 In the Genocide Case, brought by Bosnia and
Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro, the Court held that “the ob-
ligation of states parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available
to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible.”277 This case can be
interpreted in one of two ways. Either it means states must do whatever is
necessary, including unilateral MARO, to halt genocide, or it can stand for
the proposition that intervention is not lawful since that is not a “means
reasonably available to [States]” without U.N. authorization.278 In any
event, the Court made clear that states will be responsible for failing to
prevent genocide if they did not take whatever action they could “at the
instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the
existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.”279
c. Customary Right to Intervene
As it appears the Charter cannot clearly be interpreted to permit hu-
manitarian intervention without UNSC approval, many support the idea
that there is a customary right to intervene to prevent massive human
rights violations that preexists the Charter.280 This right, it is argued, has
not been diminished in the Charter era.
State practice at the end of the nineteenth century reflects a policy of
humanitarian intervention. Several instances, mostly involving European
states intervening to protect Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire,
274. Armed Activities on the Territory of The Congo (Dem. Rep. of Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶152 (Dec. 19) (holding that Uganda violated Article 2(4) when it
used military force in the DRC, even though the UNSC recognized states’ responsibility for
peace in the region. This was a direct refutation of the ability to rely on UNSC resolutions for
implied authority to use force).
275. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. 124, 132 (June 2).
276. See Reisman, supra note 64, at 81-85. R
277. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 169, ¶430 (Feb. 26) [hereinaf-
ter Genocide Case]. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Reisman, supra note 64, at 80- R
84.
278. See Genocide Case, supra note 277. R
279. Id. ¶431.
280. NEIL FENTON, UNDERSTANDING THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 14 (2004); Moore,
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suggest that this practice was accepted.281 It is also recognized that “[b]y
the end of the nineteenth century the majority of publicists admitted that a
right of humanitarian intervention (l’intervention d’humanité) existed.”282
In the Charter era, it is uncertain at best whether states have retained
a right to intervene for human rights purposes. It is widely acknowledged
that self-defense was a right that preexisted the U.N. Charter, and is a
legal right of states with or without the Charter’s article 51 authorization.
In contrast, there is no explicit language in the Charter regarding an “in-
herent right” to unilateral humanitarian intervention, and so we must look
to whether a customary norm survived the general prohibition on the use
of force in article 2(4).
There are two requirements for a norm to be considered customary
international law. First, there must be state practice that is “constant and
uniform.”283 Second, states engaging in this practice must demonstrate
opinio juris, or “evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obliga-
tory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”284 State practice in the
Charter era does not provide a clear picture of the legality of force to halt
atrocities. Although states undertook unilateral interventions that had ob-
vious humanitarian effects, it is not clear that they did so out of a sense of
a binding legal obligation.
The previously discussed interventions in the 1970s in East Pakistan
(Bangladesh), Cambodia, and Uganda effectively halted atrocities, but
were justified on the grounds of self-defense, undermining the argument
that there was a humanitarian legal norm at play.285 Similarly, the United
States led no-fly zones in Iraq to protect the Kurds and Marsh Arabs286
were justified in large part on implied U.N. authorization.287 Even in
281. Hubert, supra note 44, at 90. See Part I.C. infra for a more detailed discussion of R
these and other historical cases of humanitarian intervention.
282. BROWNLIE, supra note 229, at 338. Lillich also cites several authors for the proposi- R
tion that humanitarian intervention was a customary norm prior to the Charter, including,
Grotius, Vattel, Wheaton, Heiberg, Woolsey, Bluntschli, Westlake, Rougier, Arntz, Winfield,
Stowell, Borchard, and others. Lillich, supra note 232, at 232 (citing E. STOWELL, INTERVEN- R
TION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 461-540 (1921)). Those in the noninterventionist camp include
Halleck, Angelins Wedenhagen, Kant, Despagnet, Mamiani, Pradier-Fodere, and Brownlie.
Lillich, supra note 232, at 232 n.23. R
283. Asylum Case (Colom. V. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (Nov. 20).
284. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Neth.; Ger. v. Den.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3,
44 (Feb. 20).
285. For additional sources and discussion see infra Part I.C.1; notes 113-14. See also R
MURPHY, supra note 47, at 97-100, 102-07. Compare France’s humanitarian justification for R
intervening in the Central African Republic in 1979. Id. at 143. The international community
largely accepted France’s intervention, and it is interesting to note that it occurred after a
multilateral Commission of Inquiry made a determination that the Central African Repub-
lic’s emperor, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, had engaged in atrocity crimes. Id. at 107-08.
286. MICHAEL A. NEWTON & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE: THE TRIAL
AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 65 (2008); MURPHY, supra note 47, at 172, 179. R
287. These actions were not debated or authorized by the UNSC, and Resolution 688,
which established a threat to peace and security in northern Iraq due to the brutal treatment
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NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, most states involved in the mission relied
on moral justifications,288 or implied UNSC consent to enforce prior reso-
lutions.289 The United Kingdom290 and Belgium291 were the only two
states that argued the intervention was lawful based on humanitarian
norms. In spite of these two exceptions, most states, including the United
States, suggested that the cause was justified but should not serve as
grounds for future interventions without U.N. authorization.292
The international community’s reaction to humanitarian interventions
has not been consistent. In 1990, ECOWAS intervened to prevent the
bloodshed of a multi-party civil war in Liberia.293 Although this action was
taken by a sub-regional organization without U.N. authorization, it was
later “endorsed” by the UNSC294 and was almost universally well received
in the international community.295 In 1997, the UNSC subsequently en-
dorsed the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone months after troops
attempted to halt massacres led by Charles Taylor.296 Contrast the
favorable reaction to these interventions with the negative response to the
unilateral actions taken in the 1970s.297 The penultimate example is the
dated or individual state force. Still, while the United States emphasized implied U.N. au-
thorization based on UNSC resolutions, the United Kingdom was more forceful in suggesting
“humanitarian need” and a “customary international law principle of humanitarian interven-
tion.” MURPHY, supra note 47, at 188, 190 (internal citations omitted). R
288. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24, 1999)
(stating that Germany, holding Presidency of EU at time, informed the UNSC that the EU
had a “moral obligation” to respond.).
289. See 328 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 617 (U.K.) (statement of U.K. Defense
Secretary George Robertson), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm1998
99/cmhansrd/vo990325/debtext/90325-33.htm#90325-33_spnew3; Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release SC/6659, at 4, 7 (Mar. 26, 1999) (statements of
France and Netherlands citing prior UNSC resolutions).
290. SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOURTH RE-
PORT, 2000, H.C., ¶¶129-34 (U.K.); MARK LITMAN, KOSOVO: LAW AND DIPLOMACY (1999);
Christopher Greenwood, Jurisdiction, NATO, and the Kosovo Conflict, in ASSERTING JURIS-
DICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEGAL APPROACHES 151-61 (Patrick Capps, Mal-
colm Evans & Stratos Konstadinidis eds., 2003).
291. Oral Pleading of Belgium, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J.
Pleadings 15 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf (un-
corrected translation).
292. Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1288. R
293. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 146-51. R
294. See discussion supra note 119. R
295. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 163. Professor Mohamed suggests that even though the R
legality of the operation was not debated, “[t]he only clear conclusion from the ECOWAS
intervention is that the international community was willing not only to condone, but also to
commend, the intervention of a regional organization in an internal violent conflict without
authorization of the Security Council.” Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1309. R
296. See discussion supra note 120. R
297. See MURPHY, supra note 47, at 143 (citing a number of reasons for the negative R
response to the interventions in East Pakistan, Cambodia, and Uganda, including a post-war
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mixed global response to NATO’s Kosovo bombing campaign. Far from
establishing opinio juris, numerous scholars298 and most states299 did not
believe a legal right of humanitarian intervention existed, even if the ac-
tion was seen as legitimate.300
Modern practice and global response does not support a customary
international norm of humanitarian intervention. While each situation
represents interventions that halted, or attempted to stop, atrocity crimes,
each comes with certain caveats. In the 1970s cases, the intervening states
did not justify their actions—with the exception of France in the Central
African Republic—on humanitarian grounds, but rather on a right of self-
defense. Later in the 1990s, the world community supported cases that
later received UNSC approval (Liberia and Sierra Leone), but disap-
proved of others (Iraq and Kosovo). Rather than reflect opinio juris on
unilateral mass atrocity response, these cases show a world community
that is still deeply divided on the issue such that a right of humanitarian
intervention cannot be said to have supplanted the general principle of
nonintervention in Article 2(4).301
d. Drafters’ Intent
That the law as currently interpreted forbids unilateral intervention to
save civilians from slaughter is truly an “absurd result.”302 It is at this
point that an examination of the true purposes behind the Charter’s prohi-
bition on force is necessary to clarify whether the drafters of the Charter
intended to prohibit humanitarian intervention outright. Although the
scope of article 2(4) was intended to be quite broad, there is insufficient
force, a general mistrust of the superpowers’ motives, a visceral distaste among newly inde-
pendent nations of foreign intervention, and a general fear of the escalation of conflict in the
age of nuclear weapons).
298. See discussion supra note 123. R
299. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Debate Surveyed Pros and Cons of
Humanitarian Intervention, Globalization, Poverty, UN Reform, Observes Assembly Presi-
dent, U.N. Press Release GA/SM/105 (Oct. 2, 1999); see also Mohamed, supra note 106, at R
1306 n.127.
300. See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 125, at 4. In prophetic fashion, Brownlie and R
Lillich writing in 1974 suggested that in cases of humanitarian intervention, states might con-
done the action, even if the world community does not approve. LILLICH, supra note 232, at R
230.
301. Thomas Franck, argued that Article 2(4) no longer has the force of law because of
numerous and significant derogations during the Charter era: “The prohibition against the
use of force in relations between states has been eroded beyond recognition.” Thomas M.
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States,
64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 835 (1970). More recently, Michael Glennon argued “the Charter’s
use-of-force regime has all but collapsed.” Michael Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense,
Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 539, 539 (2002); see also Lillich, supra note 232, at 248. Even if it is true that the laws R
governing the use of force are more often recognized in the breach, the international commu-
nity’s reaction to the humanitarian interventions previously discussed does not reflect global
opinion to abandon the Charter paradigm of world order.
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evidence to conclude that the drafters gave humanitarian intervention se-
rious consideration.
The San Francisco Conference in 1945 was in the immediate aftermath
of two devastating World Wars and at a time when state sovereignty was
absolute as a concept. Delegates in attendance were concerned with
“above all, the suppression of armed conflict.”303 Although humanitarian
intervention as a response to atrocities was not discussed at the confer-
ence, this was due to the contextual focus on ending wars of aggression,
not the absence of an international right to such intervention at the
time.304 Because the issue of humanitarian intervention was not given seri-
ous consideration,305 it is hardly convincing to suggest that the general
prohibition in article 2(4) absolutely prohibits action to halt the worst
atrocities known to man, when that was, in fact, not the focus of the
negotiations.306
Another focal point of the drafters was to ensure that armed force
would only be used in the interest of the international community.307 As
one scholar notes, “The decision of the drafters to vest in the Security
Council control over the nondefensive use of force signifies a determina-
tion to change the character of military force by preventing states from
resorting to arms to pursue national interests.”308 However, is it in the
national or international interest to intervene to prevent mass atrocities?
Resolving this question necessarily raises issues of the underlying intent of
intervening states.309 Functioning properly, the Charter would allow col-
lective action “for the countering of aggression and the upholding of com-
munity values.”310 This would eliminate the need for states to act
303. Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1282. President Roosevelt made it clear that the U.S. R
focus was on suppressing aggressive war when he said, “The policy we hope and believe will
emerge from the San Francisco Conference and others to follow will embody cooperation
among nations to keep down aggressors.” Schlesinger, supra note 220, at 7. Human rights R
were not initially contemplated as a purpose of the new organization, and were only added to
the Charter’s purpose near the end of negotiations. See Proposals for the Establishment of a
General International Organization, Oct. 7, 1944, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 890, 890 (1944).
304. It is noteworthy that the Charter begins with a commitment to “save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war,” making no reference to mass atrocities except for a
passing mention of human rights. See U.N. Charter pmbl.
305. Brownlie, supra note 226, at 222 (suggesting that “[t]he participating governments R
took a view of the legal regime as a whole” and “made no reference to what statesmen would
have regarded as a non-issue [i.e. humanitarian intervention].”).
306. See also Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1285 (stating that the intent of the drafters in R
Art. 2(4) was to “formulate language that would make clear that armed force should not be
used in the absence of U.N. authorization,” but without citing to language from the travaux
préparatoires). See generally CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 207. R
307. The preamble provides that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest.” U.N. Charter pmbl.
308. Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1318. R
309. For a detailed discussion of pretextual concerns in unilateral MARO, see infra Part
IV.D.
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unilaterally. In spite of this intent, and assuming that preventing atrocity
crimes is in the common interest, the United Nations has not supplanted
the need of state action in this area as evidenced by the repeated failure to
stop these crimes.
B. The Emergence of Contingent Sovereignty
Beyond the Charter’s general prohibition on intervention, state sover-
eignty is a significant impediment to effective action to prevent atrocity
crimes. State sovereignty, the right of states to conduct internal affairs
without outside interference,311 not only allows perpetrator states to con-
tinue killing civilians, but also justifies inaction by the world commu-
nity.312 Originating with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648,313 and today
enshrined in the U.N. Charter,314 the concept has been the fundamental
building block of international relations for several centuries. With respect
to atrocity crimes, however, sovereignty is susceptible to challenge.315
Since the United Nation’s founding, the erosion of absolute sovereignty
through the development of human rights law, the rise of the individual as
a subject of international law, and the emergence of sovereignty as respon-
sibility under R2P indicates that traditional barriers are being broken in
favor of protecting civilians from slaughter.
Today, the U.N. Charter codifies the principle of state sovereignty in
articles 2(1) and 2(7).316 Some questioned the inclusion of these articles in
1945, suggesting that they were detrimental to the Charter’s goals of peace
311. See discussion infra notes 312-314. R
312. In the face of mounting atrocities, governments will often “seek refuge in the prin-
ciple of a state’s sovereign right of noninterference in its internal affairs at the expense of
victims of mass atrocities.” GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 95. R
313. See MURPHY, supra note 47, at 42 (suggesting that in its earliest form, sovereignty R
meant a ruler wielded absolute power over his subjects); see also HURST HANNUM, AUTON-
OMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING
RIGHTS 14-26 (1990); ROBERT A. KLEIN, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AMONG STATES: THE HIS-
TORY OF AN IDEA (1974); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, POWER, THE STATE, AND SOVEREIGNTY:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 179-210 (2009); EDWARD C. LUCK, SOVEREIGNTY,
CHOICE, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 10-21
(2009); Sewall, supra note 153, at 161; Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1319 (discussing how R
only a legitimate authority can wager war under the Western just war tradition). But even in
ancient times, some warned of the hazards of abusing this power. Aristotle stated, “To rule at
all costs, not only justly but unjustly, is unlawful, and merely to have the upper hand is not
necessarily to have just title to it . . . .” Aristotle, supra note 213. R
314. U.N. Charter art. 2(1) (providing that the “Organization is based on the principle
of sovereign equality of all its Members”); U.N. Charter art. 2(7) (“Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”).
315. See Ferencz, supra note 1, at 26 (suggesting that “[t]he idea of sovereignty itself is R
an obsolete notion.”).
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and security.317 In fact, the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4)
was meant in part to uphold and protect article 2(1)’s concept of the sover-
eign equality of all states.318 The question remains whether there is a limit
to what a sovereign state may do within its own borders before other
states may lawfully intervene to prevent grossly unjust behavior against
the target state’s civilians. As former Secretary-General Kofi Annan
stated, the U.N. Charter’s purpose was “to protect individual human be-
ings, not to protect those who abuse them.”319
Still, the language of the Charter is not so permissive. As discussed
above, the drafters of the U.N. Charter gave little consideration to human
rights, focusing instead on preventing aggressive war.320 At the time, the
human rights regime was only just beginning. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948, preceded just days before by Lemkin’s Geno-
cide Convention, laid the foundation for modern human rights law.321
Since then, the human rights regime has flourished in its nearly seventy-
year history. Subsequent treaties, regional courts, and the development of
ICL have significantly strengthened what were once considered nonbind-
ing, aspirational goals.322 Not only does this body of law prohibit states
from taking certain actions against civilians, but heads of state will be held
individually responsible for certain violations.
The human rights legal framework has also eroded state sovereignty
by shifting the focus from the state to the individual, making civilians sub-
jects of international law—an area that traditionally only regulated state
behavior.323 Even though enforcement of the human rights regime is often
lacking, many of its norms, including the prohibition of atrocity crimes, are
now considered jus cogens.324 This places the prohibition of genocide on
par with the jus cogens norm of the non-use of force, a status that the
317. After the San Francisco Conference, John F. Kennedy noted, “The international
relinquishing of sovereignty would have to spring from the people—it would have to be so
strong that the elected delegates would be turned out of office if they failed to do it,”
and, The New Yorker journalist, E.B. White, added that “under all is the steady throbbing of
the engines: sovereignty, sovereignty, sovereignty.” Schlesinger, supra note 220, at 156. R
318. See CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 207, at 109. But see Reisman, supra note R
64, at 58 (“[A] major purpose of international law, is the provision of security, which means R
the protection of individual lives.”).
319. Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST Sept. 18, 1999, at 49-50,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/324795.
320. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. R
321. See HENRY J. STEINER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 344 (4th ed., 1994)
(citing ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD (1990)).
322. For a discussion of international human rights law and international criminal law,
see supra Part II.B.
323. See generally RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW (2011) (discussing an emerging the-
ory of individual-centric international law).
324. Sources indicating that the prohibition of genocide is a jus cogens norm, include:
Cases Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Advisory
Opinion, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶34 (Feb. 5); Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 7 (May 28);
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principle of non-intervention has never reached.325 For this reason, one
might conclude that a sovereign’s right to be free of interference is secon-
dary and may give way when it commits atrocity crimes.326
The most striking recent development in the international legal and
political landscape is the emphasis on sovereignty as responsibility, or con-
tingent sovereignty.327 Where efforts to justify humanitarian intervention
failed because of the focus on the lawfulness of the intervening state’s ac-
tions, contingent sovereignty shifts the burden to states to prove that they
are fulfilling certain responsibilities, not least of which include the respon-
sibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes.328 For example, in re-
sponse to Syria’s brutal crackdown of a popular uprising that began in
March 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “From our per-
spective, [President Assad] has lost legitimacy, he has failed to deliver on
the promises he’s made, he has sought and accepted aid from the Iranians
as to how to repress his own people.”329 During the crisis in Libya in 2011,
Italy similarly commented that the Libyan government “no longer exists,”
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶541 (Aug. 2, 2001); see also
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 444-45 (2000).
325. See CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 207, at 109. R
326. But see ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 148-50 (2007)
(warning against the false narrative of human rights triumphing over sovereign rights).
327. Hurd, supra note 156, at 21 (“The idea of contingent sovereignty suggests that R
statehood itself is legally dependant on acceptable government behavior, such that failure of
a government to meet certain minimum standards nullifies its claim to noninterference.”).
Another variation of this concept is the theory of relational sovereignty. Helen Stacy, Hu-
manitarian Intervention and Relational Sovereignty, in INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, AND TOR-
TURE 6 (Stephen Lee ed., 2006).
328. See for example, the Genocide Report, providing:
It has often been argued that external action in response to threats of genocide constitutes
unacceptable interference in a country’s domestic affairs. There is a growing understanding,
however, that sovereignty implies rights and obligations, and that states have a basic respon-
sibility to protect their citizens from genocide and mass atrocities. No government has the
right to use national sovereignty as a shield behind which it can murder its own people.
GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at xxi. R
Gareth Evans, a sponsor of R2P in the ICISS Report, also stated,
[E]ven the strongest supporters of state sovereignty will admit today that no state
holds unlimited power to do what it wants to its own people. It is now commonly
acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility . . . . In international
human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself, sovereignty is
now understood as embracing this dual responsibility.
Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 99, 102
(2002).
329. Clinton Says Syria’s Assad Has Lost Legitimacy, REUTERS (July 12, 2011), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/us-syria-idUSLDE76A0I620110712; see also, Syria Con-
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thereby releasing Italy of its obligation to honor treaties with Qaddafi’s
regime.330
The concept of R2P directly challenges traditional notions of sover-
eignty,331 but also signals a dramatic shift in focus to the state where atroc-
ities occur. Still, R2P is limited in that its focus is on multilateral assistance
to prevent atrocities in the first place, and, if necessary, U.N.-authorized
intervention to respond to ongoing massacres.332 At least one critic argues
that this concept fails to take the necessary next step: authorizing state
action when the UNSC is incapable of mounting an effective response.333
Although R2P in the 2005 World Summit Report did not define the
threshold for military intervention, nor did it prioritize R2P over non-in-
tervention rights, it did set the normative terrain for intervention by re-
jecting the notion that sovereignty can serve as a shield to abusive
leaders.334
R2P and the concept of contingent sovereignty could lead to the con-
clusion that a state engaging in atrocity crimes is stripped of the protec-
tions sovereignty affords, including the right of non-intervention. Once the
sovereign shield is removed, then the leadership may have lost the legiti-
macy to rule, paving the way for armed intervention. This does not neces-
sarily change the nature of the prohibition on the use of force, but rather
diminishes the right to political independence and territorial integrity of
the violating state and its right to sovereign equality.335
The principle of necessity, as found in the International Law Commis-
sion’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ILC Report),336 also under-
mines the notion of absolute sovereignty. Under article 25, states violating
international law may justify their actions on necessity when the action “is
the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril.”337 The necessity of the intervention to prevent sys-
330. John M. Broder, U.S. and Allies Weigh Libya No-Fly Zone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/28/world/europe/28military.html?_r=0 (noting Italy’s
statement about application of its treaty with Libya).
331. Sewall, supra note 153, at 161. R
332. See generally id. (criticizing those who would rely on prevention only).
333. Id. (justifying response measures, but failing to discuss the legality of taking action
without U.N. authorization).
334. ROTBERG, supra note 24, at 13. For a detailed discussion of the threshold for inter- R
vention to prevent atrocity crimes, see infra Part V.
335. Tesón argues that “to the extent that state sovereignty is a value, it is an instrumen-
tal not an intrinsic value. Sovereignty serves valuable human ends; and those who grossly
assault them should not be allowed to shield themselves behind the sovereignty principle.”
Fernando R. Tesón, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN IN-
TERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 93 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O.
Keohane eds., 2003). In 1992, the U.N. Secretary-General stated that “the time of absolute
and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.”
U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (June 17, 1992).
336. G.A. Res. 56/10, art. 25, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [here-
inafter ILC Report]. The General Assembly approved the ILC Report the same year. See
G.A. Res. 56/83, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
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tematic human rights violations “precludes the wrongfulness” of the inter-
vention.338 Similar to contingent sovereignty, the principle of necessity
focuses on the state committing the underlying wrong, and justifies a sec-
ond wrong—unauthorized military intervention—to prevent “grave peril.”
Critics of this approach rely on two primary arguments. First, article
25 of the ILC Report was not intended to excuse humanitarian interven-
tion, because it “seriously impair[s] an essential interest of the State or
States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international commu-
nity as a whole.”339 The perpetrator states’ interests are obviously im-
paired when another state intervenes, but it cannot be said that any
damage has been done to the international community as a whole. Quite
the opposite is true. Responding to and halting mass atrocities puts an end
to threats to the world community—a type of grave peril to which article
25 allows a necessary, if unlawful, response.
Second, opponents of states responding to atrocity crimes rely on arti-
cle 2(4) and a strict sovereignty approach. The emphasis here is only on
the actions taken by the intervening state, not on the wrongs of perpetrat-
ing states.340 Under this approach, any use of force without U.N. authori-
zation—even to stop an ongoing genocide—diminishes the prohibition on
the use of force and the principle of sovereign equality.341 Take for exam-
ple Russia’s draft UNSC resolution following NATO’s intervention to pre-
vent the slaughter of Kosovo Albanians in 1999. Attempting to proclaim
the NATO action as a violation of international law, Russia’s draft was
rejected by Slovenia, who thought it did not sufficiently highlight the
abuses of the Yugoslav government.342 In that case, common sense ruled
the day, but too often traditionalists and strict sovereigntists prevail.
C. Nonlegal Considerations: Morality and Justification
The central focus of this Section is the lawfulness of mass atrocity re-
sponse operations when the UNSC does not take action. But legal consid-
erations alone do not paint the entire picture. Decision-makers are acutely
aware that the law does not exist in a vacuum and that other considera-
tions must be taken into account when deciding to use military force.
These factors must be considered on a case-by-case basis, and will drive
decisions to intervene to halt atrocity crimes. As one commentator notes,
effective prevention is necessary because “it would be morally unaccept-
338. Id.
339. Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1304. R
340. See id. at 1277 (emphasizing how legal restraints on the use of force reflect societal
attitudes about the role of violence in shared community, but with little emphasis on attitudes
regarding violence in terms of mass atrocities).
341. Id. at 1311.
342. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 3, 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999);
see also N.D. White, The Legality of Bombing in the Name of Humanity, 5 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 27, 33 (2000) (“[A] major concern for many states voting against the resolution
was its lack of balance in that it failed also to condemn the brutality of the repressive mea-
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able to base one’s strategy only on responding to mass crimes after the
bodies have started to pile up and when only extreme measures would
make a difference.”343
Legal philosophers have long argued that protecting the innocent is a
primary value of any legal system. Hobbes stated that the principle of self-
preservation is at the heart of all virtues.344 The preservation of human
life, then, must be a driving factor behind the law. H.L.A. Hart suggests
that the inability of even the strongest among us to defend ourselves all
the time necessitates a legal system.345 As previously discussed, the cur-
rent international legal system is often incapable of protecting the weakest
among us—those who are victimized by genocidal leaders—calling into
question the ability of the system as a whole to protect the innocent and
right wrongs.346 Therefore, normative (that is, values-based) standards
must be taken into account.
The current status of the law does not sufficiently account for moral
considerations.347 The prima facie illegality of humanitarian intervention
highlights a discomforting preference of sovereignty over human rights,
even though the latter are largely based on moral concerns.348 When
states violate sovereign rights to prevent atrocity crimes, as in the NATO
intervention in Kosovo, there exists a “gap between legality and legiti-
macy” of the operation.349 In describing the NATO campaign, commenta-
tor Bruno Simma noted a troubling disconnect between law and
morality.350
While the Kosovo Report ultimately suggested amending the law to
allow certain humanitarian interventions,351 others recommend violating
the law outright and relying on the forgiveness of the international com-
munity. This approach maintains that the existing prohibition on the use of
force remains in place, but the unlawfulness of state intervention to pre-
vent atrocities will be forgiven.352 Thomas Franck argues that the interna-
343. Luck, supra note 126, at 116. R
344. LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: ITS BASIS AND ITS GENE-
SIS 15 (Elsa M. Sinclair trans., 1936); see also Reisman, supra note 64, at 57. R
345. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 194-95 (3d ed. 2012).
346. See Terry Nardin, The Moral Basis for Humanitarian Intervention, in JUST INTER-
VENTION 11, 11-12 (Anthony F. Lang, Jr. ed., 2003).
347. Numerous scholars have discussed the moral issues underlying humanitarian inter-
vention. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 (2d ed. 2005); TESÓN,
supra note 109, at 6; Miriko Bagaric & John R. Morss, Transforming Humanitarian Interven- R
tion from an Expedient Accident to a Categorical Imperative, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 421, 428
(2005); Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1683, 1689-90 (2000).
348. Nico Krisch, Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention Af-
ter Kosovo, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 323, 327-329 (2002).
349. KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 125, at 10. R
350. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 207, at 131-32. R
351. KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 125, at 291. R
352. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
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tional community will act as a sort of “jury” through the UNSC or UNGA,
which balances the strict application of the law with considerations of
moral legitimacy.353 Similarly, Oscar Schachter argues that, even without
UNSC approval, pardoning unilateral intervention to save lives is prefera-
ble to creating a rule that allows it.354 While some describe this as the
criminal law approach to the use of force,355 it fits comfortably with the
ILC Draft Code on State Responsibility, which precludes the wrongfulness
of certain actions when necessary to prevent gravely perilous threats.356
The doctrine of necessity is in fact recognized in international law, and
should serve as the basis for the application of unilateral MARO in the
future.357
Prior to engaging in unilateral MARO, policy makers will ultimately
need to determine which factors justify intervention, whether the resulting
degree of suffering outweighs the intrusion of sovereignty, and whether
the contemplated use of force will accomplish its goals.358 Noninterven-
tionists, however, are wary of placing non-legal considerations such as le-
gitimacy and practical effects on a higher level than the legality of the
action.359 Taking a traditional approach to Charter interpretation, as well
as a strict application of sovereignty, these critics argue that extralegal
atrocity response will upend restraints on power and the operation of the
law.360
Whether Article 2(4) still has the force of absolutely prohibiting uni-
lateral atrocity response operations depends on whether or not one takes
an originalist or teleological view. The text and drafting history of the
Charter do not permit humanitarian intervention unauthorized by the
UNSC, but has this original meaning changed with the ever evolving na-
ture of international law? Even though the human rights aspects of the
Charter were secondary to sovereignty concerns at the drafting, this body
of law has grown significantly. Due to state practice and the parallel devel-
opment of humanitarian norms, the Charter must be understood in the
current normative and political context, and not with an originalist’s dog-
353. Thomas M. Franck, Legality and Legitimacy in Humanitarian Intervention, in HU-
MANITARIAN INTERVENTION 143, 148, 152 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2006);
see also Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1291-92. R
354. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 126 (1991).
355. See generally Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1298 (explaining the criminal law ap- R
proach to the international community’s humanitarian intervention strategy).
356. See ILC Report, supra note 336, art. 25(1)(a). R
357. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶¶140-42 (July 9) (recognizing the existence of
a doctrine of necessity in international law); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. V.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 92, ¶¶49-59 (Sept. 25).
358. ANTHONY C. AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE USE OF
FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 128-29 (1993). Considerations such as these
are taken into account in the MARO Handbook and inform the six threshold conditions for
unilateral intervention discussed infra Part V.
359. Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1278. R
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matic adherence to a text drafted in an era that is normatively far re-
moved.361 The traditionalist approach perpetuates a cycle of violence,
where effective response measures are impeded and atrocity crimes con-
tinue. The situation in Syria demonstrates this analysis.
D. Syria and Unilateral Intervention
As of early 2013, it appears unlikely that there will be overt military
intervention to resolve the crisis in Syria. As previously discussed, Russia
and China will not permit a UNSC resolution that authorizes intervention.
Therefore, without U.N. authorization, and without a valid self-defense
justification for most states,362 military action would be in violation of the
U.N. Charter. Even if intervention were based on humanitarian justifica-
tions, traditionalists would argue that there is no lawful exception to vio-
lating the territorial integrity or political independence of a sovereign
state.
By slaughtering his own people, however, Bashar al-Assad may have
diminished Syria’s sovereign shield. Under the principle of contingent sov-
ereignty, embraced in the concept of R2P, a state is only entitled to nonin-
terference when it effectively protects civilians from atrocity crimes.
Prominent figures, including former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clin-
ton363 and Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu,364 have since
called into question the legitimacy of the Assad regime, while many others
now support the rule of the opposition Syrian National Coalition.365 Such
statements reflect contingent sovereignty in practice. Although contingent
sovereignty does not expressly authorize unilateral intervention to oust a
sitting government, the foundation is in place to justify such an action, not
unlike the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.
In addition to diminished sovereignty, intervention in Syria could be
justified on moral grounds or the principle of necessity. Values-based justi-
fications are fairly straightforward—the international community has a
moral duty to take action to prevent further atrocities against the Syrian
361. Hurd, supra note 156, at 24 (suggesting that the law can be interpreted in both R
ways—according to an originalist interpretation, or in terms of evolving norms).
362. Turkey may have limited self-defense justifications as a result of cross-border en-
gagements with Syrian forces. But see Tim Arango, On Edge as Syria’s War Knocks Ever
Harder on the Door to Turkey, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/
13/world/middleeast/on-the-edge-in-turkey-as-syria-war-inches-closer.html?pagewanted=all
(explaining how Turkey may have limited self-defense justifications as a result of cross-bor-
der engagement with Syrian forces).
363. See Andrew Quinn & Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Clinton Says Syria’s Assad Has Lost
Legitimacy, REUTERS (July 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/us-syria-
idUSLDE76A0I620110712 see also, Syria Condemns Hilary Clinton’s Remarks About Assad,
BBC NEWS (July 12, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14123188.
364. See Diplomat to UN: Security Council Has Failed in Syria, CNN (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/28/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html.
365. See Tim Arango, European Union Backs Syrian Opposition Coalition, N.Y. TIMES
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population. Additionally, assuming intervention is unlawful, unilateral ac-
tion may be deemed necessary to stop more significant legal violations,
specifically Assad’s war crimes and crimes against humanity.
In spite of the availability of moral or necessity justifications, the cur-
rent state of the law and traditionalist interpretations of the U.N. Charter
and state sovereignty stand in the way of non-U.N. authorized mass atroc-
ity response operations in Syria. As such, if a state or group of states were
to intervene, they would have to hope for the forgiveness of the interna-
tional community much like that following the NATO intervention in Ko-
sovo. While it would be possible to halt Assad’s crimes against his people,
state intervention would be in the legal limbo of “unlawful” but “legiti-
mate” action.
Therefore, states seeking to prevent atrocity crimes in situations like
Syria are left with two choices: (1) breaking the law outright, hoping for
forgiveness, and slowly developing a new customary norm, or (2) working
with other states to draft a positive normative standard. The next Part con-
siders both approaches and prescribes a discursive process that seeks to
accomplish two interrelated objectives: justify derogations from current
prohibitions on the use of force when engaging in non-U.N. sanctioned
MARO, and encourage efforts to revise the law.
III. DEVELOPING A LEGAL NORM FOR ATROCITY RESPONSE
The current legal regime is prohibitive of atrocity response without
U.N. authorization. The initial failure to establish a permanent U.N. re-
sponse force under Article 43 and the misuse of the veto power each “ef-
fectively destroyed the power of the United Nations to act as an organ of
enforcement of international law against a potential lawbreaker.”366 As a
result, states and regional organizations must be enabled to take action,
rather than sitting by and watching atrocities unfold while waiting for an
effective U.N. response.367
The United States must take the lead in developing a norm authoriz-
ing mass atrocity response when the United Nations fails to act. By engag-
ing in a discursive process—interpretation and development of legal
norms through dialogue with other states, international organizations,
NGOs, domestic interagency actors, and the media—the United States can
argue for a change in the positive law governing atrocity prevention and
response. Moreover, when engaging in future unilateral MARO, and prior
to the development of hard law, states should embrace humanitarian justi-
fications for intervening, thereby contributing to customary norm develop-
ment. Besides prescribing a normative discursive process, this Part
contributes methods for overcoming political inaction, demonstrates that
366. Lillich, supra note 232, at 245 (stating that, as a result, “the effective power of R
using military or lesser forms of coercion in international affairs essentially remains with the
nation States.”) (internal citations omitted).
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MARO is in the domestic and international interest, and addresses con-
cerns of pretextual uses of intervention.
A. Norm Development Through Action and Discourse
Expert studies have long called for a strengthened normative frame-
work to prevent and halt atrocity crimes.368 Garnering enough support to
create positive law—treaties, statutes, regulations—is wrought with chal-
lenges, especially in our polarized political climate. Nonetheless, the alter-
native is even more problematic. As one scholar remarked:
Those who wait for others to see the rationality or morality of
their position, who expect the attractiveness of the emerging norm
or standard to do the work, are likely to be disappointed. The
development of norms is really the story of the expansion of polit-
ical support for particular sets of ideas and values.369
Scholars have paid significant attention to the legal, political, and
socio-psychological components of international norm development and
compliance.370 Among the more influential studies, Finnemore and Sik-
kink outline a three step process to norm development.371 These steps are:
(1) norm emergence, where norm entrepreneurs utilize organizational
platforms to advocate for a new standard, (2) norm cascade, where states
accepting the new norm exert peer pressure on other states to adopt the
norm, and finally (3) norm internalization, where the norm may or may
not be codified, but is internalized into state practice.372
368. KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 125, at 291 (suggesting that following NATO’s inter- R
vention in Kosovo, the law should be amended to bridge the gap between the current illegal-
ity of humanitarian intervention and the legitimate action of saving civilian lives); see also
GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 93 (concluding that a strong normative framework is R
required to prevent and halt genocide).
369. Luck, supra note 126, at 123. R
370. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2646 (1997) (describing the history of compliance theory and its several
schools, as well as further developing the “transnational legal process,” which entails three
stages of norm compliance: the interaction between transnational actors, the interpretation of
the norms governing the underlying conduct, and the internalization of the norm at issue);
see also MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF
CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISOR
(2010); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Paul Harris, The Moral Obliga-
tion to Obey the Law, in ON POLITICAL OBLIGATION (Paul Harris ed., 1990); Roscoe E. Hill,
Legal Validity and Legal Obligation, 80 YALE L.J. 47 (1970); M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima
Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973).
371. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998).
372. See Luck, supra note 126, at 110. The acceptance of R2P by every leader at the R
World Summit in 2005 is a recent and striking example of effective norm emergence and
norm cascade, but demonstrates that the persuasive, discursive process is ongoing for skep-
tics, and that norm internalization has yet to occur. Recall that consensus on this norm was
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Besides following these steps, norm development requires a cohesive
message and concept, which enhances support for an emerging norm.373
This requires significant coordination among states, civil society, and do-
mestic policy-makers.374 Thus, developing a norm that permits unilateral
MARO will require a discursive process to persuade these actors of the
values at stake when intervention is necessary; contextual differentiation
of other claims to intervene; and a clear set of principles establishing a
threshold to intervene.375
It may prove difficult to establish a positive norm for unilateral
MARO in light of previous efforts to reform the Charter.376 Some at-
tempted to amend the composition of the UNSC or limit the veto power
of the permanent five members in certain cases, among other ap-
proaches.377 While amendments to the Charter or other international
agreements would add legitimacy and persuasiveness to calls for states to
internalize a new norm,378 geo-political realities limit the feasibility of
these approaches. Powerful states will not easily give up the status quo and
relinquish that power, and weak states that remain relatively immune to
these power struggles likely will not want to be put in jeopardy.
Even when the development of positive norms is not feasible, states
can shape customary law by taking action and justifying that action on an
emerging normative value. The more the UNSC proves ineffective at re-
sponding to massive human rights violations, the more often states will
take action into their own hands (for example, Kosovo), thereby laying the
groundwork for a new customary norm.379 State practice, in this case non-
and, when these measures fail, enforcement measures through UNSC action. There is no
clarity at this point on what steps will be taken when the United Nations fails to act under
R2P and when states may forcefully intervene to prevent mass killings. Summit Report, supra
note 130. R
373. Applegarth & Block, supra note 152, at 40. R
374. Id. at 49.
375. Moore, supra note 76, at 8. R
376. Several scholars have voiced skepticism about changes in positive law governing
the use of force. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 352, at 183-84 (suggesting that a formal adjust- R
ment of the law is not necessary because international law may accommodate instances of
noncompliance without changing the rule); SCHACHTER, supra note 354, at 126 (arguing that R
it is undesirable to have a new rule allowing humanitarian intervention, and that it would be
better to acquiesce in necessary violations than open the door to unilateral uses of force);
Charney, supra note 123, at 837 (concluding that there is no international consensus in sup- R
port of a right of unilateral intervention); O’Connell, supra note 229, at 81 (stating that even R
supporters of a forgiveness approach to Charter violations for humanitarian purposes do not
advocate a universal doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention or an abandonment of
the Charter use of force regime).
377. See WAXMAN, supra note 146, at 11-14; see also Sean D. Murphy, Protean Jus Ad R
Bellum, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 22, 47-50 (2008) (suggesting various methods of amending
or reaffirming jus ad bellum, including Charter amendments, GA resolutions, UNSC resolu-
tions, major power agreement, case law, and “principles” adopted by NGOs).
378. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990);
see also MURPHY, supra note 47, at 23. R
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compliance, serves as both a breach of the law and the basis for a new
standard.380 The international community has yet to utilize force without
UN authorization under the doctrines of R2P or MARO.
In these circumstances, states must engage in the discursive process to
justify otherwise unlawful actions for two reasons. First, state behavior,
and the acceptance of developing norms, is shaped in part by reputa-
tion.381 Exposing the wrongfulness of perpetrator states and the embar-
rassing inaction of the world community will encourage an effective
response so that either the perpetrator stops the unlawful activity, or states
are shamed into taking lawful collective action.382
Second, public discourse allows states to demonstrate opinio juris
when seeking to change the customary normative landscape. In the event
of MARO, states must argue that they have the legal authority to resort to
force if nonviolent measures and the UNSC have failed to halt the mass
slaughter of civilians. As previously discussed, although the prevailing tra-
ditionalist interpretation of jus ad bellum does not clearly delineate a bind-
ing legal obligation to intervene to halt atrocities, there is sufficient
support to advocate for a developing norm.
Examples of opinio juris can be found in the evolution of humanita-
rian intervention. Even the U.N.’s Chapter VII authority has grown to
encompass peace and security operations for internal atrocity crimes.383
While not directly applicable to a customary international law analysis,
this change of application of the U.N. Charter demonstrates a significant
normative shift. Specifically, the international community now not only
380. Hurd, supra note 156, at 26 (recognizing that “[s]tate practice has a productive R
effect on the content of the law.”); Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1311-12. R
381. See MURPHY, supra note 47, at 22 (stating that “law can arise either when one is R
obliged to act due to a threatened, effective sanction or when one is obliged to act due to
social rules for which conformity is generally demanded and from which deviations are there-
fore met with social pressures large and small.”) (emphasis added).
382. This “reputational pull” to norm acceptance and compliance is evident “through
public opinion, news media, and other mechanisms of public accountability [including domes-
tic and international organizations, political debate, and other states] faced daily” by deci-
sion-makers. Koh, supra note 370, at 2652; see also NICHOLAS WHEELER, SAVING R
STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 290-91 (2000) (dis-
cussing the “shaming power of humanitarian norms”); Nicholas Wheeler, The Humanitarian
Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military Inter-
vention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 29, 39 (Jennifer M Welsh ed., 2004) (arguing that
states suffer political costs when they oppose “global humanitarian values.”); Keith A. Petty,
Beyond the Court of Public Opinion: Military Commissions and the Reputational Pull of
Compliance Theory, 42 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 303, 318-26 (2011) (arguing that earlier
engagement in the interpretive, discursive process by decision-makers would have enhanced
the legitimacy of the U.S. Military Commissions); Michael P. Scharf, International Law in
Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the Compliance Debate, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
45, 70 (2009) (discussing methods utilized by the State Department Legal Adviser to exert
influence “in shaping modalities and articulating the rationale” for actions such “that it
would be accepted by the international community.”).
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tolerates intervention to prevent states’ massive human rights violations,
but may also give intervening states legal authorization to do so.384
The international community further expressed its desire for an
emerging legal norm with its embrace of R2P.385 Again, the discourse sur-
rounding the adoption of R2P demonstrates states’ willingness to internal-
ize emerging norms and take action to protect civilians from slaughter.
That R2P found consensus among all nations in 2005 is possibly the
strongest basis to argue that MARO – just one step removed from the
collective action envisioned in R2P - is based on a legal obligation to pre-
vent atrocities occurring in other states.
Opinio juris can also be found by culling the laws and pronounce-
ments of states that have engaged in non-U.N. authorized humanitarian
intervention, and also those best positioned to influence future operations.
Specifically, the French intervention in the Central African Republic in
1979,386 the ECOWAS interventions in the 1990s,387 and the United King-
dom’s and Belgium’s involvement in the 1999 Kosovo intervention388 were
all humanitarian-based actions. Moreover, the African Union, which has
and continues to confront mass atrocities on the continent, may allow its
Members to intervene to halt atrocity crimes.389
The United States, uniquely positioned to influence the legal develop-
ment in this field, has made pronouncements since 2006 that contribute to
the legal basis for future unilateral MARO.390 Specifically, the 2006 and
2010 National Security Strategies,391 the 2010 Department of Defense
Quadrennial Defense Review,392 Senate Resolution 71 (2010),393 and
President Obama’s Study Directive of 2011394 each call for U.S. prepared-
ness to confront atrocity crimes, often in the absence of U.N. authoriza-
tion. These official statements and expert reports embraced by the United
States395 reflect domestic interpretations of the lawfulness of atrocity re-
sponse (i.e. how the use of force for humanitarian purposes is understood
differently today than it could have been in 1945). State pronouncements
384. See, e.g., the 2011 intervention in Libya authorized by the UNSC.
385. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
386. See MURPHY, supra note 47, at 107-08. R
387. See supra notes 118-120. R
388. See supra notes 290-291. R
389. A.U. Charter, art. 4(h).
390. See discussion supra Part I.D.
391. See 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 168 and accompanying text R
at IV.C.4; 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 147, at 48. R
392. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW, supra note 155, at vi (“The Department must be R
prepared to provide the President with options across a wide range of contingencies. . .which
includes preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities.”).
393. Sen. Con. Res. 71, supra note 155 (calling for the U.S. to engage in a “whole of R
government” and “strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide.”).
394. See Presidential Directive, supra note 9. R
395. See, e.g., Summit Report, supra note 130, at ¶¶138-40; GENOCIDE REPORT, supra R
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such as these,396 bolstered by the 2008 ICJ Genocide Case397 and the prin-
ciple of necessity,398 now lend considerable support to norm entrepre-
neurs arguing that opinio juris is emerging for a customary norm of non-
U.N. authorized MARO.399
Should this interpretation result in a “norm cascade,” it is noteworthy
that prior state action, current reports, and state pronouncements would
reflect a permissive, rather than obligatory norm.400 For example, Article
139 of the 2005 World Summit Report states that the international com-
munity “is prepared to take collective action,” but does not require it.401
Similarly, the U.S. 2006 National Security Strategy states that in order to
halt atrocity crimes “armed intervention may be required.”402 Such non-
binding language illustrates that a norm of non-U.N. authorized atrocity
response would operate similarly to the customary right of self-defense.
States are authorized, but not required, to take measures in defense of
396. Sources of custom include “[d]iplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press
releases, the opinions of official legal advisors, official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manu-
als of military law, executive decisions and practices [among other sources].” See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (6th ed. 2003); OSCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 84-105 (1991). It has been
argued that “instant customary law” requires no state practice at all, but rather that states
demonstrate opinio juris through votes on UN General Assembly Resolutions, for example.
See Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Custom-
ary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23, 36 (1965); Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Mo-
ment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental
Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 446 (2010). This is relevant in light of the fact that the
principle of R2P, which authorizes intervention in certain limited circumstances, was adopted
unanimously by the General Assembly in 2005. G.A. Res. 60/1, UN Doc. A/Res/60/1, ¶¶138-
40 (Sept. 15, 2005).
397. See discussion supra Part II.A.b.
398. See discussion supra Part II.C.
399. But see discussion supra Part III.A. (arguing that currently opinio juris does not
exist with regard to non-U.N. authorized humanitarian intervention).
400. The article suggests that a permissive, rather than obligatory norm of unilateral
MARO is possible in the future. To be precise, the opinio juris required of customary inter-
national law is traditionally defined as arising from a sense of legal obligation. See Continen-
tal Shelf Case, supra note 284, at para. 77; see also PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S R
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (7th ed. 1997). But not all customary
rules impose duties. STEINER, supra note 321, at 233 (describing that “[b]y virtue of a devel- R
oping custom, particular conduct may be considered to be permitted or obligatory in legal
terms . . . .”). Permissive rules “permit states to act in a particular way (for example, to
prosecute foreigners for crimes committed within the prosecuting state’s territory) without
making such actions obligatory.” MALANCZUK, supra. In the case of permissive rules, “opinio
juris means a conviction felt by states that a certain form of conduct is permitted by interna-
tional law.” Id. But in order to demonstrate custom, other states (that is, those affected by
the conduct) must acquiesce to the underlying conduct. Id.; see Case of the S.S. “Lotus”
(France v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7); STEINER supra.
401. See Summit Report, supra note 130, at ¶139 (emphasis added). R
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their own territory or in defense of others.403 Moreover, because self-de-
fense is a recognized exception to the general prohibition on the use of
force—both in custom and the Charter–it has been suggested that a new
norm of humanitarian intervention be based on a similar exception for
collective self-defense.404
States should advocate for and internalize a norm of unilateral atroc-
ity response. If a norm is developed, states will not have to rely on con-
torted legal justifications for their action, or on the flimsy “unlawful but
legitimate” rationale. A concerted discourse will generate broader public
support for legally tenuous policies that stretch the limits of the law and
hasten acceptance of the emerging norm by the international
community.405
B. Leadership: The Will to Act
The development of international norms requires political and moral
leadership from states.406 Take the development of R2P, for example.
Some argue that the inability of R2P to gain traction as a binding norm is
not as much related to the few outlier states that oppose the concept, but
rather to the disinterest and disorganization of its supporters.407 As a re-
sult, “nations [supporting R2P] must take the lead in finding and cement-
403. The right of self-defense is recognized as a permissive customary norm. See, e.g.,
Frederic L. Kirgis, Pre-emptive Action to Forestall Terrorism, ASIL INSIGHTS (2002), http://
www.asil.org/insigh88.cfm.
404. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMAN-
ITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008).
405. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 81 (2007) (arguing that in the domestic
national security context, if the President is to take action contrary to an interpreted legal
norm, then he must do so publicly and allow Congress and the people to determine whether
the crisis warrants extralegal action). As an additional example, at the international level,
prior to U.S. involvement in the Second World War, President Roosevelt provided destroyers
to aid Britain in its war efforts against Nazi-Germany as part of a Lend-Lease Program,
which was in violation of domestic and international law. Peter Margulies, True Believers at
Law: National Security Agenda, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68
MD. L. REV. 1, 20 (2008). In order to garner support for the program, Roosevelt consulted
actors at home and abroad. It is now widely recognized that although the program pushed
the envelope legally, it was reasonable given the circumstances. Id. at 31. The discursive pro-
cess is also valuable in shaping the policy options in response to international wrongs. During
the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, President Kennedy ultimately decided against using
force in response to the Soviet Union’s placement of ballistic missiles in Cuba. Id. at 69-70.
After serving to publicly confront the Soviet Union, the United Nations was instrumental in
supervising the removal of the missiles. SCHLESINGER, supra note 220, at 283. R
406. Reflecting on his struggles to abolish genocide, Raphael Lemkin proclaimed, “It
takes great moral strength to give up temporary political interests and inconveniences in
order to build something bigger and better which will serve mankind as a whole.” GENOCIDE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 93 (building on Raphael Lemkin’s statement while discussing the R
Genocide Prevention Task Force’s recommendation to strengthen international norms to re-
spond to threats of genocide); see also LUCK, supra note 126, at 124 (“The ultimate test of R
[mass atrocity prevention efforts] will be in capitals and on the ground, not in international
meeting halls.”).
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ing consensus and in moving forward on an ambitious, actionable
agenda.”408 The same is true for the adoption of norms that supplement
R2P—mass atrocity response absent U.N. authorization.
To its credit, the United States has been active to prevent some atroc-
ity crimes, with varying degrees of commitment and success, including ef-
forts to halt the slaughter in Bosnia and Kosovo, the no-fly zones in Iraq,
diplomatic pressure on Kenya in the wake of its 2008 post-election vio-
lence, intervention in Libya, and strong statements regarding Syria.409
Nonetheless, for the few instances of attempted prevention and interven-
tion, it is widely recognized that the United States has not done enough to
prevent or respond to atrocity crimes.410
The primary political reason for the legacy of inaction in response to
atrocity crimes is willful blindness, meaning the problem is ignored so that
states will not be compelled to take action.411 For example, many states
downplayed the level of violence in Rwanda, so as not to invoke the obli-
gations in the Genocide Convention.412 This type of willful blindness illus-
trates the lack of political will to respond to atrocity crimes in a
meaningful way.413
Definitional vagueness of atrocity crimes is also relied upon to justify
inaction.414 In one glaring example, the U.N. International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur concluded that Sudan did not have a policy of genocide,
and that only a competent tribunal could determine whether Sudan’s acts
met the legal definition of that crime.415 Contrary to this Commission’s
408. The United States is viewed as a strategic “wild card” in terms of support for R2P.
During the Bush administration, the U.S. position was to support R2P in so far as it empha-
sized the role of the UNSC in making R2P decisions. The Obama administration went from
merely embracing R2P to advocating its implementation in Darfur. Id. at 140-141.
409. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 94 (describing U.S. actions vis-à-vis Bosnia R
and Kosovo, Iraq and Kenya); Helene Cooper, Obama Cites Limits of U.S. Role in Libya,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy
.html?pagewanted=all; US Urges Syria to Work With Annan Peace Plan, BBC NEWS (Mar.
21, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17466453.
410. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at xxi, 94. See generally POWER, supra note 38. R
411. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 95. R
412. William Schabas, The Genocide Convention at Fifty, U.S. INST. PEACE, 6-7 (Jan. 7,
1999), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990107.pdf. Ironically, the Convention does
not mandate or authorize intervention, rather it merely requires states to “call upon the com-
petent organs of the UN” to take action to suppress acts of genocide. Genocide Convention,
supra note 61, art. 8. R
413. This is reflected in states’ faith that minimal diplomatic effort or multilateral insti-
tutions will have the desired or expected effect. In Darfur, for example, the United States
issued strongly worded statements and encouraged U.N. action, but all parties failed to fol-
low up with concrete action to halt the ongoing genocide. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, R
at 94-95. To its credit, the United States was the first to recognize the actions in Darfur as
genocide and encouraged multilateral efforts to stop it. Kuwali, supra note 224, at 37. R
414. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at xxi-xxii. R
415. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N. Secretary-General, ¶¶518, 522 (Jan. 25, 2005) (also concluding
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suggestion, decision makers need not delve into the specific intent or other
elements necessary to prove atrocity crimes, as would a prosecutor in
court. Numerous conventions now form the basis of modern international
humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal law, pro-
viding ample legal definitions for acts that might constitute atrocity crimes.
Between the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the
Rome Statute of the ICC, the definitions for genocide,416 war crimes,417
and crimes against humanity418 are readily available. The case law of
Nuremburg, the ICJ, ICTY, ICTR, and someday the ICC, although not
always consistent with each other, also provide adequate interpretive gui-
dance to provisions in these treaties that might somehow be vague. This is
precisely why use of the term “atrocity crimes” as a catchall for the more
specific legal definitions should be used by policy makers for discussion
and planning purposes.419 Allow prosecutors to worry themselves with the
precise legal definition of these heinous acts.420
The “highly subjective” nature of facts on the ground is another rea-
son cited by states that are unwilling to act.421 The “subjective” nature of
facts on the ground, however, is dubious at best. The latest technologies
will be instrumental in capitalizing on the “power of witness:” exposing
civilian slaughter to the world.422 In the broader discursive process, the
416. Genocide is defined as any of the following acts committed with the intent to de-
stroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group: 1) killing members of
the group; 2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 3) deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; 4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and 5)
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Genocide Convention, supra
note 61, art. 2; Rome Statute, supra note 94, art. 6; see also Kuwali, supra note 224, at 34-36 R
(describing case law of the ICTY and ICTR that further defines the crime of genocide).
417. Rome Statute, supra note 94, art. 8 (defining war crimes as grave breaches of the R
1949 Geneva Conventions “when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-
scale commission of such crimes.”).
418. Id. art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity as inhumane acts, such as murder, en-
slavement, forcible transfer, torture, rape, and other acts, “committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.”); see also Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶27-28 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996) (stating that crimes against humanity are “inhumane acts
that by their extent and gravity go beyond the limits tolerable to the international commu-
nity, which must perforce demand their punishment.”); Kuwali, supra note 224, at 25, 40. R
419. David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE STUDIES & PREVEN-
TION 229, 229, 239 (2006).
420. But see id. at 231.
421. Kuwali, supra note 224, at 25, 43; see also Franck & Rodley, supra note 44, at 282 R
(“The international machinery for effectively monitoring claims of “humanitarian” condi-
tions warranting unilateral intervention did not exist in the nineteenth century, does not exist
now, and is unlikely to be created within the foreseeable future.”). Today, however, techno-
logical advances have effectively mooted this line of argument. See CARNEGIE COMM’N ON
PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT, PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT: FINAL REPORT 43
(1997).
422. Although social media did not start the Egyptian revolution in 2011, it has been
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power of witness can shame perpetrators into ceasing their crimes and re-
fute allegations that crimes are being committed by everyone involved.423
Witnessing and recording genocidal acts is also valuable for creating a his-
torical record and facilitating possible future prosecutions of high level
perpetrators in either domestic or international courts.424 The Genocide
Task Force highlights the need for early warning to effectively prevent ge-
nocide, and cites the intelligence capacity of states, NGOs, and other
atrocity alert mechanisms that are available to inform decision makers of
pending and ongoing crisis situations.425 Furthermore, a 1997 study by the
Carnegie Commission rejected the argument that inaction was due to lack
of information, stating that this “argument is simply unconvincing in an
age when major governments operate extensive, sophisticated early warn-
ing and intelligence networks worldwide.”426 In the case of Rwanda, for
example, U.S. leaders, among many others, were apprised of the atrocities
and failed to take appropriate action.427
The only way to overcome these impediments to action—willful blind-
ness, definitional quagmires, and subjective facts—is for states to demon-
strate leadership. There is some evidence in past episodes that the
international community responds when the United States takes an active
leadership role in genocide prevention.428 While U.S. support to global
initiatives can spark backlash if the concept is perceived as expanding
“Western influence,” the United States is nonetheless uniquely positioned
to influence states to adopt developing norms.429 But the United States
alone is incapable of influencing events in areas where “neighboring
states, regional powers, and patron states will outweigh [the influence] of
the United States.”430 In such situations, norm development will require
building partnerships to assist in anti-atrocity efforts.431
Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.wired
.com/epicenter/2011/02/egypts-revolutionary-fire/; see, e.g., Nic Robertson, Syria Toll Rises to
25; Monitors Cheered in Besieged Town, CNN (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/
15/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html?hptHP_t3 (describing how Syria’s restrictions on me-
dia reporting make it difficult for journalists and human rights groups to verify the extent of
the ongoing massacre of Syrian civilians).
423. Sewall, supra note 153, at 159, 169; MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 18. R
424. Sewall, supra note 153, at 159, 169-70. R
425. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at xvii, 13, 24 (highlighting other useful early R
warning tools; most important amongst them the Political Instability Task Force, used by
academics since 1994 to assess and explain vulnerable states, as well as the Atrocities Watch-
list, published quarterly and considered the “major regular product” on atrocity prevention
since the NIC’s Warning Staff began distributing it in 1999).
426. CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 421, at 43. R
427. POWER, supra note 38, at 354-64. R
428. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 95. R
429. Id. at 95-96.
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C. Mass Atrocity Response Is a National & Global Security Interest
It is common for states to look away as atrocities occur because they
are not considered to implicate national interests.432 When Ambassador
Morgenthau reported the Armenian genocide to a disinterested Wilson
administration, he had to remind himself that “unless it directly affected
American lives and American interests, it was outside the concern of the
American Government.”433 Consider, for example, that the United States
embraced a foreign policy principle of nonintervention from its founding
days.434 Even though the noninterventionist impulse is ingrained in the
national character, as U.S. global influence grew so too did the need to
take proactive security measures. President Franklin Roosevelt, for exam-
ple, warned of an isolationist United States. With regard to the formation
of the United Nations, he stated, “There can be no middle ground here.
We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we
shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.”435 This
statement about conflict echoes efforts to prevent atrocity crimes. An iso-
lationist position will only foster impunity for the killing of civilians, as will
an ineffective United Nations.
Today it is widely recognized that genocide and crimes against human-
ity are crimes that affect all of humanity, not simply the target population
or the territory where the atrocity occurs.436 Still, the Genocide Preven-
tion Task Force reported that “[a] core challenge for American leaders is
to persuade others—in the U.S. government, across the United States, and
around the world—that preventing genocide is more than just a humanita-
rian aspiration; it is a national and global imperative.”437
432. Id. at 95 (“Blame for inaction hardly belongs solely to the United States; other
governments have been willing to turn a blind eye to mass atrocities.”).
433. POWER, supra note 38, at 8. R
434. George Washington famously stated that the fledgling union should “steer clear of
permanent alliances” that did not directly impact U.S. interests. See SCHLESINGER, supra
note 220, at 17. Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he admonished “entangling R
alliances.” Id. But these statements had more to do with the politics of the day, particularly
the interventionist wars in Europe, derived largely from a policy of intervention to maintain
the status quo of the powers then in place. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 46-52. R
435. SCHLESINGER, supra note 220, at 64. R
436. See Michael Abramowitz & Lawrence Woocher, How Genocide Became a Na-
tional Security Threat, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/
2010/02/26/how_genocide_became_a_national_security_threat?page=full (describing geno-
cide’s negative impact on the national security of the U.S.).
437. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at xx. Contrast the current political and public R
opinion regarding atrocity crimes to that in the 1990s. Then, the atrocities in the Balkans
were considered a “European problem.” Today, it is unlikely that such crimes would be
greeted in Congress or by the people with indifference, considering the significant interest in
response when atrocity crimes are publicized. Take, for example, the “viral” response to a
video publicizing the crimes of Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony. Hilary Whiteman, Joseph
Kony: Brutal Warlord Who Shocked World, CNN (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/
03/09/world/africa/uganda-kony-profile/index.html?hptHP_c1 (describing the documentary
“Kony 2012” produced by the NGO Invisible Children and viewed by more than fifty million
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National policy and recent studies indicate that the United States is
moving toward this perspective. Since at least 2006, the United States has
concluded that mass killings are a threat to U.S. national security.438 To-
day, the President and Congress are in agreement about the threat posed
to U.S. interests by atrocity crimes.439 The Genocide Task Force reported
that atrocity crimes are a direct threat to core U.S. national interests,440 in
addition to an assault on the universal right to life. These crimes fuel insta-
bility in weak states, which are often the source of other national security
threats, such as “terrorist recruitment and training, human trafficking, and
civil strife.”441 The spillover effects of these crimes also have long-term
consequences in both the region where they occur and in the United
States. When millions of refugees flow across porous borders, states pro-
vide humanitarian assistance ranging from assisting displaced people to
bearing high economic costs for aid. In Bosnia, for example, because state
action was ineffective at the early stages, “the United States has paid
nearly $15 billion to support peacekeeping forces.”442 This is significant in
a time of economic austerity in the United States and abroad.443
Public opinion also appears to favor measures to prevent and respond
to atrocity crimes.444 The ICISS Report found that even among states that
were staunchly opposed to infringement on sovereignty, “there was gen-
eral acceptance that there must be limited exceptions to the non-interven-
tion rule for certain kinds of emergencies.”445 At the United Nations, Kofi
Annan was a strong proponent of R2P while Secretary-General,446 and his
successor, Ban Ki-moon, is no less committed.447
438. 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 168. R
439. See discussion supra note 155. R
440. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at xx. R
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. See generally Andrew Tilghman, DoD: Budget Cuts Won’t Hurt Troops—For Now,
ARMY TIMES (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/02/military-pentagon-
says-budget-will-not-hurt-current-troops-021312w/ (describing how upcoming military budget
cuts through 2013 will limit Overseas Contingency Operations). Additionally, Sewall argues
that “relying on a vague concept of prevention could lead the United States to spend billions
on economic development or political reconciliation in places that are not at real risk—all in
the name of genocide prevention.” Sewall, supra note 153, at 159, 163. R
444. See discussion supra note 437. R
445. ICISS REPORT, supra note 104, at 31. See also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UN- R
JUST WARS xiii (3rd ed. 2000) (finding, “The most common response—a majority [of individ-
uals] in eight countries and a plurality in four—is that the Security Council has not only a
right but a responsibility to authorize the use of force [to prevent] severe human rights viola-
tions, such as genocide, even against the will of the government committing such abuses.”).
446. Hubert, supra note 44, at 89, 98. R
447. U.N. Secretary-General, Challenge is to Make Responsibility to Protect Opera-
tional, Statement on the Anniversary of Rwandan Genocide, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10934 (2007)
(“Our challenge now is to give real meaning to [R2P], by taking steps to make it operational.
Only then will it truly give hope to those facing genocide, war crimes, crimes against human-
ity and ethnic cleansing.”). Ban Ki-moon has taken numerous steps within the United Na-
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Responding forcefully to atrocity crimes can save lives, money, and
preserve the moral authority of those with the will to act.448 If the United
States is truly interested in continuing its standing as a world leader, then
it must be prepared to take whatever steps are necessary, but not necessa-
rily alone, to respond to atrocity crimes.449 This includes spending political
capital in order to convince the U.S. public and the international commu-
nity that it is the right thing to do. Teddy Roosevelt famously said of the
Armenian genocide, “until we put honor and duty first, and are willing to
risk something in order to achieve righteousness both for ourselves and for
others, we shall accomplish nothing; and we shall earn and deserve the
contempt of the strong nations of mankind.”450 The next Section embraces
this sentiment and discusses how a principled approach to unilateral
MARO will overcome concerns of pretext.
D. Overcoming Pretext
Persuading the international community that intervention is necessary
to respond to atrocity crimes is difficult on a case-by-case basis, let alone
achieving consensus on a new norm. The primary concern about the use of
force for humanitarian purposes is that this justification will serve as pre-
text for the national interests of powerful states.451 Some argue that such a
policy necessarily preferences militarily strong states over weaker states,
erodes the principle of nonintervention into sovereign matters, and under-
mines the authority of the UNSC. While these concerns are legitimate in a
world of real politick, the risk that an emerging norm will be abused can be
limited by developing principled threshold conditions.
Noninterventionists warn that carving out a humanitarian exception to
the prohibition on the use of force is easily abused.452 The issue of pretext
note 18 (establishing a framework for operationalizing the R2P agenda throughout the U.N. R
system); see also Luck, supra note 126, at 108, 119. R
448. See GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 11-12 (making detailed recommendations R
for fiscal priorities to prevent genocide).
449. Id. at xviii.
450. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, FEAR GOD AND TAKE YOUR OWN PART 377 (1916); see
also POWER, supra note 38, at 11. R
451. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 144-45 (2d
ed. 1979); Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 233, at 139, 147-48; FRANCK & RODLEY, supra R
note 44, at 304. But see Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 R
AM. J. INT’L L. 107, 107 (2006) (discussing the frailty of the pretext arguments). Another
concern, particularly from China and Russia, is that setting a new precedent for atrocity
intervention will require states to answer for their poor human rights records.
452. For example, when Nazi Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in 1939, Hitler argued
that this was necessary due to “assaults on the life and liberty of minorities, and the purpose
of disarming Czech troops and terrorist bands threatening the lives of minorities.” Brownlie,
supra note 226, at 221 (internal citation omitted). Years later, the United States was criticized R
for its intervention in Nicaragua. The ICJ stated: “[W]hile the USA might form its own ap-
praisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not
be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect.” CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNA-
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was at the forefront of concerns at the 2009 General Assembly debate on
R2P.453 The argument was that R2P is nothing more than a reformed ver-
sion of humanitarian intervention and was akin to “renewed imperialism
and major power intervention.”454 It must be noted that militarily strong
states are also concerned about a norm of intervention, particularly if it
obligates them to respond under an expanded R2P or MARO regime.455
Some argue that an expanded R2P concept, or a right to intervene,
could impact the principle of the sovereign equality of states.456 But, it was
a comparatively small, weak state, Guatemala, that drafted and negotiated
the 2009 U.N. resolution adopting the principle of R2P.457 This likely had
something to do with Guatemala’s past experience with atrocity crimes,
and the country’s recognition that more effective international efforts are
needed to prevent and respond to these crimes. Additionally, the applica-
tion of R2P and a unilateral MARO framework will always be inconsis-
tent, favoring intervention in cases where the perpetrator state is militarily
weak.458 There are simply fewer incentives and pressure points to dissuade
strong states.459 Among the threshold conditions discussed below is that
the use of force be proportionate to the underlying atrocity crime, which
includes that there be minimal loss of civilian life in the planned MARO.
A direct use of force against a well-trained armed force would likely result
in greater loss of civilian life, thereby failing the proportionality test.
There are obvious concerns about this Article’s proposal to violate the
general prohibition on the use of force for humanitarian purposes in order
to develop a customary norm. Noncompliance, it is argued, “impinges on
States often cite the U.S. and U.K.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Russia’s 2008 interven-
tion in Georgia as evidence that States will find a way to justify even unlawful uses of force
against weaker states. Applegarth & Block, supra note 150, at 134; GENOCIDE REPORT, supra R
note 8, at 95-96 (discussing the shadow cast by the Iraq invasion in 2003). For further exam- R
ples of pretextual “humanitarian” intervention, see supra notes 109, 112. R
453. See Applegarth & Block, supra note 150, at 136; Rotberg, supra note 24, at 15;. R
454. Rotberg, supra note 24, at 15. It must be noted, however, that many of those op- R
posed to this concept are “noted outliers” on many international agreements, and denounce
R2P as “a tool of the world’s most powerful states intended to justify military adventurism or
political and economic interference in domestic affairs.” These states, which include Burma,
Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Sudan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe are quick to point out
their wariness of U.S. involvement and see intervention as a way to push U.S. interests, or
exert military influence over weaker states. Applegarth & Block, supra note 150, at 129, 136; R
GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 95-96. Russia and China were largely supportive of the R
status quo. India, Vietnam, and Egypt were slightly more favorable to R2P in 2009 than they
were in 2005. Overall, approximately 94 nations were supportive of R2P in the 2009 General
Assembly debate. Rotberg, supra note 24, at 15. R
455. See LUCK, supra note 313, at 11. R
456. Mohamed, supra note 106, at 1314. R
457. G.A. Res. 308, U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009);
Luck, supra note 126, at 121. R
458. Hubert, supra note 44, at 99. R
459. See generally discussion supra Part III.B (addressing contingent sovereignty in the
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the principle that power must be exercised in accordance with law.”460
Critics of unilateral action suggest that unauthorized intervention opens
the door to noncompliance by other states, unsettles assumptions that
states must comply with the prohibition against force, and diminishes U.N.
primacy over the use of force.461 Intervention, then, could quickly cause a
downward spiral of conflict escalation and even more suffering.
This argument lacks intellectual integrity in at least two ways. First,
the focus of traditionalists is on the actions taken by states to end atroci-
ties, rather than on the perpetrators of genocide and crimes against hu-
manity. By shifting the burden, states that would take legitimate action are
called into question and must defend their atrocity response, while civilian
slaughter continues and mass murderers receive at least a temporary free
pass.
Second, concerns of noncompliance escalation are exaggerated and
fundamentally misunderstand the nature and cause of armed conflict.462
There is no evidence, empirical or otherwise, that interventions with the
purpose of halting mass atrocities have led to an out-of-control spiral of
conflict.463 And even though intervention to prevent ongoing slaughter
necessarily requires engaging the perpetrator state and likely its leader-
ship,464 this does not reflect a cascade of noncompliance. Rather it brings
to an end the humanitarian noncompliance of the perpetrator state, might
end an ongoing conflict, and, assuming the regime leadership is removed
in the MARO, could prevent future conflicts by an otherwise aggressive
state.
Finally, and most controversially, it is not conflict that is the greatest
threat to humanity: it is atrocity crimes. Although aggressive wars
throughout history have caused significant human suffering, this suffering
is only a fraction of that endured by victims of genocide, crimes against
humanity, widespread war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.465 MARO is not
aggression, although it will often take the form of an armed conflict. If we
must prioritize the two, atrocity crimes are a greater threat than armed
conflict466 and must be stopped, with force if necessary.
460. Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompilance and the International Rule of Law, 31 YALE J.
INT’L L. 189, 203 (2006).
461. Id. at 203.
462. See JOHN NORTON MOORE, SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE, xx (2004) (stating that
“[w]ars are not simply accidents,” and describing how aggressive war is a result of a combina-
tion of three underlying deficiencies—form of government, individual decision makers, and
lack of deterrence).
463. Even where ECOWAS intervened in Liberia and later Sierra Leone, where there
were initially positive results followed by ongoing slaughter in both cases, the culprit was not
the underlying humanitarian effort, rather the capacity of those forces to bring the mass
murders to an end. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. R
464. See Sewall, supra note 153, at 166; GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 74. R
465. See RUMMEL, supra note 19, at 1. R
466. See supra Part I.A.; supra text accompanying note 19. Death tolls alone will not R
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Developing norms are fragile and must be applied with discipline in
order to persuade others to embrace the norm and dispel criticism. States
interested in advancing a norm of unilateral MARO must be sure that it is
applied in limited circumstances and with clearly articulated threshold
conditions. Following these conditions—discussed in detail below and ap-
plied to the situation in Syria—will overcome suggestions that interven-
tion is for pretextual purposes and erodes the rule of law. As part of a
principled effort to stop atrocity crimes once and for all, MARO is the
world community’s opportunity to finally make good on the unfulfilled
promise of “never again.”
IV. PROPOSED THRESHOLD FOR UNILATERAL
ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS
Waiting for the United Nations to effectively respond to atrocity
crimes is a failed strategy. Various proposals have been introduced to re-
form the United Nations and enable it to better respond to atrocities and
aggression, yet none have proven successful.467 As a result, states should
endeavor to establish a new norm permitting action when the UNSC fails
to exercise its duties, and, if necessary, back up MARO with forceful argu-
ments on behalf of the humanitarian norm justifying the intervention.
That this approach conflicts with the U.N. Charter’s provisions is not
in doubt, and, as a result, must be advanced prudently. As such, the
threshold conditions proposed below builds upon decades of efforts by
governments, scholars, and expert committees seeking to develop methods
to stop mass atrocities when the United Nations fails to act.468 Based upon
theless, the fact that several times as many civilians have been killed in atrocities as com-
pared to war related casualties is compelling.
467. See Edward M. Kennedy, International Humanitarian Assistance: Proposals for Ac-
tion, 12 VA. J. INT’L L. 299, 307 (1971-72); see also LEE FEINSTEIN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, DARFUR AND BEYOND: WHAT IS NEEDED TO PREVENT MASS ATROCITIES 22-23
(2007); FRANCK, supra note 352, at 155-62 (suggesting that the five permanent members of R
the UNSC agree not to use their veto in the event of humanitarian emergencies); WAXMAN,
supra note 146, at 5 (citing Task Force on the U.N., American Interests and UN Reform: R
Report of the Congressional Task Force on the United Nations, U.S. INST. PEACE 28 (2005),
www.usip.org/files/file/usip_un_report.pdf (suggesting creation of a U.N. rapid reaction
force)); U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, at 33 (Mar. 21, 2005) (urging consensus among
U.N. members regarding standards for intervention).
468. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 104, at 32-37; Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and R
Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHI-
CAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS, supra note 335, at 221-23; John Norton Moore, R
Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 24-25 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Reisman, supra note 233, at 195; R
Kuwali, supra note 224, at 30, 45; Lillich, supra note 226, at 347-51; Mohamed, supra note R
106, at 1323-1324; V.P. Nanda, The United States’ Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Im- R
pact on World Order—Part I, 43 DENV. L.J. 439, 475 (1966); Scheffer, supra note 19, at 133; R
Michael L. Burton, Note, Legalising the Sublegal: A Proposal for Codifying a Doctrine of
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 85 GEO. L.J. 417, 427 (1996); Gareth Evans, Speech to
the UN General Assembly in New York, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: The Need
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lessons from these works, the principle of necessity, and modern jus ad
bellum, the six conditions for the responsible application of MARO are:
(1) an objective threat assessment of atrocity crimes is conducted prior to
intervention, (2) the intervention is necessary to prevent or halt the atroci-
ties, (3) the scale and nature of the intervention is proportional to the
threat to civilians, (4) intervening states have coordinated with regional
actors and coalition partners, (5) the intervening states regularly update
the United Nations of the situation, and (6) the intervening states conduct
advanced planning for post-atrocity or jus post bellum contingency efforts
prior to the intervention. The following Sections describe how these condi-
tions—to be applied conjunctively—may be utilized.
A. Objective Threat of Atrocity Crimes
Experts agree that an initial consideration before using force to pre-
vent atrocity crimes is that the underlying atrocity be accurately assessed
and found to be immediate and of sufficient magnitude.469 This means that
there must be an objectively measurable atrocity crime of a certain charac-
ter and that it is presently occurring or will be committed imminently.
The magnitude of the human rights violation justifying intervention
must be limited to the most serious offenses. The commonly recognized
atrocity crimes—genocide, widespread war crimes, crimes against human-
ity, and ethnic cleansing—are the only appropriate crimes that would per-
mit outside intervention.470 These atrocities are well defined,471 and
limiting response actions to these crimes prevents the use of force for
lesser or pretextual reasons.472
469. See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 125, at 192-95 (requiring “serious violations of R
human rights or international humanitarian law.”); THE DANISH INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 192-93 (1999) (requiring
only serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law); Lillich, supra note
232, at 347-51 (including in his criteria for humanitarian intervention the immediacy of the R
human rights violation and the extent of the violation of human rights); Moore, supra note
468, at 24-25 (requiring an immediate threat of genocide or other widespread arbitrary depri- R
vation of human life in violation of international law); Scheffer, supra note 19, at 133 R
(describing appropriate resort to force for R2P purposes, which must include an accurately
identified atrocity of sufficient magnitude). Along the same lines, the U.K. requires that
there be an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. See also U.N. Secretary-General, Rep.
of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Con-
flict, 22, U.N. Doc. S/1999/957 (Sept. 8, 1999) [hereinafter Protection of Civilians Report]
(considering the scope of the atrocity crime, including the number of people harmed and the
nature of violations); ICISS REPORT, supra note 104, at 32-37, 53-55 (requiring just cause in R
the form of large scale ethnic cleansing or loss of life and the primary purpose of the inter-
vening state is to stop or prevent the atrocity); Robin Cook, U.K. Foreign Sec’y, Guiding
Humanitarian Intervention, Speech to the Am. Bar Ass’n, at 55 (July 19, 2000) [hereinafter
Secretary Cook Speech], available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/rp08-56.pdf.
470. Kuwali, supra note 224, at 30; see MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 6, annex A, at R
103.
471. See supra notes 414-420 and accompanying text. R
472. For example, U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989-90 were
based, in part, on the protection of democratic principles and the right of self-determination,
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The ability to measure the extent of atrocity crimes will be affected by
the capacity of early warning mechanisms.473 Some argue that the subjec-
tivity of assessing grave circumstances undermines the implementation of
an effective response strategy.474 But modern technologies, along with
well-tested observance and reporting mechanisms exercised by states,
NGOs, and media outlets have mooted this argument. Working together,
state governments and NGOs should be able to develop a coalition that
aims to shed light on facts on the ground—the power of witness.475
Another approach worth considering, but by no means required, is an
outside adjudicative body determining whether atrocity crimes are ongo-
ing prior to the authorization of unilateral MARO. Prior to the French
intervention in the Central African Republic in 1979, a Commission of
Inquiry made up of five African countries determined that serious human
rights violations had occurred.476 Similar apolitical bodies, such as the Af-
rican Court of Justice and Human Rights, the ICJ, or even a well respected
NGO, could be used to determine whether the threshold for intervention
has been met.477 Even if the subsequent intervention violates articles 2(4)
and 2(7) due to lack of U.N. support, it will gain legitimacy if an impartial
international organization finds that atrocities are occurring.
B. Intervention Is Necessary
Non-U.N. authorized MARO is deemed necessary when atrocity
crimes are reasonably certain to occur or are presently occurring and the
only way to safeguard civilians from slaughter is to use military force.478
Several conditions must be met prior to satisfying the necessity prong of
this threshold analysis, including that force be used as a last resort, the
UNSC has failed to act or its action is deemed infeasible, and the threat is
immediate requiring urgent action.
International order is governed by the principle that state disputes are
to be settled peacefully.479 This means that prior to using military force to
respond to atrocity crimes other methods—diplomatic, economic, multi-
IN ACTION 6 (2007) (citing ICISS REPORT, supra note 104). This demonstrates the need to R
limit unilateral MARO to only the most severe atrocity crimes, and does not include the
overthrow of elected governments, environmental disasters, or even widespread human
rights abuse, unless it results in a large-scale loss of life.
473. See GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24. R
474. Kuwali, supra note 224, at 29; see also Franck & Rodley, supra note 44, at 275. R
475. See supra note 422 and accompanying text. R
476. MURPHY, supra note 47, at 107-08. R
477. Kuwali, supra note 224, at 45. R
478. ILC Report, supra note 336, art. 25 (allowing unlawful acts to be “justified” when R
they are necessary to safeguard an essential state or international interest. However, the
wrongful act must be the only way to safeguard essential interests threatened by a grave and
imminent peril). See also Franck, supra note 468, at 221-23 (discussing that force may be R
necessary for humanitarian intervention); Nanda, supra note 468, at 475 (suggesting that R
there be no other recourse prior to humanitarian intervention).
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lateral—must be exhausted or deemed infeasible.480 This preserves the in-
tegrity of state sovereignty, allowing domestic authorities the opportunity
to gain control of an internal matter and meet their responsibilities as pro-
vided for in R2P.481 But if the state proves unwilling or unable to prevent
atrocities, either due to complicity in the crimes or lack of control, then
the concept of contingent sovereignty applies, and intervention may be
appropriate.
Additionally, all efforts must be made to secure UNSC authorization;
only when the Council fails to act—or its action is deemed infeasible—
should states take on unilateral MARO.482 This reaffirms the UNSC’s au-
thority over the lawful use of force, but also recognizes that inaction by the
Council does not mean civilians must be subject to slaughter. One com-
mentator suggests that states invoke article 34 of the Charter, which calls
for the UNSC to investigate a pending crisis and engage in prevention in a
timely manner.483 Additionally, regional organizations might take action
under article 53, or the General Assembly could become involved.484 If
these bodies are successfully engaged, then the intervention can be kept
within the broader purpose of the U.N. Charter—that the use of force be
applied only in the collective interest of states. Even if not adhering to the
black letter of the Charter, this approach is deferential to the rule of law.
Necessity also speaks to the immediacy of the threat. While the occur-
rence of an objective atrocity is an obvious trigger to intervention, the
480. ICISS REPORT, supra note 104, at 35-37 (requiring the exhaustion of nonmilitary R
options prior to military intervention to enforce R2P); Moore, supra note 468, at 24-25 (pre- R
scribing an exhaustion of diplomatic and other peaceful techniques for protecting the
threatened rights to the extent possible and consistent with protection of the threatened
rights); see also Protection of Civilians Report, supra note 469, at 22 (recommending that the R
exhaustion of peaceful efforts, and the inability of local authorities to enforce the law or their
unwillingness and complicity, be considered).
481. According to the 2005 Summit Report: (1) the state in question has primary re-
sponsibility to protect its citizens; (2) the international community should improve capacity-
building and assistance measures in states under pressure or risk, and (3) the international
community must react decisively to crises when states fail to do so. See Summit Report, supra
note 130, ¶¶138-39. R
482. See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 125, at 192-93 (discussing intervention only when R
the United Nations has failed to act); Franck, supra note 468, at 221-23; Moore, supra note R
468, at 24-25 (describing intervention only upon the unavailability of effective action by an R
international agency, regional organization, or the United Nations); Secretary Cook Speech,
supra note 469 (describing the preference to act under UNSC authority, but, if not feasible, R
then with a coalition of states). The following conditions were offered by Professor Jules
Lobel: (1) whether the situation is condemned by the UNSC as a threat to peace under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, (2) whether the UNSC is paralyzed by a veto and the
action is being taken by a regional organization that says it is “intervening to protect human
rights,” (3) the UNSC is silent or refuses to condemn the intervention, and (4) peaceful op-
tions have been exhausted. Jules Lobel, Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 19, 29-30 (2000) (pointing out that the weakness of this
approach is the failure to determine who decides whether a situation meets these criteria and
requires the use of force).
483. Kuwali, supra note 224, at 45-46. R
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threat of mass murder short of actual commission of atrocity crimes poses
a greater challenge. In these cases, “anticipatory MARO” should mirror
the Caroline test for anticipatory self-defense.485 Under that test, interven-
tion is justified in situations where the “necessity of self-defense [or, in this
author’s opinion, atrocity response] is instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”486
When early warning mechanisms are effective, it is possible to recog-
nize the preparation phase of atrocity crimes, where groups are made to
wear identifying symbols, death lists are made, victims are separated, seg-
regation and starvation occur, weapons are stockpiled, and militia are
trained.487 It is at this stage that humanitarian supplies should be gathered
and military forces should be organized, including advanced planning for
MARO. So long as the atrocity is imminent, then military intervention
should be authorized.
C. Proportionate Response
The character and scope of MARO will be circumscribed by the
human rights violation that instigated the action. The use of force, then,
must be proportional to the underlying crisis, cause minimal harm to civil-
ians, and, if possible, cause as little interference with state independence as
possible.488 As such, the proportionality of a MARO action must be
viewed on a case-by-case basis depending on the nature of the underlying
humanitarian crisis.
The use of force in jus ad bellum must be “necessary” (discussed
above) and “proportional.”489 Because we are contemplating unilateral
485. Letter From Daniel Webster to Henry Stephen Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in 1 THE PA-
PERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 58, 62 (Kenneth Earl Shewmaker ed., 1983)
[hereinafter Caroline Doctrine]. This standard arose out of the Canadian rebellion of 1837,
where British forces boarded aU.S. vessel—The Caroline—believed to be supporting rebel
troops, set it on fire, and sent it over Niagara Falls. U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster
objected, and the British agreed that the necessity giving rise to anticipatory self-defense
must be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliber-
ation.” Id. at 67.
486. Id.
487. Stanton, supra note 55, at 24-27 (describing the telltale signs of atrocity prepara- R
tion: the segregation of target populations, e.g. German Jews being required to wear distinc-
tive symbols and removed from their homes to ghettos and camps; and the use of various
media outlets—newspaper, radio, etc.—to propagate ethnic violence, e.g. RTLM radio in
Rwanda). Samantha Power describes many of the preparatory acts taken by governments
prior to carrying out atrocity crimes. POWER, supra note 38. These include compiling lists of R
targeted members of opposing ethnic groups as the Serbs did in Bosnia in 1992 and Hutu did
in Rwanda in 1994. Id. at 249, 333. Targeted groups are also forced to leave their homes and
cities, as evidenced in Cambodia in 1975 and as occurred with the Kurds in Iraq in 1982. See
id. at 88, 177. Additionally, men and women of the targeted ethnic groups are separated, as
witnessed in Srebrenica in 1995. See id. at 392.
488. Cf. Nanda, supra note 468, at 475 (urging limited duration and limited coercive R
measures).
489. See Caroline Doctrine, supra note 485. See also Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum R
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MARO without U.N. authorization, the action must be “for the shortest
possible period during the continuance of [the atrocity crimes], and strictly
confined within the narrowest limits imposed by [these crimes].”490 If the
planned MARO will result in a disproportionate loss of civilian life, or risk
escalating to a broader, deadlier conflict, then this element of the thresh-
old analysis will not be satisfied.
Some scholars place an emphasis on a limited impact on existing au-
thority structures in target states.491 In an ideal situation, the political in-
dependence of the target state could remain intact. But many situations
will require dissolution of the government, targeting regime elites who are
complicit or directly involved in atrocity crimes, or making arrests for fu-
ture prosecution.492 The extent of the violation of the target state’s politi-
cal independence will depend on how deep the nexus is between civilian
slaughter and government leaders. Additionally, military planners may
deem a mission infeasible if they are not able to incapacitate the target
state’s defense infrastructure.
D. Regional and Coalition Coordination
Nearly all commentators agree that if the United Nations fails to act
and states feel obliged to intervene to halt atrocity crimes, they should do
so with a coalition of states.493 This will generate a broader consensus and
added legitimacy for the action. Moreover, working with a coalition signals
that the intervention is for the right reasons and not purely out of an indi-
vidual state’s self-interest.
Regional actors must be encouraged to act even when the United Na-
tions has not authorized intervention, as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ko-
sovo. This is a second best to UNSC authorization. Five international
organizations—the United Nations, EU, AU, ECOWAS, and NATO—
have some capacity to engage in MARO.494 The AU and ECOWAS oper-
ate with the broadest legal flexibility under the African Union Constitu-
tive Act, but their forces need the most training, capacity building, and
logistical support.495 Conversely, NATO and the EU have demonstrated
their capacity for atrocity response in Kosovo and the DRC respectively,
but have traditional legal limits (for example, the UN Charter) on humani-
tarian intervention.496
Working with a coalition or in support of regional groups will alleviate
some international concerns that the United States is acting out of imperi-
alistic design. Domestically, it is critical for the United States to demon-
490. ILC Report, supra note 336, art. 25 and accompanying commentary. R
491. Moore, supra note 468, at 24-25. R
492. See, e.g., MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 6 at 78-80. R
493. KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 125, at 194-95; see also Secretary Cook Speech, supra R
note 469. R
494. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 85. R
495. Id. at 85-86.
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strate that it is sharing the responsibility and cost for these actions. U.S.
public opinion appears to oppose increased foreign intervention,497 which
most likely reflects domestic economic concerns and war fatigue following
Iraq and during the draw down in Afghanistan. As such, responsibility
sharing is also part of the administration’s comprehensive atrocity preven-
tion strategy.498
E. Intervening States’ Reports to the UNSC
Any time states engage in non-U.N. authorized MARO, the United
Nations (and any relevant regional organization) must be notified of the
action at an early stage and updated throughout the course of the inter-
vention. This is akin to the reporting requirement of states under article 51
self-defense measures. It will serve the purpose of promoting accountabil-
ity of intervening states, and it will reinforce U.N. primacy in matters of
international peace and security.499 Furthermore, this will likely motivate
the United Nations to issue statements or resolutions which provide gui-
dance to intervening states, express condemnation or support of the ac-
tion, inspire U.N. assistance, or other guiding instructions. In any case,
intervening states are legally bound to comply with any relevant UNSC
resolutions.500
F. Intervening States’ Jus Post Bellum Planning
States engaging in MARO must have a contingency plan for jus post
bellum—implementing the rule of law after the intervention has success-
fully halted the atrocity crime.501 Measures to consider are humanitarian
aid from government agencies, the United Nations, regional organizations,
NGOs, or other nonmilitary agencies; the possible introduction of U.N.
peacekeeping forces to prevent the outbreak of hostilities once the
MARO is complete; truth and reconciliation measures; domestic or inter-
national criminal proceedings for perpetrators of atrocity crimes; and rule
of law initiatives to develop a functioning political and legal system.
This element incorporates planning for a reasonable prospect of suc-
cess.502 If it appears impracticable to successfully halt the atrocity, or if
doing so would result in a much larger, and more catastrophic armed con-
flict (for example, intervention in China), then this prong is not satisfied.
497. Fred Backus, Poll: Americans Against U.S. Intervention in Syria, N. Korea, CBS
News (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57581989/poll-americans-
against-u.s-intervention-in-syria-n-korea/; Public Wary of Military Intervention in Libya:
Broad Concern that U.S. Military is Overcommitted (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.people-press
.org/2011/03/14/public-wary-of-military-intervention-in-libya/.
498. Presidential Directive, supra note 9. R
499. Protection of Civilians Report, supra note 469, at 22 (requiring that the UNSC have R
the ability to monitor the response).
500. Moore, supra note 468, at 24-25. R
501. See, e.g., Major Richard P. DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War Tradition:
Defining Jus Post Bellum, 186 MIL. L. REV. 116 (2004).
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In this sense, MARO that do not appear likely to succeed will probably
fail the proportionality prong of this threshold analysis as well.
MARO action is necessarily narrowly tailored to bring an end to
atrocity crimes.503 Still, in the court of public opinion, which plays a large
part in the viability of emerging norms, MARO success will not be mea-
sured in the short-term success of preventing or halting genocide or crimes
against humanity. The value of these operations will depend on their long-
term success at atrocity prevention and political stability.
Ultimately, the above six conditions must be applied as a whole. Ad-
hering to these conditions should add conceptual clarity to states’ response
to mass atrocities, and will garner widespread support for an emerging
norm; overcome criticism of unlawfulness and political pretext; enhance
the likelihood of mission success; and limit the frequency and scope of
interventions, thereby reinforcing the rule of law. These conditions pur-
posefully omit one factor that appears frequently in the literature: the
clean hands of the intervener.504 This concept means that the intervening
state should only act if it stands nothing to gain from the intervention. The
author does not discount the risk of states acting out of self-interest. This
is an historical inevitability, and something that persists today, as we see in
the way states jealously guard traditional concepts of sovereignty. Instead,
the above conditions implicitly limit selfish state acts by requiring inter-
veners to act only when the humanitarian crisis is demonstrable, to seek
U.N. authorization or other multilateral support, and to limit interference
with the target state’s political independence to the extent possible.
Rather, the “clean hands” element was omitted to reflect the paradigm
shift that started with R2P and continues with the development of
MARO—that the prevention and response to atrocity crimes is in the in-
terest of all nations.
G. MARO Threshold Applied to Syria
The situation in Syria provides a timely and complex example of how
the six threshold conditions can be applied to ongoing atrocities. The op-
portunity for swift intervention to prevent atrocities has long since passed.
As this article went to print, there had not yet been overt intervention, yet
thousands have perished both as a result of atrocity crimes and as casual-
ties to a non-international armed conflict.505 Nonetheless, as states learn
of Syria’s possible use of chemical weapons against its people and of prep-
arations for future mass killings506 there may be a greater impetus to
intervene.
503. See generally MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 6. R
504. Franck, supra note 468, at 221-23; Lillich, supra note 226, at 347-51. R
505. Turkey Claims Evidence of Syrian Chemical Weapons Use, BBC News (May 10,
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22484115 (citing the total number of
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The first condition, that there be objectively identifiable atrocity
crimes, was established shortly after the Assad regime began its brutal
crackdown on protesters and dissidents after the March 2011 uprising. In
July 2011, Amnesty International cited possible crimes against humanity
committed by Syria’s armed forces during a security crackdown. Specifi-
cally, Amnesty cited civilian deaths while in custody, torture and arbitrary
detention that occurred in May 2011 when the Syrian army and security
forces took action in the town of Tell Kalakh.507 The U.N. Human Rights
Council issued a report in June 2011 condemning the human rights viola-
tions committed by Syrian forces.508 The report relied on information
from human rights organizations and refugees fleeing Syria. Later in 2012,
increased access was available to both reporters and monitors, and the
results were overwhelming. It was finally confirmed that Syria was com-
mitting atrocities against its civilian population.509
The situation on the ground is now somewhat more complex. The op-
position is better organized and has allegedly committed crimes of its
own.510 As anticipated by MARO doctrine, multi-party dynamics in con-
flict situations should not deter an effective response. Lessons learned
from the situation in Bosnia in the 1990s should remind leaders that, even
when atrocities are allegedly committed by both sides in an internal armed
conflict, there is no legitimate reason not to act to prevent further civilian
slaughter.511 The same holds true in Syria, where the initial failure to re-
spond has permitted crimes against tens of thousands of civilians.512
Although the evidence against Assad’s regime is now strong, in the
early months of the popular uprising accurate reports of civilian deaths
were tentative due to limited access by media and other observers inside
Syria.513 This highlights the urgency of early reporting mechanisms that
utilize the latest technology and are shared between states, NGOs, and
media outlets. This way the commission of atrocity crimes, like those in
Syria, can be verified before the bodies begin piling up.
507. AMNESTY INT’L, CRACKDOWN IN SYRIA: TERROR IN TELL KALAKH, (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/mde240292011en_2.pdf.
508. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r on Human Rights [OHCHR], Preliminary report
of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/CRP.1 (June 14, 2011).
509. See sources cited supra note 54. R
510. Ian Black, Syrian Rebels Accused of War Crimes, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/17/syrian-rebels-accused-war-crimes.
511. POWER, supra note 38, at 284 (describing how the United States failed to take R
initial action in Bosnia in part out of concern that intervention would result in a Vietnam-like
quagmire because atrocities were being committed by all sides).
512. See Azmat Khan, Syria’s Shocking Civilian Death Toll, FRONTLINE (Sept. 14,
2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/battle-for-syria/syrias-
shocking-civilian-death-toll/.
513. Jennifer Preston, Seeking to Disrupt Protestors, Syria Cracks Down on Social Me-
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Having determined that mass atrocities are being committed in Syria,
the next step is to determine whether intervention is necessary. During the
first year of the crisis, the necessity of intervention fluctuated as the world
community discussed, but failed to implement, various response measures.
On the side of necessity, the inability of the UNSC to secure even
economic sanctions against Syria514 made it clear that there would be no
U.N.-sponsored resolution to the atrocities. Moreover, the moment Kofi
Annan’s six-point peace plan failed to take hold in 2012,515 it seemed that
a diplomatic solution was unattainable and that peaceful measures had
been exhausted. Expressing doubt about the success of diplomatic efforts,
UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, stated that, even though Kofi An-
nan’s plan was still the best hope for peace, “persistent divisions” in the
UN Security Council “have themselves become an obstacle to diplomacy,
making the work of any mediator vastly more difficult.”516
In spite of the apparent exhaustion of peaceful options, the immediate
need for outside intervention is less certain today. What was once a lop-
sided government crackdown on civilians has transformed into a full-
fledged non-international armed conflict.517 That the status may have
changed from government atrocities to a civil war does not, in and of itself,
preclude the necessity of outside intervention. If the Syrian regime contin-
ues to engage in atrocities, whether against civilians or widespread war
crimes against rebel forces, then the necessity condition is fulfilled. Simi-
larly, the use of chemical weapons, if they have in fact been employed,
represents a significant escalation in the Syrian regime’s criminal activity.
Such disregard for the laws of armed conflict and the well being of its
civilian population necessitates intervention to prevent further slaughter.
Assuming that intervention is necessary, the next requirement is that
the intervention be a proportionate response to ongoing atrocities. This
means using whatever force is required to halt the war crimes and crimes
against humanity being committed against dissidents, defectors, and politi-
cal prisoners inside Syria. Today, this could include targeted strikes on
Syria’s defense infrastructure and the apprehension or temporary safe pas-
sage of President Assad. Already, numerous states have called for the re-
moval of the embattled regime’s president.518
514. Neil MacFarquhar, Russia and China Block U.N. Action on Crisis in Syria, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/syria-homs-
death-toll-said-to-rise.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
515. But see Syria Crisis: Kofi Annan Quits as UN-Arab League Envoy, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19099676.
516. But see Syria Crisis: Kofi Annan Quits as UN-Arab League Envoy, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19099676.
517. Ben Hubbard, Syrian Rebels Seize Military Base, Munitions, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 20, 2012) http://bigstory.ap.org/article/britain-officially-recognizes-syrian-opposition.
518. Reena Ninan, Secretary Clinton Says Syrian President Assad ‘Must Go’, ABC
NEWS (Apr. 1, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/secretary-hillary-clinton-syrian-presi-
dent-assad/story?id=16049737#.ULRQTYVaOt8. Richard Spencer, Morsi Tells Iran That
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In order to halt atrocities and oust Assad, states can rely on a wide
range of tactics. As mentioned in Part I.D. above, disrupting supply lines,
launching cyber network attacks, and protecting internally displaced per-
sons may become necessary.519 Various military strategies, ranging from
securing limited areas with the intent of growing safe zones like “oil
spots,” to attacking and defeating leaders, might be called for depending
on the nature of the underlying atrocities.520 As the severity of the crimes
increase, so will the lawfulness of more intrusive and violent response
measures.
With a proportional response in mind, the fourth condition urges, but
does not require, that there be regional or coalition support for any
MARO action. This is the only prong of the threshold analysis that is not
mandatory but is nonetheless strongly advised in order to increase the le-
gitimacy and support for the operation. Obvious allies in the movement to
oust Assad and put an end to mass atrocities include Turkey,521 which is
experiencing the brunt of the refugee influx and the costs of the Syrian
crisis; the Arab League, which has already called for Assad to step
down522 and assisted in observer missions; and the United States, which
has been a vocal proponent at the UNSC of ending atrocities in Syria.
Other Western and Arab states have demonstrated support for the opposi-
tion coalition and, as a result, might provide assistance in an intervention
to halt ongoing crimes.
The fifth condition can be met if the intervening states provide regular
status updates of the intervention to the UNSC. This requires keeping the
UNSC abreast of new developments and adhering to possible limiting
UNSC resolutions.
The sixth condition, jus post bellum planning, will require a significant
degree of forethought regarding reconstructing the damage done during
the intervention and the preceding atrocities, political reform to prevent
the next Assad from grabbing unlimited power, and restitution to the vic-
tims of regime violence. Additionally, consideration must be given to re-
gional and global effects of intervening in Syria. For example, were states
to send forces into Damascus to oust Assad, this could possibly generate a
reaction from Iran that escalates the conflict and further destabilizes the
region.523 A similar analysis must be done with regard to Russia and
see Clinton: “Friends of Syria” Must Unite to Stop Russia, China “Blockading” Progress, CBS
NEWS (July 6, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57467452/clinton-friends-of-
syria-must-unite-to-stop-russia-china-blockading-progress/.
519. GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 84. R
520. MARO HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 20. R
521. Jonathon Burch, Turkey tells Syria’s Assad: Step Down, REUTERS(Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/22/us-syria-idUSL5E7MD0GZ20111122.
522. Syria’s Bashar al-Assad Should Go, says Arab League, BBC NEWS (July 23, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18950418.
523. Bassem Mroue, Iran Warns Against Attacking Syria, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 26,
2013), http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/01/26/iran_warns_against_attacking_syria
.html. Recent air strikes by Israel have raised concerns of the conflict spilling over into the
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China, who have sided with Assad’s regime. If pre-intervention planning
indicates that Iran’s threats are genuine, and that Russia would turn Syria
into a proxy war with the United States, then one must consider whether
post-conflict stability is attainable. This prong of the MARO threshold
analysis cannot be met if it is determined that a certain degree of stability
is not feasible following the intervention.
As this analysis demonstrates, the threshold for non-U.N. authorized
intervention under MARO doctrine is not easily met. Quite the opposite is
true. The complex situation in Syria shows that depending on the nature of
the conflict and the actions, or in this case inaction, of the international
community, the necessity of intervention may change over time. Currently,
although the conflict can appropriately be categorized as a non-interna-
tional armed conflict, Syria continues to disregard fundamental norms of
humanitarian and human rights law. Under these circumstances, the
threshold conditions for mass atrocity response operations have been met.
Far from allowing intervention for self-serving purposes, a careful applica-
tion of these threshold conditions will ensure that an emerging norm of
non-U.N. authorized atrocity response is applied responsibly and
effectively.
CONCLUSION
It is not clear that the law has evolved so much since the Charter was
drafted to permit a unilateral right to intervene without U.N. authoriza-
tion. Certainly the law has evolved with respect to antiquated notions of
sovereignty and even the ICJ has revealed the extent to which states
should take action to prevent genocide. Nonetheless, commentators and
most states are unwilling to take the final step and allow military interven-
tion when foreign civilians are at risk of large-scale slaughter. This must
change.
This Article endeavors to urge action by decision makers to utilize
whatever steps are necessary to prevent the next Cambodia or Rwanda.
This includes diplomatic, economic, and multilateral measures to dissuade
perpetrator states from committing mass atrocities. When these measures
fail, however, states must work together (or alone if necessary) to respond
to ongoing atrocities.
A principled application of the emerging MARO doctrine will high-
light the feasibility of limited atrocity response, as well as garner support
for a norm of protecting civilians through force. In order to address con-
cerns that this approach will serve as pretext for imperialist conquests,
states must engage in a discursive process that justifies unilateral MARO,
places the burden on perpetrator states to protect civilians, and shames the
inaction of others. Even while a customary or positive norm is developing,
states will be on notice that sovereignty is now synonymous with
responsibility.
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If the international community has learned anything from a long his-
tory of civilian massacres, it should be that there has never been a consist-
ently effective method to combat atrocity crimes. This is not an indictment
of the legal regime intended to protect basic human rights, or even of mul-
tilateral institutions responsible for maintaining peace and security. Each
has contributed significantly to world order, but each is limited in scope
and enforceability. If governments choose to seek comfort in the status
quo, the world will continue to fail to protect civilians from mass-murder-
ing regimes.
